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Summary 
 
This dissertation is an empirical investigation of the implications of the Indonesian oil 
palm sector for rural village communities located in Jambi province, on the island of 
Sumatra. It consists of three contributions to the scientific literature on land-use 
dynamics, economic development, and institutional change. 
In Chapter 1, I introduce the reader to the general topic of this research and give a brief 
overview of the development of the Indonesian oil palm sector, embedded in a historical 
context. I further outline how this study contributes to the existing literature and present 
the overall research objectives that will be addressed in the subsequent individual 
chapters. Specifically, this study examines land-use dynamics and attempts to explain 
land-use by various determinants at the village level (Chapter 2); it analyzes factors 
predicting the inclusion of village communities into the oil palm sector and evaluates the 
effects of market integration on economic development at the village level; finally, it 
explores the effects of market integration on village institutions (Chapter 4). 
In Chapter 2, I examine land-use dynamics at the village level of three major land-use 
systems: oil palm, rubber, and forest. The dynamics are analyzed by looking at land-use 
over time. In particular, I am interested in explaining village-level land-use in 2002 and 
2012 by several lagged land-use systems as well as socioeconomic and policy variables. 
Econometrically, a seemingly unrelated regression model is applied which 
accommodates a simultaneous estimation of various equations and accounts for the 
likely correlation of the land-use equations. I find that in spite of significant oil palm 
expansion, rubber remains the dominant crop. The data also suggest that oil palm has not 
been a major driver of deforestation but indirect effects are possible since oil palm 
expands in areas with ongoing logging activities. Regarding socioeconomic and policy 
factors, especially a relocation program seemed to be instrumental to the oil palm 
development. 
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In Chapter 3, I investigate the factors that determine the inclusion of villages into the oil 
palm sector through contract farming schemes and evaluate the impact of this form of 
market integration on economic development. Since the adoption of contract farming 
arrangements is conditional on an investor who visits a village to propose a contract, I 
investigate contract adoption as a two-step model. In particular, I employ a bivariate 
model with selection. This allows me to estimate the impact of various factors on the 
probability of contract adoption by accounting for the factors that predict the probability 
of investor visit. At the same time, I can account for a possible selection bias. To 
identify the model, a topographic measure is used as an instrument. I find evidence that, 
conditional on being visited by an investor, no access to electricity at the village level 
was the only significant factor predicting the adoption of contract farming schemes. 
Overall, it appears that, at the village level, contract farming schemes have not been 
entirely equally accessible; however, I do not find evidence that the rural poor were 
excluded either. 
Furthermore, to examine the effects of market integration on economic development at 
the village level I use village wealth that is based on shares of households owning 
various assets as a proxy. A recall dataset is used to analyze wealth effects over time, in 
particular between 2002 and 2012. The estimation exercise reveals that villages in which 
a contract was signed have a higher wealth index compared with villages in which no 
contract was adopted. Moreover, larger groups of farmers under contract are associated 
with higher levels of village wealth. I also find a time effect: the wealth index is higher 
in villages that signed a contract earlier than those which did so more recently. 
In Chapter 4, I explore the effects of increased formalized market integration on village 
institutions. Specifically, I want to understand how contract farming schemes, that 
introduce institutional changes towards more formalized and anonymous business 
relationships, affect generalized trust preferences at the village level. In using both 
survey data and behavioral data elicited through an experiment, I show that villages in 
which a contract was signed exhibit larger aggregated trust preferences, compared with 
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villages where no contract was signed. This is due likely to a change in village 
institutions induced by the emergence of formalized relationships between contract 
farmers and anonymous business actors. Further analysis at the individual level reveals 
that market integration of villages has a positive effect on generalized trust preferences 
for all village inhabitants, contracted or not. Possibly, apart from contract participation 
increased investments in transportation and market infrastructure also increased the 
integration of non-contract villagers into more formalized and anonymous markets. 
In Chapter 5, I conclude by summarizing the overall study and by stressing the key 
findings. I further present some derived policy recommendations and state the 
limitations of this study along with avenues for future research. 
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1.1 General background 
During the past decades large strides against poverty have been made, yet millions of 
rural people are still considered extremely poor and suffer from undernutrition. 
According to estimates provided by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), in 
2014, some 1 billion people still live in extreme poverty and more than 800 million 
people continue to go hungry. In addition, despite the fact that these problems exist 
across the world, there is a clear rural tendency. More than 70% of the people who are 
deemed poor live in rural areas in developing and transition countries and make a living 
in the agricultural sector as low-paid farm laborers or subsistence producers (FAO, 
2014).  
A widely adopted strategy to alleviate poverty has been through promoting economic 
development (Ravallion, 2001; Dollar and Kraay, 2002). Whereas at first, states largely 
controlled their agricultural sectors, in 1981, the World Bank released a report that 
argues in favor of economic adjustments towards privatization and market liberalization 
to accelerate economic development (World Bank, 1981). As a result, in many 
developing and transition countries, governments retreated from controlling agricultural 
production and marketing and cleared the way for private sector engagement (Swinnen 
and Maertens, 2007). Apart from the rationale to liberalize (agricultural) economies as a 
strategy to reduce poverty, several developments from the more recent past prompted 
governments to stimulate agricultural sectors and to continue their efforts to attract 
commercial agricultural investments. First, the increasing global demand for food, 
biofuels and natural resources that is largely driven by increasing global population and 
rising incomes is noteworthy. But also the period of high and volatile prices following 
the 2007-2008 commodity price boom and the global financial crisis reminded many 
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countries of the need to be more independent of imports to reduce vulnerability to price 
shocks (World Bank, 2011). 
Thus, various stimuli and global developments have induced immense agricultural 
investments worldwide. On the one hand, investments were made into improved 
technology (e.g. machinery, improved seed varieties) to intensify existing modes of 
agricultural production. On the other hand, governments invested considerably in the 
expansion of their agricultural activities. As an inevitable result, rural landscapes have 
been undergoing substantial transformations. Especially, cultivation of perennial crops, 
such as oil palm, sugarcane, but also plantation forests, has gained considerable 
importance (World Bank, 2011). According to official figures, globally, between 1990 
and 2012, perennial cropland drastically increased by one-third, from 119 million to 163 
million ha, respectively (FAOSTAT, 2014). At the same time, rural landscapes have been 
experiencing substantial reduction in forest area. In this regard, between 2000 and 2012, 
the world lost 230 million ha of its total forest cover. Especially, this trend is well 
pronounced in tropical regions. For example in Brazil, the historical leader of clearing 
forests, total forest cover loss amounted to some 35 million ha between 2000 and 2012. 
In comparison, total forest cover loss merely amounted to some 16 million ha in 
Indonesia. Nevertheless, the Southeast Asian country has recently become the country 
with the world’s highest deforestation rate (Hansen et al., 2013). Also in terms of 
clearing tropical primary forests Indonesia is leading, having an annual primary forest 
loss that is almost double that of Brazil by 2012 (0.84 million ha and 0.46 million ha, 
respectively; Margono et al., 2014). 
Whereas tropical rural landscapes have endured considerable forest cover losses, 
agricultural investments into these regions are increasing. In particular, the rapid 
expansion of the oil palm sector stands out. Palm oil, a vegetable oil extracted from the 
oil palm tree, today, is one of the most demanded commodities worldwide. Global palm 
oil production more than quadrupled from some 61 million to almost 260 million tons of 
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palm oil from 1990-2012 (Figure 1). More specifically, with a total production of 220 
million tons in 2012, Asia is by far the largest producer of palm oil fruits worldwide. 
Figure 1. Global palm oil fruit production between 1990-2012 
Source: FAOSTAT (2014) 
In contrast to Asia, both Africa’s and South America’s palm oil fruit production of 19 
million and 10 million tons in 2012, respectively, appears meager. Taking a look at 
global land-use figures reveals how the oil palm area has been expanding: from 1990-
2012, the global oil palm area tripled to almost 18 million ha (Figure 2). Already since 
the mid-1990s most of the global oil palm area is located in Asia where in 2012 some 12 
million ha were under oil palm cultivation. Compared with Africa (4.7 million ha) and 
South America (0.6 million ha), Asia can be considered a hotspot of global oil palm 
cultivation. However, whereas the application of lower-yielding varieties and higher 
production costs in Africa may explain the land-use disparity with Asia (Carrasco et al., 
2014), global demand for palm oil is voracious (Corley, 2009). Sooner or later the 
suitable land for oil palm production in Asia will be exploited and, consequently, agro-
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Figure 2. Global area under oil palm cultivation between 1990-2012 
 
Source: FAOSTAT (2014) 
The boom is due largely to several factors. First, palm oil is versatile: it may be used for 
edible purposes but also constitutes an important ingredient in cosmetic products and 
biofuel (Carter et al., 2007). Second, compared with other vegetable oils like rapeseed 
and soya, palm oil is cultivated more productively and production costs are lower (Carter 
et al., 2007; World Bank, 2011). The latter is partly a result of how oil palm is usually 
cultivated; large-scale monoculture plantations that fully integrate production and 
marketing of the crop allow the achievement of large economies of scale. Frequently, 
governments stimulated the involvement of smallholder farmers under contract farming 
arrangements (Swinnen and Maertens, 2007). This offered a viable strategy to alleviate 
poverty by promoting rural economic development. At the same time, the vertical 
integration (i.e. contract farming) introduced considerable institutional changes towards 
more formalized and anonymous business relationships. 
In sum, various drivers, such as a rationale to promote economic development, resilience 
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for natural commodities, induced public and private agricultural investments. At the 
same time, tropical landscapes are increasingly under pressure experiencing substantial 
reduction of forest and a vast expansion of agricultural land. In this regard, the oil palm 
expansion in Indonesia, which lies at the center of this dissertation, is definitely one of 
the most rapid as well as contested recent developments. In the following section, I will 
focus on the oil palm sector in Indonesia and will stress various aspects of it, embedded 
in a brief historical account that will be useful to keep in mind while reading the 
remainder of this thesis. 
 
1.2 The Indonesian frontier 
In 2008, Indonesia overtook Malaysia and became the world's number one producer of 
palm oil, reaching a total production of 113 million tons in 2012 (Figure 1). Besides that, 
also in terms of total land area under oil palm cultivation Indonesia is leading. From 
1990-2012, the oil palm area increased tenfold to reach some 6 million ha (Figure 2). 
This development caused tremendous transformations of tropical landscapes. In addition, 
many oil palm leases granted to private companies currently remain undeveloped 
(Carlson et al., 2013) which makes more transformations towards oil palm monoculture 
likely in the near future. In economic terms, the Indonesian oil palm sector has created an 
estimated 1.7 million to 3 million jobs (World Bank, 2011), and it has been reported to 
substantially contribute to increasing rural incomes (Barlow et al., 2003; Susila, 2004; 
Zen et al., 2005) and to considerable national benefits generated from export revenues 
(Sheil et al., 2009). 
Jointly, these land-use and economic outcomes are the result of governmental efforts to 
promote an emerging sector. Whereas production and marketing of palm oil was directly 
controlled by the state at first during the early 1980s, in subsequent years the government 
increasingly incentivized the engagement of selected private agro-companies by 
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providing access to land and credits at concessionary interest rates (Larson, 1996; 
McCarthy, 2010). 
During these years the development of the oil palm sector went hand in hand with 
another policy objective. Through the relocation of people from densely populated areas 
(e.g. Java) to regions of land abundance (i.e. Sumatra, Kalimantan) the government 
intended to stimulate the development of Indonesia's outer islands (Budidarsono et al., 
2013). The so-called transmigration schemes provided a readily disciplined labor force to 
meet the increasing demand for plantation and factory workers (McCarthy, 2010). On the 
other hand, by involving these so-called transmigrants in palm oil production the 
government could work towards achieving its population redistribution policy. 
In 1998, after the fall of Suharto’s New Order regime the new government further 
stimulated the oil palm sector, but with a different approach: the government retreated for 
the most part and approved reforms to liberalize markets that promoted a substantial 
influx of private agro-companies (Larson, 1996; McCarthy, 2010). Official figures 
confirm this trend, from 2000-2012 the number of operational large-scale oil palm 
plantations more than doubled from some 700 to about 1500 estates (Ministry of 
Agriculture, 2014). 
In addition to opening agricultural sectors for private companies, the emerging oil palm 
sector was instrumental for the promotion of rural socioeconomic development through 
involving smallholder farmers (Zen et al., 2005). In doing so, the government relied on 
past experiences from Malaysia during the 1970s and introduced a joint venture scheme 
between private companies and cohorts of smallholder farmers (Feintrenie et al., 2010a). 
This scheme that is often referred to as Nucleus Estates Scheme and Smallholders (NES) 
usually entails a plantation that is equipped with a processing factory at the center and 
surrounding estate plantations. In the outer circle smallholdings are located for the 
farmers who participate in contract farming schemes. These outgrower schemes are in 
proximity to the center to guarantee that the fresh fruit bunches (FFB) can be processed 
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before they perish; usually this starts 48 hours after these are harvested (McCarthy, 
2010). 
Since the advent of oil palm, different forms of the NES schemes have evolved in 
Indonesia. At first, during the 1980s and early 1990s, private companies were required to 
develop NES schemes by incorporating smallholder farmers in outgrower schemes in 
exchange for access to land and capital. Later, a process of decentralization shifted 
political and budgetary responsibilities down to the district and village level. This 
allowed companies to engage in community-company ‘partnerships’ and more directly 
negotiate with groups of farmers or farmer cooperatives about available communal land 
to be transformed into oil palm plantations (Feintrenie et al., 2010a; McCarthy et al., 
2012). Generally, the institutional foundation of the relationship between private 
companies and smallholder farmers has constituted formal contracts. On the one hand, 
contract farming provided a viable opportunity for farmers to overcome the barriers 
associated with oil palm cultivation (e.g. high initial investment costs, knowledge 
intensive production process, and limited access to input and output markets). On the 
other hand, contracts guaranteed a continuous supply of FFB allowing processing mills 
to operate at optimal levels. Whereas initially smallholder farmers were largely supported 
and dependent on the provision of crucial services, since the late 1990s a growing 
number of independent smallholder farmers have emerged. In figures, from 2000-2012, 
Indonesian smallholder farmers considerably increased their share of land under oil palm 
cultivation from 0.24 to 0.38. In contrast, for the same period the share of oil palm land 
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 Unfortunately, these figures do not distinguish between dependent and independent smallholder farmers. 
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1.3 Challenges and opportunities 
The tremendous agricultural investments that were made into the Indonesian oil palm 
sector pose both challenges and opportunities for the environment and smallholder 
farmers alike. As mentioned, the development of the oil palm sector through opening 
markets and allowing private companies to enter the industry resulted in substantial 
economic benefits for Indonesia as a whole. But also, at the local level the continuous 
integration of smallholder farmers in large-scale plantations improved rural livelihoods 
(Barlow et al., 2003; Susila, 2004; Zen et al., 2005, Sheil et al., 2009). 
However, major challenges evolved at the same time. For example, through agricultural 
investments private companies have been extensively involved in commercial 
acquisitions of ‘non-private’ lands. Due to unclear land rights many incidents have been 
reported on the exploitation and dispossession of rural communities that lead to (yet 
unresolved) land conflicts (Wakker, 2005; Colchester et al., 2006; Marti, 2008; Borras 
and Franco, 2010). Furthermore, in the wake of decentralization, district officials who 
have been largely involved in issuing planting permits sometimes abuse their position of 
authority to benefit personally (Marti, 2008). Moreover, the contractual relationship 
between smallholder farmers and private companies has also frequently been afflicted 
with conflict. Especially, in ‘decentralized-localized community-based’ negotiations, 
contractual arrangements have not always been transparent and lacking free, prior and 
informed consent (Rist et al., 2010, McCarthy et al., 2012). 
The involvement of private companies and smallholder farmers in the Indonesian oil 
palm sector has induced tremendous changes in rural landscapes towards oil palm 
monoculture. As mentioned, at the same time the forest cover is decreasing at increasing 
rates (Hansen et al., 2013). Often the expansion of oil palm is held responsible for the 
observed high deforestation rates in the tropics (Curran et al., 2004; Carlson et al., 2012; 
Margono et al., 2012; Margono et al., 2014) and other negative environmental/ecological 
consequences, such as biodiversity loss (Fitzherbert et al., 2008; Koh and Wilcove, 2008; 
Wilcove and Koh, 2010; Wilcove et al., 2013; Barnes et al., 2014), loss of carbon stocks 
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and peat degradation (Koh et al., 2011; Carlson et al., 2013), forest fires and thus 
increased greenhouse gas emissions (Dennis et al., 2005), and water pollution and soil 
erosion (Obidzinski, et al., 2013). 
 
1.4 Problem statement and research objectives 
In the previous section, I stressed some general opportunities and challenges associated 
with the emerging oil palm sector in Indonesia. In what follows, I will more specifically 
address current research gaps and indicate the contribution of this dissertation. 
Large-scale agricultural investments have caused tremendous transformations of tropical 
landscapes where land-use changes towards monoculture oil palm have often been 
associated with detrimental effects on tropical forests. In the general deforestation 
literature, the primary goal has usually been to quantify forest cover losses, deforestation 
rates and infer the environmental consequences associated with the observed trends (see 
for example DeFries et al., 2002; Hansen et al., 2010; Hansen et al., 2013). Conducting 
analyses at large scales (i.e. national but also global) require an appropriate data 
collection method. Therefore, global analyses of land-use changes are usually based on 
remotely sensed data recorded for various periods of time. In doing so, it has been of 
marginal importance to actually identify the drivers of land-use change. In spite of a 
growing strand of literature that combines remote sensing data with survey data to 
identify drivers of land-use change (Muller and Zeller, 2002; Caviglia-Harris and Harris, 
2008, De Souza Soler and Verburg, 2010), the literature remains scant. 
In particular within the oil palm context, the related literature has often presented land-
use maps that accurately outline current and past land-use trajectories (Curran et al., 
2004; Carlson et al., 2012; Carlson et al., 2013). But little emphasis has been placed on 
the drivers that determine these dynamics, although these can be manifold (Lambin et al., 
2003). For example, land-use change may be related to (past) socioeconomic conditions 
in the area but also government policies may play a decisive role. Focusing on the drivers 
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of land-use change could help adjust policies that aim to avoid undesirable outcomes. In 
addition, the literature either adopts a general perspective on the oil palm expansion or 
specifically focuses on agricultural industries (Carlson et al., 2012). In different words, 
the impact local communities may have on inducing land-use changes and transforming 
tropical landscapes has largely been neglected. The urgency to address this gap in 
literature is rising considering the increasing importance of smallholder farmers within 
the Indonesian oil palm sector. 
The emergence of an oil palm sector in Indonesia has, as mentioned, affected millions of 
rural livelihoods. However, despite the fact that private oil palm companies and the 
involvement of smallholder farmers under contract farming schemes have been shaping 
economic outcomes already for more than the past three decades, the empirical evidence 
remains scarce and mixed. For example, authors have pointed out that, in addition to the 
mentioned negative social implication (i.e. land and contractual conflicts), contract 
farming arrangements have not equally been accessible to all farmers (McCarthy, 2010). 
Another study concludes that richer contracted smallholders tend to benefit considerably 
more compared to their poorer fellow smallholders (Cahyadi and Waibel, 2013). On the 
other hand, oil palm cultivation has contributed to increased incomes and higher returns 
to land and labor (Feintrenie et al., 2010; Rist et al., 2010; Cahyadi and Waibel, 2013). 
Overall, this strand of literature examines socioeconomic effects for rural farming 
households. Considering, however, that the emergence of the oil palm sector induced 
investments into transportation and market infrastructure (Larson, 1996), broader 
development implications for local communities have largely been neglected. In addition, 
research has mainly relied on case study and descriptive analyses, restricting broader 
inferences and thus also limiting the formulation of sound policies. 
Moreover, focusing on local communities rather than households allows the adoption of 
a broader perspective on the inclusion into the oil palm sector. To date, studies have 
mainly focused on households’ decisions to adopt oil palm contracts within village 
communities (see for example McCarthy, 2010; Cahyadi and Waibel, 2013). In 
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particular, in the oil palm sector private investors have targeted entire village 
communities. In addition, the decision to adopt or reject a contract offer proposed by an 
investor is usually a group outcome preceding negotiations that took place at the village 
or farmer cooperative level (McCarthy and Cramb, 2009). To the best of our knowledge, 
an empirical investigation on the factors that determine contract adoption across villages 
is missing in the literature.  
Apart from visible effects on land-use and economic development, the emergence of the 
Indonesian oil palm sector increasingly integrated rural villages into formalized markets 
and thus also affected more intangible aspects of village life; specifically, village 
institutions. In detail, village communities were increasingly integrated into formalized 
markets through contract farming arrangements (Swinnen and Maertens, 2007). A small 
but growing strand of literature examines the relationship between such institutional 
changes (i.e. formalizing institutions) and informal institutions, such as trust. The 
empirical evidence, however, remains scarce and also mixed. Whereas the majority of 
the findings suggest that formalized institutions, such as formal market integration, has a 
positive effect on trust levels (Berggren and Jordahl, 2006; Fischer, 2008, Henrich et al., 
2010; Meijerink et al., 2014), other scholars report lowered trust levels (Siziba and Bulte, 
2012). Most of the mentioned studies base their results on cross-country analysis and, in 
addition, measure trust preferences with survey questions. However, it has been argued 
that survey questions, as used in the World Value Survey, are often ill-suited to actually 
measure trust (Glaeser et al., 2000). Thus, more research is required to contribute to the 
existing empirical literature investigating the link between market integration and trust 
by applying measures of trust that go beyond simple survey questions. 
Taken together, in this dissertation I study the implications of a specific emerging 
agricultural sector within three different, yet related, domains of a village community. In 
more detail, I empirically investigate the effects of the Indonesian oil palm sector on 
land-use dynamics, economic development, and institutional change. Rural areas in the 
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province of Jambi were chosen as the study location because Jambi represents a tropical 
frontier of transformations towards oil palm plantations (Faust et al., 2013).
2
  
In addition, I want to stress that the village is the unit of analysis in the overall study. In 
contrast to more disaggregated and conventional analyses, say, at the individual level, the 
village level allows for the examination of broader implications on land-use dynamics, 
economic development, and institutional change. Conducting the analysis at the village 
level allows me to examine land-use dynamics by taking wider spatial areas into 
consideration. In addition, I can evaluate broader socioeconomic and institutional 
implications for entire village communities. In particular for the oil palm sector in our 
study region a village-level analysis provides a natural perspective: rather than 
individuals, oil palm investors targeted entire villages for the inclusion into the oil palm 
sector. Furthermore, in case a contract was signed in a village, the inclusion into the oil 
palm sector induced the transformation of many village aspects (i.e. village organization, 
infrastructure, institutions) likely affecting all village inhabitants, contracted or not. 
Finally, with the adoption of a village-level perspective I intend to provide an 
unconventional look that could support policy-makers in the formulation of 
comprehensive policies. 
I formulate the following research objectives: 
1. Examining land-use dynamics and explaining land-use by various determinants 
(i.e. socioeconomic and policy). 
2. Analyzing factors predicting the inclusion into the oil palm sector and evaluating 
the effects of market integration on economic development. 
3. Exploring the effects of market integration on village institutions (i.e. generalized 
trust). 
                                                          
2
 This study is part of a collaborative research center (CRC) which focuses on ecological and 
socioeconomic functions of tropical lowland rainforest transformation systems. Thus, not only oil palm as 
a major transformation system lies at the core of the overall research center but also rubber plantations and 
rubber agroforestry. Please refer to Faust et al. (2013) for a detailed description of the study area and 
further information on the objectives of the CRC. 
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To address the research objectives, I make use of both survey and behavioral data that 
were collected through a structured questionnaire and an economic experiment, 
respectively. For details on the village questionnaire please refer to B1 in the Appendix. 
The behavioral data were elicited through an experimental game. A total of 902 
respondents, who were selected on a random basis prior to participation, participated in 
the experiment. All respondents also participated in a short individual survey after the 
experiment (B2 in the Appendix).  
Figure 3. Map of Jambi province with sample villages 
 
The data are collected in a total of 98 villages in Jambi province (Figure 3). Regarding 
the general sampling strategy, I purposively selected five districts in the lowlands of 
Jambi province. These districts, namely Muaro Jambi, Batang Hari, Sarolangun, Tebo, 
and Bungo, have largely been affected by agricultural investment and, thus, are subject to 
major land-use changes. On a random basis I further selected 25 sub-districts, five per 
district. For all 25 sub-districts I compiled complete lists of villages using data from the 
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Indonesian national village census (PODES). From these lists, I randomly sampled four 
villages per sub-district, resulting in a total of 100 villages. However, due to logistical 
problems, two of these villages could not be reached, leaving us with a total sample of 98 
villages for this study.
3
 The data collection took place between September and December 
2012. 
 
1.5 Dissertation outline 
This study is organized as follows. The above formulated research objectives are 
individually addressed in the subsequent chapters. Thus, Chapter 2, which addresses 
research objective one, examines land-use dynamics and analyzes village-level factors 
that are associated with observed land-use. Specifically, I analyze land-use dynamics of 
three major land-use systems: oil palm, rubber, and forest. The dynamics are analyzed by 
looking at land-use over time. In particular, I explain village-level land-use in 2002 and 
2012 by several lagged land-use systems as well as socioeconomic and policy variables. 
Econometrically, a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model is applied which 
accommodates a simultaneous estimation of various equations and accounts for the likely 
correlation of the land-use equations. 
In Chapter 3, which addresses research objective two, I investigate the factors that 
determine the inclusion of villages into the oil palm sector through contract farming 
schemes and evaluate the impact of this form of market integration on economic 
development. Since the adoption of contract farming arrangements is conditional on an 
investor who visits a village to propose a contract, I investigate contract adoption at the 
village level as a two-step model. In particular, I employ a bivariate model with 
selection. Furthermore, to examine the effects of market integration on economic 
development at the village level I use a wealth index (WI) that is based on shares of 
                                                          
3
 Further details on the sampling strategy and a detailed list of the selected villages can be found in Faust et 
al. (2013). Note that the sampling framework was jointly established with other sub-projects within the 
CRC. 
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households owning various assets as a proxy. A recall dataset is used to analyze wealth 
effects over time, in particular between 2002 and 2012. 
In Chapter 4, I explore the effects of market integration on village institutions. 
Specifically, I want to understand how contract farming schemes, that introduce 
institutional changes towards more formalized and anonymous business relationships, 
affect generalized trust preferences at the village level. To do so, I make use of both 
survey data and behavioral data elicited through a behavioral experiment. I further probe 
generalized trust differences between contract participants and non-contract participants 
who live in the same village. 
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes by summarizing the overall study and presenting the key 
findings. I further derive policy recommendations and state the limitations of this study 
jointly with suggesting avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Land-use Dynamics: 
The Role of Policies and Socioeconomic Factors 
 
Abstract. We investigate land-use dynamics in Jambi, Sumatra, one of the hotspots of 
Indonesia’s recent oil palm boom. Data from a structured village survey are used to 
analyze the role of socioeconomic and policy factors. Oil palm is partly grown on large 
plantations, but smallholders are also involved to a significant extent. We find that, in 
spite of considerable oil palm expansion, rubber remains the dominant crop. Most of the 
oil palm growth takes place on previous fallow and rubber land. Oil palm has not been a 
major driver of deforestation. Much of the forest in Jambi was cleared more than 20 
years ago, and rubber was an established cash crop long before the oil palm boom 
started. However, oil palm growth occurs in locations with ongoing logging activities, so 
indirect effects on deforestation are possible. The Indonesian government’s 
transmigration program of the 1980s and 1990s was instrumental for the start and spread 
of oil palm in Jambi. Some autochthonous villages have adopted oil palm, but adoption 




Recently, tropical lowland regions in many parts of the world have experienced major 
land-use changes. The forest area declined significantly, while the area used for 
agricultural production increased. In Southeast Asia in particular, the land under oil palm 
was expanded considerably. In Indonesia, which has been the largest palm oil producer 
worldwide since 2008, the oil palm area increased from 0.7 million ha in 1990 to 6.5 
million ha in 2012 (FAOSTAT, 2014). Globally, the oil palm expansion is driven by 
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rising demand for oil palm products for human and livestock consumption, as ingredients 
in the cosmetics industry, and to some extent also for biofuel (McCarthy, 2010). While 
oil palm has caused an economic boom in the producing regions, it has also attracted 
criticism on environmental and social grounds. Oil palm expansion is often held 
responsible for deforestation, biodiversity loss, increased greenhouse gas emissions, and 
conflicts over land rights between oil palm companies and local communities (Curran et 
al., 2004; Fitzherbert et al., 2008; Koh and Wilcove, 2008; Wilcove and Koh, 2010; Koh 
et al., 2011; Wicke et al., 2011; Carlson et al., 2012; Margono et al., 2012; Obidzinski et 
al., 2013; Dewi et al., 2013; Wheeler et al., 2013; Barnes et al., 2014). However, oil palm 
is not only grown on large-scale plantations. Local smallholder farmers are increasingly 
involved as well (Feintrenie et al., 2010a; Feintrenie et al., 2010b; Rist et al., 2010). In 
Indonesia, the active involvement of smallholder farmers in oil palm cultivation is part of 
an official government policy (Larson, 1996). 
What are the drivers of the oil palm expansion and related other land-use changes at the 
local level? Why are the trends more pronounced in certain locations than in others? 
Addressing such questions could help adjust policies aimed at avoiding undesirable 
outcomes, but related research is scant (Nesheim et al., 2014). Several studies have 
analyzed land-use changes in oil palm hotspots using satellite images (Hansen et al., 
2009; Koh et al., 2011; Carlson et al., 2012; Margono et al., 2012). However, while 
satellite images for different points in time provide reliable information about the types 
of land-use changes, they cannot explain why these changes occurred. In other words, the 
socioeconomic and policy drivers remain unclear. Regional policies in particular are 
expected to play an important role for land-use changes. In Indonesia, for instance, the 
government has implemented the so-called transmigration program since the 1980s in 
which people from Java were relocated to Sumatra and other less densely populated 
islands and supported in oil palm cultivation and other economic activities (Larson, 
1996; Fearnside, 1997; Levang, 1997). 
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In this chapter, we address this knowledge gap and analyze the types and determinants of 
land-use changes in Indonesia. The concrete study region is the province of Jambi on the 
island of Sumatra, where the expansion of oil palm has been very rapid over the last 30 
years. Other important land-use systems in Jambi include rubber and forest. We use data 
from a survey of randomly selected villages to explain land-use at a certain point in time 
through land-use in previous time periods and a set of socioeconomic and policy factors. 
We account for likely correlation between different land-use equations by using a SUR 
approach. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides some 
background of Jambi and the Indonesian government’s transmigration program. After 
that, the village survey and the statistical approach are described, before the estimation 
results are presented and discussed. The last section concludes. 
 
2.2 Background 
Land-use in Jambi province 
Located in central Sumatra, the province of Jambi has increasingly become a hotspot of 
oil palm cultivation during recent decades. The area under oil palm in Jambi almost 
quadrupled from 150,000 ha in 1996 to 550,000 ha in 2011 (Figure 4; BPS, 2012). 
During the same period, the area under rubber increased by only 27%, from 510,000 to 
650,000 ha. Despite this rapid expansion of oil palm, rubber remains the dominant crop 
in Jambi. We also observe a considerable increase in fallow land. Fallow land is locally 
often referred to as ‘sleeping land’, because households and communities keep this land 
with the intention of some future use. Fallow land is either over-logged forest or 
unproductive plantation land. Paddy cultivation is only observed in some pockets of 
Jambi with a declining trend. Primary forest land declined considerably over the last 
decades while the land for agricultural use expanded (Margono et al., 2012; Villamor et 
al., 2014). While the mountainous regions in southwestern Jambi still hold large natural 
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forests, the remaining forest in the lowlands is small and nowadays largely confined to 
two national parks and a protected area. In addition, villages in the lowlands have 
shrinking patches of secondary forest at various levels of degradation. 
Figure 4. Land-use change in Jambi province between 1990-2012 
 
Notes: The left-hand Y-axis refers to rubber, oil palm, paddy and fallow land; the right-hand Y-
axis refers to primary forest; source: Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS, 2012); Margono et al. (2012). 
 
Transmigration program 
We expect that the government’s transmigration program played an important role in 
shaping land-use changes in Jambi. As part of this program, families from Java’s densely 
populated areas were relocated on a voluntary basis to the so-called ‘Outer Islands’ 
Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Papua. Apart from a spatial-political rationale of Suharto’s 
New Order Regime in achieving unity across the various ethnicities (Elmhirst, 1999), the 
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development in rural areas. At the beginning of the program, in the early-1980s, 
transmigrants were allocated rice fields in their new homes mainly for subsistence 
farming. But relatively soon, transmigrants also received government support to cultivate 
rubber as a cash crop (Levang, 1997). From the late-1980s, the Indonesian government 
changed the focus and started to develop the oil palm sector. This was also the time when 
the first ‘oil palm transmigrants’ arrived in Jambi through fully government-sponsored 
schemes. These oil palm transmigrants were placed into newly established settlements 
next to large government-managed oil palm estates. Participants were allocated a piece of 
oil palm land (usually 2-3 ha per family) at the periphery – the plasma – of the estate. 
Likewise, agricultural inputs and extension services were provided by the government 
through a loan system (Fearnside, 1997). After loan repayment, transmigrant families 
could obtain a formal title for their piece of land (Murdiyarso et al., 2002). At the core of 
the plantation area – the inti – an oil palm mill was established, allowing the processing 
of the FFB within a short period after harvest. Such inti-plasma systems are often 
referred to NES schemes. Similar NES schemes for oil palm were soon also established 
with the involvement of private companies under strict contractual conditions. In 
exchange for land concessions and access to subsidized capital provided by the 
government, private companies had to guarantee the involvement of smallholder 
transmigrants, and sometimes also autochthonous communities. However, autochthonous 
communities started to be involved in oil palm schemes significantly later. For many of 
them, rubber is still the most important crop. 
The NES schemes that were established in the 1980s and 1990s largely remained in place 
until now, although the overall conditions have changed. Due to the large costs and the 
fall of the Suharto Regime in 1998, the government gradually backed out. Today, the oil 
palm sector in Jambi is dominated by private companies and smallholder farmers. After 
1999, the post-Suharto government implemented a decentralization process, shifting 
decision-making power to local authorities. Companies that wish to establish new oil 
palm plantations now have to negotiate directly with district governments and local 
communities over access to land (Larson, 1996; McCarthy, 2010). Such contracts are 
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often similar to NES schemes, because communities that provide part of their land for 
plantation establishment may request loans and other support from companies for their 
own oil palm cultivation. However, most autochthonous communities do not hold 
formally recognized titles for their land (Barkmann et al., 2010). Hence, conflicts over 
land rights and contractual details are commonplace. In this respect, transmigrants who 
received a formally recognized land title after loan repayment have a clear advantage 
over the autochthonous population. Autochthonous people can also apply for formal land 
titles, but the administrative procedure is costly and time-consuming (Thorburn, 2004). 
In addition to the contracts, an increasing number of smallholders have recently started to 
cultivate oil palm independently. In some cases, these are farmers whose initial contracts 
expired. Other independent oil palm growers never had a contract, but could access the 
required capital and knowledge through other channels. In our analysis, we are 
particularly interested to analyze recent land-use changes and possible differences 
between migrants and autochthonous people. 
 
2.3 Materials and methods 
Village survey 
We carried out a village survey in the lowland regions of Jambi province that have been 
most affected by land-use changes over the last few decades. The five major lowland 
districts in Jambi are Muaro Jambi, Batang Hari, Sarolangun, Tebo, and Bungo. In each 
of these five districts, five sub-districts were randomly selected for the survey. For all 
these 25 sub-districts we compiled complete lists of villages using data from PODES. 
From these lists, we randomly sampled four villages in each sub-district, resulting in a 
total of 100 villages. Due to logistical problems, two of these villages could not be 
reached; the other 98 villages were visited for detailed data collection through interviews 
with the village leadership. The locations of these 98 sample villages are shown in the 
map in Figure 3. 
Chapter 2: Land-use Dynamics: The Role of Policies and Socioeconomic Factors 22 
Data collection took place from September to December 2012. A structured 
questionnaire was designed for this purpose. Interviews were carried out in the local 
language by enumerators from Jambi University. These enumerators were trained 
intensively and supervised in the field by the researchers. Before visiting the villages, we 
made appointments with the village head, explaining the purpose of the study and asking 
for cooperation. We organized group interviews with several village representatives. All 
village heads agreed to participate in the group interviews. In addition, other village 
officials, such as the village secretary, village hamlet leaders, and elderly villagers were 
invited to participate. Usually, the group interviews were organized in the house of the 
village head or his/her office and lasted for three to four hours in each village. In most 
villages, statistical data about current and past population structures, land use, land titles, 
and related details are kept as hard copy or digital files, which facilitated the process of 
filling in the questionnaire considerably. 
The survey data collected include a breakdown of the total village area by land-use 
systems. The village area comprises the land that village households use individually as 
well as communal areas and land leased out to companies. The three major land-use 
systems in Jambi’s lowlands are rubber, oil palm, and (secondary) forest. Furthermore, 
villages have varying areas of fallow land and to a lesser degree also cultivate paddy. For 
rubber in particular, different production intensities are observed, ranging from extensive 
agroforestry systems (sometimes referred to as ‘jungle rubber’) to intensively cultivated 
rubber plantations. As boundaries are fluid, we do not differentiate between production 
intensities in the main part of the analysis. However, we test the robustness of the results 
by further disaggregating rubber systems in supplementary estimates.
4
 
                                                          
4
 In the village questionnaire, we made the distinction between perkebunan karet (rubber monoculture) and 
hutan karet (jungle rubber/rubber agroforest). Yet we realized that the definitions are not uniform. In 
several villages, the term hutan karet was also used when only a few fruit trees had been planted into a 
rubber monoculture plantation. This might potentially bias the results of the disaggregated analysis. 
Another concern may be related to the distinction between forest and rubber agroforest. Ekadinata and 
Vincent (2011) noted that it is hard to distinguish complex rubber agroforests from secondary forests in 
satellite images. This problem is less relevant in our context, because we use people’s responses from the 
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In the group interviews, we asked for the land-use details in all villages as well as for 
village socioeconomic data, such as population structure, infrastructure conditions, and 
types of institutions. Furthermore, we asked the group of respondents for estimates on the 
share of village households owning certain assets and using particular technologies. All 
variables were captured for 2012, representing the status quo at the time of the 
interviews. Moreover, we asked the same questions also for 2002 and 1992, thus 
covering changes over a period of 20 years. The data for 2002 and 1992 were recalled by 
the villagers, which may potentially lead to lower data accuracy. However, for many of 
the variables data were available from statistical records kept at the village level. For 
other variables, group discussions proved to be very useful, as collective memories are 
often better than individual ones. While some measurement error is possible, we are 
confident that the data quality is sufficient to reveal important trends. These data are used 
in the statistical analysis as explained below. 
 
Modeling land-use dynamics 
We want to understand how land-use in the lowlands of Jambi changed during the last 20 
years and what factors contributed to these changes. To model land-use dynamics, we 
specified the following system of equations: 
𝑂𝑃𝑣𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽12012𝑣 + 𝛾1
′𝐿𝑈𝑣𝑡−10 + 𝛿1𝐿𝑣𝑡 + 𝜌1
′ 𝑆𝑣𝑡−10 + 1𝑣 + 𝜇1𝑣𝑡,  (1) 
𝑅𝑈𝑣𝑡 = 𝛼2 + 𝛽22012𝑣 + 𝛾2
′ 𝐿𝑈𝑣𝑡−10 + 𝛿2𝐿𝑣𝑡 + 𝜌2
′ 𝑆𝑣𝑡−10 + 2𝑣 + 𝜇2𝑣𝑡  (2) 
𝐹𝑂𝑣𝑡 = 𝛼3 + 𝛽32012𝑣 + 𝛾3
′ 𝐿𝑈𝑣𝑡−10 + 𝛿3𝐿𝑣𝑡 + 𝜌3
′ 𝑆𝑣𝑡−10 + 3𝑣 + 𝜇3𝑣𝑡  (3) 
where 𝑂𝑃𝑣𝑡 is the oil palm area, 𝑅𝑈𝑣𝑡 the rubber area, and 𝐹𝑂𝑣𝑡 the forest area in village 
𝑣 at time 𝑡, all expressed in ha. 𝐿𝑈𝑣𝑡−10 is a vector of land-use systems in the same 
village 10 years earlier. 𝐿𝑣𝑡 is the total area in village 𝑣 at time 𝑡, which we include on 
                                                                                                                                                                            
interviews rather than satellite images. Our experience with the group interviews in the different villages 
shows that the distinction between hutan karet and hutan (forests) was more straightforward. 
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the right-hand side to control for villages of different land size. The total village area 
includes land under forest, rubber, oil palm, and fallow, as well as other uses such as 
residential areas and food crop cultivation (paddy, fruits, vegetables). 𝑆𝑣𝑡−10 is a vector 
of village-level socioeconomic variables; to avoid endogeneity we use lagged values for 
time period 𝑡 − 10.  captures the time-invariant unobserved factors in each equation 
that may affect land use. To control for such unobserved factors, we include village fixed 
effects.  𝜇𝑣𝑡 in each equation is the idiosyncratic error term that changes over time and 
across villages. Time 𝑡 includes the observations for 2002 and 2012. To control for a 
time trend, we include a year dummy for 2012. Accordingly, 𝑡 − 10 includes the 
observations for 1992 and 2002.  
The vector of lagged land-use systems (𝐿𝑈𝑣𝑡−10) includes oil palm, rubber, forest, and 
fallow land, all expressed in ha. The estimated coefficients for these land-use variables 
(𝛾′) help us to identify land-use trends. For instance, a positive and significant coefficient 
for the lagged forest area in the oil palm equation would suggest that the oil palm 
expansion contributes directly to deforestation. A positive and significant coefficient for 
the lagged oil palm area in the oil palm equation would suggest a path-dependency 
towards specialization at the village level. 
In terms of socioeconomic variables as part of vector 𝑆𝑣𝑡−10, we build on the land-use 
change and deforestation literature (e.g., Lambin et al., 2003; Mitsuda and Ito, 2011). We 
use village characteristics such as population density, distance to road, share of 
households with formal land titles, and share of households using certain types of 
technologies such as mineral fertilizers. Furthermore, wealth may play an important role 
for land-use change decisions, such as switching towards oil palm (Feintrenie et al., 
2010b). We constructed a wealth index – WI – at the village level, building on data on 
the percentage of households owning assets such as cars, television, fridges, and mobile 
phones. The WI was calculated using principle component analysis, as described in Sahn 
and Stifel (2003). It is normalized in the 0-1 range, with higher values representing 
higher village-level wealth. 
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In this model, equations (1) to (3) are not independent. When total land is limited, land-
use change decisions from one system to another are made simultaneously. We therefore 
estimate this system of equations with the SUR approach. The SUR model produces 
consistent estimates also when there is error term correlation (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2009, p.162). The Breusch-Pagan test is used to test for error term correlation. We 
estimate the SUR model with a feasible generalized least squares estimator, which 
requires the equations not to have identical sets of regressors (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2009, p.163). We therefore exclude individual variables from 𝐿𝑈𝑣𝑡−10 in equations (2) 
and (3). 
 
Modeling the role of migration 
In addition to other socioeconomic factors, we are interested to better understand the role 
of migration. As discussed above, transmigrants from Java were the first smallholders to 
start oil palm cultivation in Jambi. We use a transmigrant dummy for villages that were 
initiated as part of the government’s transmigration program. Moreover, we use a dummy 
for villages that were started by spontaneous migrants. Spontaneous migrants may also 
be from Java, or from other parts of Sumatra, who came to Jambi without being part of 
the transmigration program. The reference group consists of villages that were founded 
by autochthonous people, mainly the Melayu Jambi. Autochthonous people are 
characterized by a more sedentary lifestyle. These dummies refer to the migration status 
of villages, not necessarily other ethnic characteristics of the village population. 
Nowadays, most villages in Jambi comprise a mixture of ethnicities due to marriages and 
additional migration. To capture the possible role of ethnical homogeneity for land-use 
changes, we use a variable measuring the population share of the dominant ethnicity in a 
particular village. 
The two migration dummies (spontaneous migration and transmigration) are closely 
correlated with the village fixed effects, leading to collinearity problems in estimation. 
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Hence, we first estimate a model with village fixed effects but without migration 
dummies. In a second specification, we include the migration dummies and exclude the 
village fixed effects. In additional specifications, we test whether spontaneous migration 
and transmigration also affect the coefficients of the other variables by interacting with 
𝐿𝑈𝑣𝑡−10 and 𝑆𝑣𝑡−10. For instance, it might be possible that the availability of forest land 
affects oil palm expansion differently in autochthonous and migrant villages. Similarly, 
the role of wealth or land titles for land-use change decisions may differ by migration 
background. Including all possible interaction terms in one specification would inflate 
the standard errors due to low degrees of freedom. We therefore use a sequence of 
additional specifications, including different groups of interaction terms always along 




Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for our sample of villages for the three points in time: 
1992, 2002, and 2012. Of the 98 villages for which we had collected data in 2012, 8 
villages had to be dropped for the following reasons. In five cases, the villages had 
recently emerged through separation from another village; for these five villages, we 
could collect data for 2012 but not for the previous time periods. Since we want to model 
trends over time, using these five villages in this analysis did not make sense. Three other 
villages had to be dropped because of missing data and stark outliers for some of the 
variables. We therefore remain with 90 village observations. These 90 villages include a 
few that were newly founded during the last 20 years (e.g. through a new transmigration 
settlement). Therefore, the numbers of observations are somewhat smaller in 1992 and 
2002 than in 2012. When villages were newly founded and did not emerge through 
separation from another village, we decided to keep them in order not to further reduce 
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the sample size. We include an additional dummy variable into the model to control for 
possible differences between old and newly founded villages. 









      
   Oil palm (ha) 61.5 (225.67) 269.09 (543.52) 565.78 (780.75) 
   Rubber (ha) 2387.65 (6821.96) 2435.63 (6753.58) 2334.12 (6254.25) 
   Forest (ha) 1417.49 (2615.41) 866.05 (1978.17) 779.11 (1872.04) 
   Fallow (ha) 660.13 (1155.75) 669.26 (1157.21) 662.61 (1137.99) 
   Total land (ha) 5057.72 (7640.09) 4889.79 (7417.02) 4558.11 (6951.48) 
Migration dummies 
   Autochthonous village (d) 0.611 (0.491) 0.592 (0.495) 0.578 (0.497) 
   Spontaneous migrant village (d) 0.167 (0.375) 0.158 (0.367) 0.167 (0.375) 
   Transmigrant village (d) 0.222 (0.418) 0.251 (0.436) 0.256 (0.439) 
Socioeconomic variables 
   Population density (pop/ha) 0.486 (0.565) 0.761 (0.818) 1.006 (1.039) 
   Distance to road (km) 4.244 (14.31) 2.181 (7.351) 1.266 (5.427) 
   Chemical fertilizer (share of households) 0.186 (0.342) 0.328 (0.381) 0.496 (0.366) 
   Wealth index (0-1) 0.151 (0.163) 0.479 (0.291) 0.724 (0.131) 
   Dominant ethnicity (share of households) 0.762 (0.327) 0.787 (0.273) 0.806 (0.167) 
   Land title (share of households) 0.213 (0.356) 0.351 (0.393) 0.458 (0.349) 
Note: Mean values are shown with standard deviations in parentheses. 
On average, in 2012 villages had a total land area of 4558 ha, of which 51% was covered 
with rubber (Table 1). This underlines that rubber is still the dominant agricultural crop 
in Jambi. The rest of the village land is under secondary forest (17%), fallow (15%), oil 
palm (12%), and other uses (5%), including residential areas and food crops, such as 
paddy, fruits, and vegetables. However, land use changed considerably over the last 20 
years. In particular, the oil palm area has increased almost tenfold since 1992, while the 
forested area was nearly cut in half. The fallow area and the land under rubber did not 
change much in size, although nowadays rubber is often cultivated more intensively than 
20 years ago. That the average fallow land did hardly change since 1992 does not mean 
that exactly the same pieces of land are still fallow 20 years later. As mentioned, fallow 
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land is either over-logged forest or unproductive plantation land.
5
 Fallow is therefore a 
temporary state in which the land is kept available for new land-use decisions by 
individual households or the village community. 
Table 1 also shows other village characteristics. In 2012, 58% of the sample villages 
were autochthonous, 25% were transmigrant, and 17% were spontaneous migrant 
villages. As expected, the proportion of transmigrant villages increased somewhat over 
time with new settlements being established under the government program. The data on 
population density suggest significant population growth over the 20-year period. 
Furthermore, the use of agricultural technology (chemical fertilizer) and mean wealth 
levels have significantly increased, and infrastructure conditions have improved since 
1992. 
 
Base model estimation results 
Table 2 presents results from estimation of equations (1) to (3). The Breusch-Pagan test 
statistic shows that the null hypothesis of no error term correlation between the equations 
has to be rejected. We conclude that the SUR approach is more suitable than the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) estimator. The number of observations in the regressions is 180, 
consisting of the 90 villages observed for t = 2012 and t = 2002, and corresponding 
lagged time periods for 2002 and 1992. Not all of the villages sampled in 2012 existed in 
previous periods. When a village did not exist in 2002 or 1992, all variable values for 
these years were set to zero. To control for possible systematic differences between such 
new villages and older ones, we additionally include an ‘old village’ dummy, which 
takes a value of one for all villages that already existed in 1992 and zero otherwise. 
                                                          
5
 Traditionally, fallow land in Jambi was connected to swidden agriculture. However, with increasing 
population density and the growing role of tree crops, swidden agriculture disappeared almost completely 
(De Jong et al., 2001). In the village questionnaire, we attempted to avoid any confusion by defining fallow 
land as over-logged or unproductive plots. 
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We first focus on the left-hand part of Table 2 (columns 1 to 3). The year dummy for 
2012 in column (1) suggests that the oil palm area increased significantly, on average by 
502 ha per village during the 2002-2012 period. For rubber (column 2), no such effect is 
observed. For the forest area (column 3), a negative time trend occurs, which is not 
statistically significant though. Looking at the role of lagged land-use systems, oil palm 
cultivation in the past contributes to further expansion of oil palm, while rubber 
cultivation in the past contributes to further expansion of rubber. However, the positive 
and significant lagged rubber coefficient in column (1) indicates that there is also some 
conversion of rubber to oil palm. Furthermore, fallow land in the past contributes 
significantly to oil palm expansion. The coefficient for lagged forest land in column (1) 
is not significantly different from zero, suggesting that the oil palm expansion during the 
last 10 years did not contribute to deforestation directly. On the other hand, the results in 
column (3) show that oil palm cultivation and fallow land in the past both contributed to 
declining forest land at the village level. 
Turning to the effect of the socioeconomic variables, we observe that old villages that 
already existed in 1992 increased the oil palm area significantly less than newly 
established villages. We further find that higher population density in the village 10 years 
ago is associated with less oil palm cultivation today (column 1), whereas the association 
between population density and forest land is insignificant (column 3). In terms of 
infrastructure conditions, distance to an all-season road in the past is associated with 
more oil palm and forest land today. Each additional km of distance increases the village 
oil palm area by 11 ha and the forest area by 38 ha. Wealth does not have a significant 
effect for rubber and forest land, but it does play an important role for oil palm 
expansion. Villages with a higher lagged WI increased their oil palm land significantly 
less than poorer villages. Implications of these results are discussed further below.
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Table 2. Land-use equations (SUR model) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Oil palm Rubber Forest Oil palm Rubber Forest 
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Socioeconomic variables       












































































































Village fixed effects YES YES YES NO NO NO 
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 
R
2
 0.87 0.99 0.91 0.58 0.99 0.71 
Breusch-Pagan independence test (chi
2
) 51.68*** 19.01*** 
 
Notes: Estimation coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses. All land-use variables are expressed in ha. HH, 
households. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
a
 Total land comprises 
the total village area, including oil palm, rubber, forest, and fallow land, as well as residential areas and food crops such as 
paddy, fruits, and vegetables. 
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Results on the role of migration 
We now present the results regarding the role of migration in more detail by including 
migration dummies for villages that were started by spontaneous migrants and 
transmigrants as explanatory variables. Results of this expanded model are shown in 
columns (4) to (6) of Table 2. Controlling for other factors, transmigrant villages have 
significantly larger oil palm areas than autochthonous villages that constitute the 
reference group (column 4). However, the transmigrant dummy has no significant effect 
on rubber and forest areas (columns 5 and 6). As explained, early transmigrants were 
supported in rubber cultivation. Yet spontaneous migrant villages have significantly less 
rubber than autochthonous villages. They also tend to have less forest land.  
The other coefficients of the land-use and socioeconomic variables are also affected, 
which is largely due to the exclusion of village fixed effects in columns (4) to (6). As 
explained, the joint inclusion of migration dummies and village fixed effects causes 
collinearity problems. Differences in the coefficients with and without village fixed 
effects should not be overinterpreted. Nonetheless, it appears that migration might have 
more systematic effects on land-use change that cannot be fully captured with the two 
migration dummies alone. We therefore, interact these dummies with the major land-use 
and other socioeconomic variables to gain further insights. As described above, we use a 
sequential approach and estimate the model separately with different groups of 
interaction terms included. Results of these additional specifications are shown in Tables 
3 and 4. 
In Table 3, we analyze in how far the effects of previous land-use variables differ 
between autochthonous and migrant villages. Part A of the Table reveals that each ha of 
oil palm 10 years ago contributes to 0.19 ha of additional oil palm today (column 1). This 
effect is smaller than the one observed in column (1) of Table 2; in Table 3 it only refers 
to autochthonous villages because we now include interaction terms with the two 
migration dummies. The significant coefficient for the transmigrant interaction shows
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Table 3. Model results with interactions between migration dummies and land-use 
systems (SUR model) 
  
(1) (2) (3) 
  














































































Land-use controls YES YES YES 
 
Socioeconomic controls YES YES YES 
 
Village fixed effects YES YES YES 
 
Observations 180 180 180 
Notes: Estimation coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses. All land-use variables 
are expressed in ha. Parts A, B, C, and D were estimated in separate regressions. All regressions 
contain a year 2012 dummy and the same land-use and socioeconomic variables as in Table 2; these 
other variables are not shown here for brevity. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 
5% level. * Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 4. Model results with interactions between migration dummies and other 
socioeconomic variables (SUR model) 
  
(1) (2) (3) 
  


























































































Land-use controls YES YES YES 
 
Socioeconomic controls YES YES YES 
 
Village fixed effects YES YES YES 
 
Observations 180 180 180 
Notes: Estimation coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses. All land-use variables 
are expressed in ha. Parts A, B, C, and D were estimated in separate regressions. All regressions 
contain a year 2012 dummy and the same land-use and socioeconomic variables as in Table 2; these 
other variables are not shown here for brevity. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 
5% level. * Significant at the 10% level. 
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that the lagged oil palm effect is larger among transmigrants as compared to the base 
category of autochthonous villages. The combined effect for transmigrant villages is 
derived as the sum of both coefficients, in this case 0.19 + 0.48 = 0.67. Part B reveals 
significant differences also in the effect of lagged rubber land on oil palm expansion 
between autochthonous and migrant villages (column 1). Lagged rubber land has a 
positive effect in all village types, suggesting significant conversion of rubber to oil 
palm. But the effect is much stronger in migrant villages, and especially among 
spontaneous migrants. On the other hand, lagged rubber land contributes to more future 
rubber only in autochthonous villages (column 2). 
Parts C and D in Table 3 show differential effects between village types for lagged forest 
and fallow land. In spontaneous migrant villages, there seems to be significant 
conversion of forest into oil palm land – an effect that is not observed in autochthonous 
and transmigrant villages. Past fallow land is associated with more future oil palm and 
less future rubber and forest land in autochthonous villages. Most of the interaction terms 
are not significant, suggesting that fallow land plays a similar role also in spontaneous 
migrant and transmigrant villages. 
Table 4 shows results with interaction terms between the migration dummies and other 
socioeconomic factors. Part A reveals that higher population density in the past is 
associated with significantly smaller oil palm areas in autochthonous villages. The effect 
seems to be similar in spontaneous migrant villages, but not in transmigrant villages. The 
combined effect in transmigrant villages is close to zero (-437.38 + 446.48 = 9.10), 
suggesting that oil palm expansion in these villages occurs independent of population 
density. 
Part B of Table 4 shows that an increase of lagged road distance is positively associated 
with forest land in autochthonous villages. However, the same effect is not observed in 
transmigrant villages; in the transmigration program, new villages were sometimes 
deliberately established in remoter areas. Also for wealth, we observe notable differences 
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between migrant and autochthonous villages (part C). Above we found that lagged 
wealth is associated with less oil palm expansion. We now see that this effect only holds 
for autochthonous villages, where wealth contributes to less oil palm and more rubber 
land. For the migrant villages, the combined wealth effects are not statistically 
significant. 
Finally, part D of Table 4 reveals interesting results for the role of land titles. The 
variable land title is measured as the share of households in the village holding a land 
title. A larger lagged share of households with land titles is associated with further oil 
palm expansion in transmigrant and spontaneous migrant villages. In contrast, in 
autochthonous villages the lagged share of households with land titles has a negative 
effect on oil palm cultivation. We discuss these results and their implications in more 
detail further below. 
 
Robustness checks 
In this subsection, we test whether the main results also hold with some changes in model 
specification. For this purpose, we use the model shown in Table 2 with village fixed 
effects (columns 1-3) as the base and introduce several changes, as described in the 
following. 
First, we examine whether differentiating between different rubber production systems 
would affect the results. As described above, rubber is cultivated with different 
intensities, including monoculture plantations and rubber agroforests. Boundaries are not 
always clear-cut, so that in the base model we decided to club different intensities into 
one single rubber variable. In an alternative specification, we distinguished further and 
used the lagged land under rubber plantations and rubber agroforests (as stated by 
villagers in the group interviews) as two separate explanatory variables. These alternative 
results are shown in Table A1 in the Appendix. Both variables are positive and 
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significant in the oil palm equation, but the size of the coefficients differs. The results 
suggest that conversion to oil palm is more likely on previous rubber agroforest land than 
on previous monoculture rubber plantations. The other estimates are very similar to the 
base model results in Table 2. 
Second, location factors beyond distance to road may play a role for land-use decisions. 
In particular, access to an oil palm mill is important for the decision to grow oil palm, 
because the fruits are perishable and have to be milled within 48 hours after harvest. The 
only mills that exist in Jambi are those that were established by state or private 
plantations that also involve smallholders through NES schemes. While we do not have 
information about the exact distance between villages and mills for the three points in 
time, we know whether or not an NES contract exists in the village and when such a 
contract has been made. Hence, we include a contract dummy into the model as a proxy 
for access to an oil palm mill.
6
 In addition, the contract dummy is also a proxy for 
technical and managerial knowledge about oil palm cultivation, because contracted 
farmers also receive training and access to inputs. Results of this alternative specification 
with a contract dummy included are shown in Table A2 in the Appendix. Unsurprisingly, 
contracts are associated with significant oil palm expansion in the village. The other 
results are very similar to those in the base model. 
Third, and related to the previous point, the institutional conditions under which oil palm 
farming occurs may affect land-use developments over time. In addition to contract 
farming, there are also many smallholders in Jambi who cultivate oil palm independently 
(Cahyadi and Waibel, 2013). This is not fully captured by the contract dummy at the 
village level, because contracts usually involve some but not all farmers in a village. 
Even in transmigrant villages, which were established as part of NES schemes, there are 
independent oil palm growers whose contracts have expired or who moved to the village 
after the transmigration program had ended. We therefore tested another model 
                                                          
6
 A contract dummy was not included in the base model, because this variable may potentially be 
endogenous. 
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specification where we used the share of village oil palm land that is cultivated 
independently as explanatory variable. Results in Table A3 (Appendix) reveal that this 
variable is associated with significant growth of the oil palm area. This is plausible, 
because the independent oil palm land can be expanded more flexibly than the oil palm 
area under contract. Again, the other results are similar to those in the base model. 
In terms of institutional conditions, the status of the forest land surrounding the villages 
may potentially affect land-use dynamics too. For instance, one might expect that state 
forest land (kawasan hutan) would be less prone to deforestation than forest land that is 
owned by the village communities or by individual households. However, while more 
than 70% of the national forest area in Indonesia is state forest land, this does not have a 
significant influence on deforestation activities at the local level. In local communities, 
de facto tenure is considered more important than formal land rights (Krishna et al., 
2014). Moreover, in the post-New Order Regime (after 1998) customary land rights have 
again received increasing recognition. Against this background, we argue that not 
controlling for the status of the forest land does not introduce a bias to the analysis. 
 
2.5 Discussion 
Interpretation of results 
Jambi province has undergone tremendous land-use changes over the last decades. We 
have analyzed the role of lagged land use on current developments and found significant 
path-dependencies: villages that cultivated much oil palm (rubber) in the past also 
expanded their oil palm (rubber) area more extensively in subsequent periods. The oil 
palm expansion has taken place primarily on previous fallow land, not on forest land. 
Hence, the increasing oil palm cultivation by smallholders has not been a major driver of 
deforestation. In this regard, Jambi is not representative of rainforest frontier regions. 
Much of the primary forest in Jambi was cleared more than 20 years ago, and rubber was 
an established cash crop long before the oil palm boom started. Some conversion of 
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rubber to oil palm can be observed in Jambi. Such conversion is more likely for 
extensively cultivated agroforestry rubber than on intensive rubber plantations. This is 
likely due to the past investments made for establishing rubber plantations and the large 
foregone profits in an unproductive interim period when clearing the land and 
establishing a new oil palm plantation (Feintrenie and Levang, 2009). 
Concerning deforestation, our results point at another path-dependency: more intensive 
logging and land conversion in the past are associated with more deforestation also in the 
future. Oil palm expansion occurs in locations with ongoing logging activities, so indirect 
effects on deforestation are possible. However, the results suggest that villagers in Jambi 
do not clear forest with the immediate intention to use the land for oil palm. This is in 
line with a recent study in Papua New Guinea, where Nelson et al. (2013) found that 
deforestation takes place without the explicit intention to grow oil palm in the future. 
While industrial oil palm plantations appear to play a role for deforestation (Gaveau et 
al., 2009; Carlson et al., 2012; Carlson et al., 2013), other extractive industries were often 
found to be more relevant. For large parts of Indonesia (i.e. Kalimantan, Sumatra, Papua, 
Sulawesi and Moloccus), Abood et al. (2014) showed that fiber plantations and logging 
concessions rank first and second as drivers of deforestation; according to that study the 
oil palm industry ranks third. 
In terms of socioeconomic variables, we observe that population density has no 
significant effect on forest land conversion. This is noteworthy, because population 
pressure has often been identified as a driver of deforestation (e.g., Mertens et al., 2000; 
Kirby et al., 2006; Mena et al., 2006). However, DeFries et al. (2010) pointed out that 
urban population growth and associated increases in the demand for agricultural products 
are probably more important drivers of deforestation than rural population growth, as 
captured in our data. However, our results suggest that higher population density is 
associated with lower rates of oil palm expansion. This cannot be explained by 
differences in wealth between villages with higher and lower population density, because 
we have controlled for average wealth levels. We rather feel that differences in labor 
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availability and labor costs may be important. Intensive rubber cultivation has much 
higher labor requirements than oil palm cultivation. In particular, rubber plantations 
require continuous labor availability for tapping the trees. In contrast, for oil palm 
significant labor input is required only in certain intervals for harvesting the ripe fruits. 
Hence, more densely populated villages with higher labor availability have lower 
incentives to switch to oil palm. The population density effect was found to be 
particularly strong in autochthonous villages. 
The positive association between road distance and forest area was expected and is in 
line with the literature showing that better road infrastructure can contribute to 
deforestation (Kirby et al., 2006). Yet the positive association between road distance and 
oil palm area is somewhat surprising. Conventionally, one would expect that better 
infrastructure contributes to more cash crop cultivation (Gaveau et al., 2009). However, 
as mentioned, in Jambi rubber was already a major cash crop before the oil palm boom 
started (Feintrenie and Levang, 2009). Many of the oil palm NES schemes were 
deliberately established in remoter regions. These remoter regions later also benefited 
from infrastructure improvements, but infrastructure developments were not the trigger 
of the oil palm expansion. 
The negative association between past village wealth and oil palm expansion may also be 
contrary to initial expectations. Establishing new oil palm plantations requires access to 
capital for buying the planting material and other inputs, and also to bridge the period of 
3-5 years before the first fruits can be harvested. However, participants in oil palm NES 
schemes had access to subsidized loans and other support measures, so that for them 
limited initial wealth was not a major constraint to start oil palm cultivation. On the other 
hand, wealthier villages with productive rubber plantations had fewer incentives to 
switch to oil palm that was brought to Jambi from outside. These differences in financial 
incentives can also explain the observed path-dependencies that were mentioned above.
7
 
                                                          
7
 The negative association between wealth and oil palm expansion was found to be particularly pronounced 
in autochthonous villages. However, Feintrenie and Levang (2009) observed cases where wealthy 
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In terms of the role of migration, our findings suggest that migrant villages (i.e., villages 
founded by the transmigration program or by spontaneous migrants) differ from 
autochthonous villages. Migrant villages have more oil palm land. For transmigrant 
villages the reason is obvious, as many of these villages were established as part of an oil 
palm NES scheme. For spontaneous migrants, who were not allocated any land by the 
government, clearing forest land is one way of getting access to an own agricultural 
production base. Spontaneous migrants have no rubber-growing tradition, and they 
migrated at a time when the oil palm boom had already started in Jambi. It is therefore 
not surprising that spontaneous migrants focused more on oil palm than on rubber 
cultivation. Like the transmigrants, many of the spontaneous migrants came from Java, 
so cultural similarities can be expected. Nevertheless, we found some significant 
differences between the two types of villages in terms of land-use dynamics (Table 3). 
These differences support the hypothesis that the government’s transmigration program 
had significant long-term effects on land-use decisions. 
One important benefit that transmigrants enjoy is the option to obtain formal land titles 
after loan repayment. Among other advantages, land titles can be used as collateral and 
therefore improve households’ access to agricultural credit (Feder and Nishio, 1998). 
While transmigrants in particular received subsidies for oil palm cultivation in the 
beginning, these subsidized programs ceased. Many successful transmigrants who had 
obtained land titles have started to establish new independent oil palm plantations more 
recently. For spontaneous migrants, land titles were also found to be important for oil 
palm expansion, but spontaneous migrants either purchased titled land or they obtained a 
title for appropriated land through a costly application process. Spontaneous migrants do 
not fall under the customary law, where de facto land rights are recognized without 
formal titles. These customary land rights only apply to the autochthonous population. 
Against this background, the negative association between land titles and oil palm 
expansion in autochthonous villages is plausible. While autochthonous households can 
                                                                                                                                                                            
individuals from autochthonous villages had invested in oil palm plantations (within NES schemes) outside 
their own villages. 
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apply for land titles, many of them have never entered this costly procedure, unless they 
plan to sell their land. Hence, obtaining land titles can be considered as a strategy of 
autochthonous people to exit own agricultural production in the medium run, rather than 
investing in new oil palm plantations. Formal land transactions are increasingly observed 
in Jambi with autochthonous people as sellers and migrants as buyers (Krishna et al., 
2014). 
Traditional land rights are also important for land-use decisions from a different 
perspective. Many autochthonous villages still apply a matrilineal inheritance system. 
This system has undergone substantial transformations from communal towards 
individualized (single family) ownership (Otsuka et al., 2001). Clearing forest land and 
subsequently planting trees may be interpreted as one strategy of men to strengthen their 
land rights and privately claim land that was previously controlled by the community 
(Villamor et al., 2013). 
 
Limitations 
The analysis has shown that the use of survey data represents an effective tool to analyze 
land-use dynamics, especially with a view to better understanding the role of 
socioeconomic and policy factors. However, survey data also come with certain 
disadvantages. Compared to satellite images, the accuracy of the land-use data obtained 
from a survey is lower. This is especially true when long recall periods are used in the 
interviews. We tried to minimize inaccuracies to the extent possible, but differences in 
perception, definitions, and memories certainly play a role and cannot be ruled out 
completely. To describe land-use dynamics, explain the observed trends, and derive 
policy implications, a combination of remotely sensed land-use data with socioeconomic 
data obtained from surveys seems to be a promising avenue, as a growing strand of 
literature demonstrates (e.g. Muller and Zeller, 2002; Caviglia-Harris and Harris, 2008, 
De Souza Soler and Verburg, 2010). It should also be stressed that the interpretation of 
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causality in our models should be done with caution. While we have tried to control for 
possible confounding factors, correlation between explanatory variables and error terms 
may still occur in some cases. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have investigated land-use dynamics in the province of Jambi on the 
island of Sumatra, using data from a survey of randomly selected villages. Through 
structured interviews with village leaders we collected recall data on land use and a broad 
set of other village-level variables covering a period of 20 years, from 1992 to 2012. The 
data reveal considerable land-use changes, with a decline in forest land and a rapid 
expansion of oil palm. Nevertheless, rubber remains the dominant crop in Jambi. Oil 
palm is partly grown on large public sector or private company plantations, but 
smallholder farmers are also involved to a considerable extent. While it is often argued 
that oil palm is the main driver of deforestation, this has not been the case in Jambi in the 
recent past. Most of the oil palm growth takes place on previous fallow and unproductive 
rubber land. This land was covered with forest at some point, but it was logged and 
cleared without the immediate intention to grow oil palm. However, our data also show 
that oil palm growth occurs in locations with ongoing logging activities, so that indirect 
effects on deforestation are possible. 
In terms of socioeconomic and policy factors, our results show that the Indonesian 
government’s transmigration program played a key role for the start and spread of oil 
palm cultivation in Jambi and the significant involvement of smallholder farmers. In the 
transmigration program, people from densely populated islands (e.g. Java or Bali) were 
relocated to less populated areas in Sumatra (and elsewhere) and supported in oil palm 
cultivation in so-called NES schemes. Many of these schemes were established in the 
1980s and 1990s in relatively remote areas. Although some autochthonous villages in 
Jambi are now also growing oil palm, they have started later than the transmigrant 
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villages and expand their oil palm area at a slower pace. Field observations suggest that 
the government-supported oil palm NES schemes were beneficial for many of the 
transmigrant families. At the same time, the transmigrant program may have contributed 
to the risk of unequal developments between the transmigrant and autochthonous 
population. Analyzing trends and possible causes of inequality further would be an 
interesting area for future research. 
Our results do not allow statements on whether the oil palm expansion in Jambi is good 
or bad. Such statements would require comprehensive analysis of the economic, social, 
and environmental impacts, which is beyond the scope of this study. However, our study 
clearly shows that socioeconomic and policy factors play an important role in explaining 
land-use trends at the local level. In this regard, our results go beyond spatially explicit 
analyses with satellite data, which often analyze land-use trajectories without explaining 
them. Improved understanding of socioeconomic and policy factors is an important 
precondition to design sustainable land-use policies. 
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Chapter 3 
Contract Farming and Economic Development 
 
Abstract. Through contract farming schemes between cohorts of farmers and private 
companies the Indonesian government intended to spur rural economic development.  In 
particular within the oil palm sector, such community-company ‘partnerships’ are 
commonplace. Yet, empirical evidence of the success of these formations remains mixed. 
In this chapter, we investigate the effects of contract farming on economic development 
at the village level. At the same time, little is understood regarding the factors that 
determine that cohorts of farmers sign a contract. Analyzing data from a structured 
village survey, we find a positive effect of contract farming schemes on economic 
development, in particular on village wealth. The share of farmers under contract and 
contract length play a significant role in this. Regarding contract adoption, we observe 
that contract participation is conditional on the visit of a private investor. Controlling for 
this conditionality, we find that villages that have no access to electricity are more likely 
to participate in community-company partnerships. Finally, considering the government’s 
intention to spur rural economic development through contract farming and the positive 
wealth effects associated with it, we find that contract farming has not been entirely 
equally accessible; however, we do not find evidence that the rural poor were excluded. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the wake of increasing global demand for vegetable oil, the production of palm oil has 
extensively been promoted in many developing countries. At the same time, the 
emerging oil palm sector generated opportunities to spur rural economic development 
and to alleviate poverty. To achieve this, the government of Indonesia – the largest palm 
oil producing country worldwide – promoted ‘partnership’ formations between 
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commercial agro-industrial plantations and local communities (Feintrenie et al., 2010a). 
Through contract farming arrangements that were usually made with cohorts of farmers, 
oil palm developed along with economic development (Susila, 2004; Zen et al., 2005). 
However, palm oil production has also been associated with negative environmental and 
social implications. For example, it has contributed to deforestation, loss of biodiversity 
and carbon stocks, and caused the emergence of land and contractual conflicts 
(Colchester et al., 2006; Fitzherbert et al., 2008; Koh and Wilcove, 2008; Hansen et al., 
2009; Rist et al., 2010; Carlson et al., 2012; Margono et al., 2012). Moreover, authors 
have pointed out that contract farming schemes have not been equally accessible to all 
farmers (McCarthy, 2010). Furthermore, established contracts have been found to lack 
transparency and to benefit private companies more than local communities (Rist et al. 
2010). But also within communities the benefits are unequally shared: richer contract 
farmers tend to benefit considerably more than their poorer village fellows (Cahyadi and 
Waibel, 2013). 
Thus, the empirical evidence gives rise to suspect that community-company partnerships 
can have detrimental effects for those villagers who participate in contract farming. At 
the same time, the studies show that the emerging oil palm industry in Indonesia has 
potential for spurring economic development and improving livelihoods in rural areas 
(Rist et al., 2010; Feintrenie et al., 2010; McCarthy, 2010; Rosyani, 2011; Cahyadi and 
Waibel, 2013). Taken together, the findings are mixed and oftentimes largely based on 
case studies and descriptive analyses. A quantitative evaluation is missing in the 
literature. 
The first objective of this chapter intends to fill the empirical gap in the literature by 
analyzing the effects of community-company partnerships on economic development at 
the village level. The unit of analysis is the village, which allows us to investigate 
broader implications for entire village communities that participate in community-
company partnerships. In addition, this village-level perspective recognizes that usually 
cohorts of farmers participate in contract farming schemes. Rather than individual 
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farmers bargaining over contract conditions, contracts are frequently negotiated at the 
famer cooperative or even at the village level (McCarthy and Cramb, 2009). 
Furthermore, the village-level analysis allows us to examine indirect effects of contract 
farming schemes. In this respect, the government promoted the emerging industry by 
investing into transportation and market infrastructure (Larson, 1996). This was likely 
beneficial to all villagers, contracted or not. In sum, the village-level analysis allows the 
investigation of direct and indirect effects of community-company partnerships on 
economic development. 
The participation in community-company partnerships within the Indonesian oil palm 
industry is an obvious precondition to benefit from the supposedly positive economic 
effects. Within villages, at the individual level it has been reported that contract farming 
has not been accessible to all farmers alike (McCarthy, 2010). Perhaps, the same could 
be true for the inclusion into the oil palm industry across village communities. The 
inclusion encompasses two steps. First, an oil palm representative, or investor, targets 
prospective villages that are suitable for being included into the oil palm industry and 
proposes a contract. In a second step a decision is made, usually collectively, to accept or 
reject the contract offer (McCarthy and Cramb, 2009). In this chapter, the second 
objective is to analyze the impact of certain village-level factors on the probability 
contract adoption at the village level. Due to the conditionality of contract adoption on 
being visited by an investor, we control for the impact of certain village-level factors on 
investor visit. To the best of our knowledge this has not been addressed in the literature. 
However, better understanding the conditions that determine the inclusion and thus the 
formation of communal-company relationships is necessary to guide the formulation of 
sound rural economic policies. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we present a 
brief historical account of the oil palm development in Indonesia with special attention 
placed on contract farming in our study region. Section 3 outlines our materials and 
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methods used. In Section 4 we present the descriptive and estimation results. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
3.2 Background 
In Indonesia, the oil palm development can broadly be distinguished into two major 
phases: first, the government-led phase (1970s – 1998) that started with the arrival of oil 
palm in Indonesia and, second, the market-oriented phase (1999 – present) that was 
initiated after the fall of Suharto’s New Order regime (Larson, 1996; Zen et al., 2005; 
McCarthy, 2010; Budidarsono et al., 2013). In this section, we will present a brief 
historical account of the oil palm development in Jambi province by placing the 





In the 1970s, the Indonesian government initiated the development of an oil palm sector. 
Before that time the focus was mainly on rubber production which is still the major cash 
crop to be found in Jambi to date. Advised by the World Bank at that time, the 
Indonesian government intended to spur economic development in rural areas by 
sponsoring smallholders (Zen et al., 2005). Apart from clearing lands and planting oil 
palm close to newly established state-owned oil palm plantations (so-called Perseroan 
Terbatas Perkebunan Nusantara), smallholders were given 2-4 ha of land and technical 
assistance to successfully cultivate the perennial crop. The smallholders harvested and 
delivered the FFB to the attached oil palm mill for further processing (Larson, 1996). 
Amid the 1980s the Indonesian government intended to further stimulate the oil palm 
sector by gradually involving a selection of private companies. On the one hand, the 
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 Some of this section has already been discussed in the Introduction of this dissertation. However, in this 
section I provide a more detailed account of the oil palm development in Jambi province. 
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government assumed responsibility for infrastructure development and also issued large 
land concessions and provided subsidized loans; in exchange, companies were required 
to involve smallholders into their plantation plan (Larson, 1996). These community-
company partnerships are also referred to as Perkebunan Inti Rakyat, NES, or Inti-
Plasma. Typically, these had the company estate at its core (Inti) and were surrounded by 
plantations reserved for smallholders (Plasma; Feintrenie et al., 2010a).  
To adhere to the government requirements, farmers were typically included upon 
surrendering a certain amount of (unproductive) land to the company. In return they 
received an oil palm ‘package’. This comprised several services, like opening and 
planting of land, agricultural training in the initial 4-5 years before the oil palm trees 
would start yielding. Moreover, the companies provided employment at the estate. 
Especially during those initial 4-5 years of palm oil farming this employment was very 
welcome to bridge an initial income gap. Most importantly, the farmers received a 
developed oil palm plot on which high-yielding palm trees were planted. Furthermore, 
the package included technical assistance, such as fertilizers, herbicides and pesticides 
(Zen et al., 2005). However, farmers could either choose to work and manage the plots 
themselves or entrust these to the company. In the latter case operating costs are 
deducted from the profits generated by this plot. Sometimes the farmers decided to 
directly sell their land to the company and get compensated in cash (Rist et al., 2010). 
Finally, the package included loan schemes which the participating farmers could make 
use of to cover establishment and operational costs. These loans had a payback of usually 
20 years (Fearnside, 1997).  
This package enabled contract farmers to efficiently cultivate oil palm resulting in higher 
yields and, thus, higher profits compared to individual smallholders. The latter often 
lacked the technical knowledge needed for effective fertilizer applications and often 
could not access or understand the relevance of high-yielding varieties (Barlow et al., 
2003). 
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To guarantee smooth plantation operations, the private estate and mills required labor. 
Apart from employing local people, the Indonesian government involved migrants in the 
oil palm industry. A relocation program, called the transmigrasi program was 
instrumental to meet the demand for cheap labor (McCarthy, 2010). Basically, the 
rationale was to relocate people from over-densely populated areas, such as Java, to areas 
of land abundance (Fearnside, 1997). This program was fully sponsored by the 
government, meaning that in addition to the general contract conditions, the 
transmigrants usually got 2-4 ha of oil palm land, (land for) housing as well as a 
homegarden. In contrast to most of the officially untitled land to be found in vast parts of 
Sumatra, transmigrants would receive a government land title after these completed to 
repay the granted loans (Murdiyarso et al., 2002). 
During the next phase, the Koperasi Kredit Primer untuk Anggota, the mentioned 
package remained the contractual basis. However, after almost one decade of directly 
sponsoring the oil palm sector, starting around 1995, the Indonesian government decided 
to gradually retreat from its active role. Rather, it started to assume a monitoring 
function. Instead of pushing the oil palm development through direct investments, 
including the transmigration program, budget constraints as well as increasing land 
scarcity and the emerging conflicts revolving around customary versus statutory land 
rights (Colchester et al., 2006) resulted in a policy shift. First, (Jambi’s) local people 
were increasingly included. Second, rising land scarcity led companies to seek alternative 
land sources. They followed a rather strategic approach: villages willing to receive a 
contract were obliged to establish a farmer cooperative. Functioning as an intermediary 
between farmers and the private companies, these cooperatives were responsible for the 
provision of technical assistance, manage loan schemes and most of all gathered suitable 
village land (Larson, 1996). This land would then collectively be handed-over to the 
company for estate development. Established contracts at the cooperative level were 
binding for all its members and once a contract was signed it was usually not possible for 
hesitating farmers to get contracted at a later stage (McCarthy, 2010).  
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Before a contract is adopted at the village level, a company representative – whom we 
will refer to as investor – visits a prospective village. In more detail, the investor attends 
several village meetings for ‘socialization’ where (s)he praises the benefits oil palm 
cultivation is associated with, for the village as a whole, but also for participating 
smallholder farmers in particular. In case both parties show an interest the investor 
proposes a contract. At large, the components included in the package were rather fix but 
certain aspects (i.e. initial debt estimation, prices, interest rates) remain negotiable 
(Feintrenie et al., 2010a). Next, contract conditions are discussed among the villagers 
and, in a follow-up meeting with the investor negotiations over contract conditions take 
place. Finally, contract proposals are either accepted and signed, rejected, or subject to 
renegotiation. Usually, this process is accompanied by government officials and bank 
representatives. But also, oftentimes the bargaining process over contractual conditions is 
dominated by village elites, who, occasionally, abused their authority for personal 
interests (Zen et al., 2005; McCarthy et al., 2012).  
 
Market-oriented phase 
The most recent phase is the laissez-faire phase which was initiated simultaneously with 
the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 and set in motion a process of liberalization. In 
more detail, this comprised the opening of the oil palm sector to private investment and 
companies and, at the same time, shifted budgetary responsibility down to the district 
level (McCarthy et al., 2012). Even the smallest political authority, the village, was 
entitled to more decision-making power over village related aspects (i.e. land, 
budgeting). Additionally, the rights of village communities were strengthened, especially 
vis-à-vis private companies and the government (Rist et al., 2010). In contrast, private 
companies could not benefit anymore from highly subsidized capital. As a consequence, 
money was borrowed from private banks charging steep interest rates. The government’s 
initial terms to include smallholders into private estates were not binding anymore 
(Larson, 1996); nor was the provision of the package. Against this background and the 
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increasing competition among private companies, various forms of contractual 
arrangements evolved. In contrast to the preceding phases, here, the degree of benefits 
extracted from contracts highly depended on the bargaining skills of the village elite and 
his/her integrity. At the same time, contractual outcomes depended on the extent 
companies were able to exploit their favorable position. Considering district governments 
faced budgetary constraints, they tended to offer companies highly beneficial terms of 
production. This also affected negotiations because in this phase these had to be in line 
with district, rather than central government, regulations (McCarthy et al., 2012). Among 
various forms of contractual arrangements, during this phase, farmers frequently engaged 
in contract farming arrangements wherein they outsourced all operations to the company 
in exchange for a percentage of the revenue (Casson, 2000). 
This phase is also typified by an increasing amount of independent smallholder oil palm 
farmers. Sometimes, these are farmers with expired contracts. Usually independent oil 
palm farmers never had a contract but accessed the required resources from a maturing 
sector (e.g. improved road conditions, disseminated technical knowledge, available input 
and output markets). In our analysis, we control for the two major phases we discussed. 
 
3.3 Materials and methods 
Survey design 
For this research we purposively selected 5 districts representing the lowlands of Jambi 
province. The lowlands are chosen since these are characterized by major agricultural 
transformations towards monoculture (Gatto et al., 2014). In particular we included the 
districts Muaro Jambi, Batang Hari, Sarolangun, Bungo and Tebo. To account for spatial 
variability, within each of the districts we drew a random sample of 5 sub-districts. 
Further, based on an extensive list of villages we took from PODES, we drew a random 
sample of 100 villages. However, due to logistical difficulties in the field we had to 
exclude 2 villages. Figure 3 depicts the map of sample villages in Jambi. 
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Data collection took place between September and December 2012. Interviews were 
carried out by six students from Jambi University, who participated in intensive training 
during a two week workshop prior to survey implementation. Before visiting the villages 
we made appointments with the village head to inquire about his/her and other village 
officials’ availability. We organized group interviews in which we invited key village 
officials (i.e. village head, secretary, group leaders, elderly people) in order to elicit data 
on certain village aspects, such as village assets, land-use change, demographics, 
technology use, contractual arrangements with companies, etc., by means of a structured 
survey. In general, the group interviews took three to four hours and were held in the 
house of the village head or his/her office. In addition to collecting data on the current 
status of the villages in 2012, we inquired data for past village characteristics, in 
particular for the years 2002 and 1992. To further guarantee the quality of the data, we 
invited elderly people to the interviews who have been living there already for a 
substantial period of time. In most villages a village ‘monograph’ existed with current 
and past socioeconomic data, such as demography, land-use, land titles, and others. In 
case villages had a contract farming arrangement, the details were generally easier to 
recall due to its drastic implications for village life. 
To utilize the panel structure for this study we had to drop some observations. The 
reasons are mainly twofold. First, unfortunately our sample includes a few villages that 
did not yet exist in 1992. The second exclusion criterion was that, even though some 
villages existed in 1992, certain villages underwent considerable changes at a given point 
throughout the period of interest (1992-2012). Drastic changes in, for instance, 
demographic or land-use characteristics occurred when a village neighborhood separated 
from its mother village. Hence, the data gathered for the year 2012 do not refer to the 
same village 20 years ago. In sum, the sample of 78 villages was used in this study. 
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Analytical framework 
Before an effect of company-communal partnerships on economic development can be 
observed, villages need to be included in the oil palm industry. Therefore, we start the 
analytical framework by explaining how we model the inclusion in the oil palm industry. 
In the then following section we describe how we model the effect of company-
communal partnerships on economic development. 
 
Modeling inclusion in oil palm industry 
Since the adoption of a contract is conditional on being visited by an oil palm investor, 
we specify an econometric model that accounts for a possible sample selection bias. In 
comparison with a randomly selected village, villages that are visited by an investor may 
also be more likely to adopt a contract. Apart from the observed factors we can control 
for, self-selection bias is problematic if the unobserved factors are the same for investor 
visit and contract adoption (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009; p.556). For instance, some 
village elites could be better connected to the industry than elites in other villages, 
possibly resulting in a greater chance that an investor visits and that the village adopts a 
contract. To control for this we employ a bivariate probit model that allows the 
specification of two separate probit models with correlated error terms. A significant 
correlation in the errors would indicate that the estimation suffers from a selection bias.  
Following Greene’s (2008, p.817) notation we specified the following model: 
Selection equation:  𝑦𝑖
∗ =  𝛼1
′ 𝑥𝑣1 +  𝑖,     𝑦𝑖 = 1 if 𝑦𝑖
∗ > 0,    𝑦𝑖 = 0 if 𝑦𝑖
∗ < 0       (4) 
Outcome equation:  𝑦𝑣
∗ =  𝛼2
′ 𝑥𝑣2 +  𝑣,     𝑦𝑣 = 1 if 𝑦𝑣
∗ > 0,    𝑦𝑣 = 0 if 𝑦𝑣
∗ < 0       (5) 
𝑖, 𝑣~ 𝐵𝑉𝑁(0,0,1,1, 𝜌), Var[ 𝑖] = Var[ 𝑣] = 1, Cov[ 𝑖, 𝑣] =  𝜌 
(𝑦𝑣, 𝑥𝑣2 is only observed when 𝑦𝑖 = 1); 
where 𝑦𝑖
∗ is an unobserved variable reflecting the benefits for an investor i of visiting a 
village. Likewise,  𝑦𝑣
∗ reflects the utility gain for a village v if a contract is adopted at the 
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village. The outcome variables 𝑦𝑖 and 𝑦𝑣 are observed variables which equal one if an 
investor visits a village or if a village adopts a contract, respectively. The vector 𝑥 
comprises explanatory variables such as village size (i.e. in terms of population and land 
area), village accessibility (i.e. distance to an all season road, distance to oil palm mill), 
village infrastructure (i.e. access to electricity), village institutions (i.e. share of farmers 
holding government land titles), village wealth, and village type (i.e. transmigrant). The 
error terms 𝑖  and 𝑣 have a bivariate normal distribution with zero mean and a unit 
variance. The correlation coefficient between the disturbance terms will be estimated and 
is denoted with 𝜌. 
In modeling village inclusion into the oil palm industry we have to take the following 
into account. Investors visited villages and contracts were adopted throughout the entire 
period from 1992-2012, and thus also within the 10 year time intervals. If we used the 
data for 2012 to explain contract adoption, in the analysis we would likely run into issues 
of reverse causality because certain village-level factors may have changed as a result of 
adopting a contract. Therefore, we adjusted our dataset. In case investor visit occurred in 
the period between 1992 and 2001, we use data for the year 1992 to explain investor 
visit/contract adoption. Likewise, for the villages which were visited in some year 
between 2002 and 2012 we make use of the data for the year 2002 to explain contract 
adoption. 
Finally, to identify the model we need a variable that introduces nontrivial variation to 
the outcome equation (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009, p.558). The requirements for such a 
variable are the same as for instruments used in regular ‘instrumental variable’ 
estimations (IV). We identified the variable average land slope as a valid instrument. At 
the village level, this is measured as the share of village land characterized by a certain 
land slope (i.e. 1= flat, …, 5= steep). In the specific case of oil palm cultivation in Jambi 
it may be argued that steeper average land slopes in villages reflect to some extent the 
attractiveness of a given village. This is because in Jambi much of the available land that 
is characterized by flat slopes can be found in areas already under extensive agricultural 
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cultivation (i.e. rubber). Since these are less likely transformed into oil palm (Gatto et al., 
2014), investors have to seek alternative areas for oil palm cultivation. Thus, we argue 
that steeper average land slopes are positively correlated with the incidence of investor 
visit. At the same time, it is not likely that the instrument directly affects the incidence of 
contract adoption because of the conditionality of contract adoption on investor visit. 
We want to briefly discuss our expectation regarding the impact of the explanatory 
variables on the outcome/selection variables. From an investor’s perspective it is 
reasonable to visit those villages that hold much agricultural potential. Thus we predict 
that total village land has a positive effect on investor visit. Since more populated 
villages are more likely to be located in urban areas, where available land is scarce, we 
expect a negative correlation with investor visit. Further, the farther away a village is 
from an all season road, a proxy for accessibility, we predict a lower probability of being 
visited. These expectations are largely borrowed from the literature on land-use change 
(for instance Lambin et al., 2003, p. 226; Mitsuda and Ito, 2011). Furthermore, proximity 
to an oil palm mill is likely to predict investor visit because this would guarantee that the 
FFB are processed in a timely manner and would reduce transactions costs. In terms of 
village infrastructure, access to electricity may likely be a decisive factor for being 
visited, since the availability of electricity would facilitate a rapid operation 
commencement. Moreover, we predict government land titles to be a positive predictor 
for attracting investors to the village. Larger shares of households holding government 
land titles could imply that land disputes between villagers and the 
government/companies are less likely to have taken place prior to investor visit. Past 
village involvement in land conflicts may have negative implications for the upcoming 
relationship between the company and the villagers (i.e. granting lease rights for land, 
distrust in village) jeopardizing smooth business operations. Consequently, larger shares 
of formal village land could be attractive for private companies to avoid future conflict. 
Next, we expect a negative relationship between village wealth and investor visit. This is 
because poorer villages may have less alternative income-generating activities and their 
main asset is probably land, which provides investors with a good bargaining position. 
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Our expectation regarding the impact of the explanatory variables on the incidence of 
contract adoption largely coincide with the impact on investor visit. Generally, the 
village-level factors that indicate that a village is located in a more rural area (i.e. smaller 
population, more village land, poorer accessibility, no access to electricity) are expected 
to be positively correlated with contract adoption. Next, since contract farming has the 
potential to improve livelihoods we expect that villages with a lower wealth index are 
more inclined to adopt a contract. Also because a lower wealth index possibly reflects 
fewer outside business options. Finally, in case the explanatory variables are 
insignificant, this would suggest that contract farming in the oil palm sector was 
inclusive, conditional on being visited by an investor. 
 
Modeling impacts on economic development 
Village wealth index 
We analyze the effects of communal-company partnerships on economic development 
that we proxy by village wealth. Thus, we created a village wealth measure – wealth 
index (WI) – in following the idea of Sahn and Stifel (2003). Technically, 𝑊𝐼 is a 
function of various percentages of individual-level assets and is specified as follows: 
 
𝑊𝐼𝑣 = 𝛽1𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑏𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑣 +  𝛽2𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑣 +  𝛽3𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑣 +  𝛽4𝑡𝑣𝑣 + 𝛽5𝑑𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑣 + 𝛽6𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑣 +
𝛽7𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑣 + 𝛽8𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 + 𝛽9𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣,            (6) 
 
where the 𝛽s are the generated results from a principle component analysis. The various 
wealth components are the percentage of households owning the following assets in 
village 𝑣: motorbike, car, truck, television, satellite dish for television reception, mobile 
phone, fridge, air-conditioning, and generator.
9
 We normalized 𝑊𝐼 resulting in an index 
with scores between 0 and 1, where values closer to zero reflect lower relative asset 
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 As a robustness check, we constructed an alternative WI adding various variables distance to a health 
clinic and to an elementary school – to the specification. 
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ownership. Moreover, since the variable is within the range of 0-1, the estimation results 
can be interpreted as percentages. 
 
Modeling base effects 
We want to understand how economic development (i.e. WI) at the village level is 
influenced by communal-company partnerships. As discussed, the involvement in these 
partnership formations happens through contract farming schemes which are not only 
beneficial to the contract participants (direct effect) but also to other villagers who 
benefit from improved infrastructure (indirect effect). We specified the following 
equation: 
 
𝑊𝐼1𝑣𝑡 =  𝛼1 +  𝛽12012𝑣 + 𝛿1𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑣𝑡 + 𝜌1𝑋𝑣𝑡−10 + 1𝑣 +  𝜇1𝑣𝑡,        (7) 
 
where the 𝑊𝐼𝑣𝑡 is the relative wealth of village v at time t, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑣𝑡 is a dummy 
variable that reflects if a contract was signed in village v at time t; 𝑋𝑣𝑡−10 is a vector of 
village-controls in village v at time t-10; the lagged values are used to avoid issues of 
endogeneity.  captures the time-invariant unobserved factors that affect the WI. To 
control for these unobserved heterogeneities we employ a fixed/random effects model 
depending on the results of the Hausman test. 𝜇1𝑣𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term that 
changes over time and across villages. We also include the year dummy 2012𝑣 to control 
for a possible time trend. Time t includes the observations for 2002 and 2012 and, 
accordingly, t-10 includes the values for 1992 and 2002. 
The vector of variables, 𝑋𝑣𝑡−10, includes socioeconomic village-level factors. We control 
for population density. For Jambi, higher population densities are associated with more 
urban settlements, whereas lower population densities are more likely to be found in 
Jambi’s rural areas. Generally it can be expected that villages in urban areas are richer 
compared with their rural counterparts. Consequently, we predict that population density 
has a positive effect on village wealth. 
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Moreover, we control for institutional differences between the villages by including the 
share of households holding government land titles. Our expectation is mixed. There may 
be a positive relationship between land titles and village wealth, because land titles can 
be used to access formal credit. In turn, villages with lower shares of land titles may less 
frequently access formal credit and, consequently, cannot use this for accumulating 
wealth. However, the relationship may also be negative. For example, larger shares of 
land titles could lead to a decrease in village wealth because the money spent on applying 
for a land title cannot be used to purchase other assets. 
Next, access to electricity is likely to induce economic development and thus we expect a 
positive correlation with village wealth. In a similar vein, we predict the distance to an all 
season road to be positively correlated with village wealth. Better village accessibility 
allows for more outside options which, in turn, fosters economic development. 
Furthermore, the distance to an oil palm mill may be an indicator for the degree of 
integration into the oil palm industry. This may have positive effects on village wealth, 
for instance, due to reduced transaction costs. Also likely, industry development may be 
accompanied with the emergence of new markets and various employment opportunities 
(e.g. oil palm mill, oil palm estate, transportation of oil palm fruits, security, input 
markets) which are likely to positively affect village wealth. 
Moreover, oil palm smallholders without any contract have gained increasing importance 
in Jambi. These may, at least partly, have an effect on the accumulation of wealth at the 
village level. We control for the influence of independent oil palm farmers by including a 
variable which captures the share of oil palm land cropped by independent smallholders. 
Finally, contractual conflicts with private companies may have negative implications for 
economic development, for instance, because farmers stop working, and/or companies 
would refrain from disbursing salaries. 
Furthermore, we will run two additional specifications of equation (7) in which we 
replace contract by contract size and contract length, respectively. The reasons are the 
following. The contract dummy captures the effect of being included in the oil palm 
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industry for the entire village. However, we realize that there are large variations 
regarding the amount of villagers under contract. Therefore, we account for this by 
including contract size in an additional specification. We argue that contract size is 
positively correlated with WI because not only more villagers may benefit from contract 
farming but also other villagers may benefit more. For example, villages with larger 
shares of contract farmers may be more important for private companies than villages 
where only a few farmers are contracted. This may result in improved village 
infrastructure. In a third model specification of equation (7) we include the variable 
contract length. In doing so, we control for a time effect. It may be argued that villages 
where contracts were signed in the past (say 10 years ago) could exhibit a larger WI than 
villages that signed a contract in the more recent past (say 2 years ago). In a similar vein, 
the infrastructural improvements (e.g. roads, markets) need time to develop and thus to 
materialize their effect on WI. Therefore, the variable contract length captures the 
amount of years that passed since a contract was signed in a village. Technically, it takes 
the value 1 if the contract was signed in 2012, the value 2 if a contract was signed in 
2011, etc., and 0 if no contract was signed. In addition, to examine if the contract effect is 
linear or diminishes over time we add the squared terms of contract length. 
 
Modeling phase effects 
As we discussed earlier, the oil palm development in Jambi has undergone several 
phases. It may be argued that village wealth is affected by the actual phase a contract was 
adopted in. To investigate this, we distinguish two major phases: the government-led 
phase and the market-oriented phase. Within the former phase the basis of every contract 
was the package as well as subsidized loans which were not guaranteed anymore in the 
subsequent market-oriented phase. In fact, decentralization shifted budgetary 
responsibilities to the district governments which, consequently, competed for attracting 
private company investments (McCarthy et al. 2012). In addition, this phase introduced 
more competition among private companies which may have led to a better bargaining 
position of the village. However, negotiations had to be in line with district – rather than 
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central government – regulations, providing another opportunity for private companies to 
exploit their favorable position vis-à-vis district governments (idem). Moreover, villages 
that were involved in the oil palm industry in the government-led phase were more likely 
benefit from spillover effects induced by government infrastructural investments (Larson, 
1996). Taken together, we predict that compared to contracts adopted in the market-
oriented phase, contracts adopted in government-led phase had more potential to be 
beneficial for village communities. 
To model this, we specified an alternative specification that is almost identical to 
equation (7). The difference is that we break down the contract variable to account for 
the respective phase of adoption. In doing so, we replace contract with two dummy 
variables: the first dummy captures the effect of contracts that were adopted in the 
government-led phase; the second dummy captures the contract effect for the market-
oriented phase. The reference group consists of villages without a contract. Accordingly, 
we specified contract size. Overall, this allows us to control for some of the potential 
heterogeneity originating from the respective phase of adoption that may affect our 
outcome variable WI. 
 
3.4 Results and discussion 
Descriptive statistics 
Throughout the period of interest, from 1992 until 2012, contracts had been adopted in 
our research region. Out of our total sample of villages that existed in 1992 (N=78), 49 
were visited by an investor. Figure 5 depicts the year in which villages accepted (N=27) 
or rejected (N=22) a contract offer. It is striking that in the early 1990s relatively few 
offers were made which, in turn, were almost always accepted. Especially towards the 
end of our period of interest, however, villages were more frequently being visited and 
accepted the offers less often. Considering the process of liberalization associated with 
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the earlier mentioned market-oriented phase, the increasing involvement of private 
companies in the oil palm sector is not surprising. 
Whereas contractual opportunities increased, participation in contract farming schemes 
had overall been reduced throughout the entire period. In this regard, Figure 6 depicts the 
average share of households under contract in contract villages per year. The trend is 
clear: the number of households under contract is decreasing. Expressed in mean values, 
in 2002 about 43 % of the farming households participated in contract farming, and 35 % 
in 2012 (also see Table 5). Many smallholders have started to cultivate oil palm 
independently due to a decreasing need for company support for various reasons (i.e. 
better access to loans and inputs, acquired agronomic knowledge) (McCarthy, 2010). 
This is also reflected in our data. In 1992, only a small share of total oil palm land was 
cultivated independently (5%). This is in stark contrast to the year 2012 where the 
average share of independently cultivated oil palm land increased to 74% (Table 5). 
 
 










rejected (N=22) accepted (N=27)
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Figure 6. Average share of contract households per contract village by year
 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics I 
 
Means (Std. dev.) 
 
1992 2002 2012 
 
Full Sample (N=78) 












































Contract village sample (i.e. if contract exists in village) 
 N=1 N=17 N=27 




























Chapter 3: Contract Farming and Economic Development 63 
Next, in 2012 the average contract length was about 12.4 years (Table 5). The shortest 
contract length is 1 year and the longest contract lasted for 22 years suggesting that the 
most recent contract was adopted in 2012 and the longest lasting contract in 1991.
10
 It is 
also worth mentioning that none of the contracts ended during the period of interest. 
Finally, we observe some incidences of conflicts with a private company. These are 
mainly related to not well-understanding contract conditions and the alteration of 
conditions from the company side after the contract was agreed upon and signed. These 
issues have also been found to be major causes of conflict in other studies (Sirait, 2009; 
Rist et al., 2010). Despite the increase of signed contracts from 1992 – 2012, we observe 
that contractual conflicts exclusively occurred between 1992 and 2002. 
Table 5 and 6 summarize the descriptive statistics for our explanatory variables. Here, we 
want to highlight the WI variable. In 1992, the average village had a wealth score of 
0.27. Ten years later, the average village could almost double this score. Finally, in 2012 
this score reached the value 0.74. Although villages have become richer over the years, 
when they were first met by an investor, wealth was equally distributed across the sample 
villages (Table 6). In this respect, we do not find a significant difference between villages 
which were visited by an investor (0.36) and those which were not (0.34). Next, 
conditional on being visited, prior to contract adoption villages seem to have a 
significantly lower WI (0.32) compared to villages which rejected a contract offer (0.41). 
Less outside options (e.g. less employment opportunities) for villages before adopting a 
contract may be the reason. 
Comparing the remaining village characteristics of villages that were visited by an 
investor to those villages that were not, it seems that villages were fairly similar in terms 
of population, land area, distance to an all season road, access to electricity and village 
type (Table 6 column 2-3). The two groups of villages also differ in certain aspects. For 
                                                          
10
 Generally, we explain contract adoption with village characteristics from the year 1992. It may be 
argued that we run into problems of endogeneity when we use data for 1992 to explain contract adoption 
in 1991. However, we believe that village characteristics do not alter considerably within one year. Thus, 
we argue that the biases are likely to be minimal. Moreover, this is only the case for one observation. 
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example, investor villages were characterized by significantly steeper average land 
slopes and a location closer to an oil palm mill. In addition, investor villages also 
possessed on average more government land titles prior to being visited. This may point 
at a companies’ strategy to avoid areas with ongoing or the potential of land conflicts. 
 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics II 
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Notes: Means are based on data for the years 1992 and 2002, depending on the year of investor 
visit/contract adoption. If investor visit/contract adoption occurred between 1992-2001, we used the data 
for the year 1992; likewise, if investor visit/contract adoption occurred between 2002-2012, we used the 
data for the year 2002; the asterisks refer to the significance levels from a simple t-test between the groups 
(2)-(3) and (4)-(5), respectively; *** significance at the 1% level; ** significance at the 5% level; * 
significance at the 10% level. 
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Comparing village characteristics of villages prior to contract adoption with villages 
which rejected a contract offer (column 4-5), we only find little significant differences. 
Yet, contract villages consist significantly more of villages founded by the government-
led relocation program (26%), named the transmigrasi program. This is not surprising 
because all of the villages received a contract per definition. That there are 
transmigration villages which rejected the contract offer (9%) can be explained by the 
fact that a few transmigration villages received a contract in the 1980s and were 
approached by an investor after their first contract expired. It is worth mentioning that 
only one transmigrant village accepted a contract for the second time after the first one 
expired. We will now turn to the estimation results explaining contract adoption and 
impacts of contract farming on village wealth. 
 
Estimation results investor visit and contract adoption 
We model contract adoption in two steps because of its conditionality on investor visit. 
We employ a bivariate probit with selection model to deal with a possible selection bias 
(see Table A4 in the Appendix). The model is identified by using the average land slope 
as an instrument. The correlation in the errors equals -0.28 which is insignificant 
according to the Wald test. Consequently, our estimation results are unlikely to suffer 
from a selection bias. Thus, in Table 7 we present the univariate probit estimation results 
which generally confirm the estimation results of the bivariate probit with sample 
selection. 
Staying with the probit results in Table 7, the estimation results reveal that investors are 
more likely to visit villages with steeper average land slopes (equation 4). As we have 
argued, before the Indonesian government structurally focused on developing an oil palm 
sector in the early 1990s, the emphasis was on the rubber sector. The well-establishment 
of rubber in Jambi has led to a scarcity of land. As a consequence, available land was 
found in areas with, on average, steeper land slopes.  
Chapter 3: Contract Farming and Economic Development 66 
Next, the results suggest that villages that are located in proximity to an existing oil palm 
industry (i.e. oil palm mill) are more likely to be targeted by an investor. Specifically, 
every additional kilometer of distance from the village to the closest oil palm mill 
decreases the probability of being visited by an investor by 0.2%. This is not surprising 
because proximity to existing oil palm industry reduces transaction costs. In addition, a 
good connection to oil palm mills is needed to guarantee that the FFB are processed in a 
timely manner. Usually, when the fruits are harvested they start to perish rapidly after 48 
hours. 
Government land titles significantly predict investor visit. It appears that private 
companies are more attracted by villages with higher shares of secured land, rather than 
unsecured land that is largely governed by customary land rights. This is likely a 
response to the presence of many unresolved land conflicts between communities and 
companies which often resulted in physical opposition (Colchester et al., 2006) that, at 
the same time, disrupted smooth business operations. Overall, this result stresses the 
importance of formal land titles, not only for borrowing formal credit, but also to 
increase the villages’ attractiveness.  
Other factors, such as proximity to all season road and availability of electricity, we 
expected to be conducive to company operations, are not significant.  
We now turn to the discussion of the factors that affect the probability of contract 
adoption. Conditional on investor visit, we find that only one variable is significant. 
Villages without access to electricity have a 35% higher probability of adoption a 
contract. As predicted, no access to the public grid could be an indication for being 
located in rural areas where economic opportunities are often scant. Thus, a contract 
represents a welcome opportunity to stimulate economic development and thus, village 
wealth. Apart from this, none of the explanatory variables enter significantly in 
explaining contract adoption. 
Chapter 3: Contract Farming and Economic Development 67 
Finally, as a robustness check we reduced the explanatory variables in the model and find 
consistent results. We now turn to the results regarding the impact of contract adoption 
on village wealth. 




















































































Constant -0.854 0.512 
   
  (0.618) (0.564) 
   
Log likelihood -42.19 -29.64 
   
Wald chi
2
(9/8) 15.65 8.00 
   
Prob. > chi
2
 0.07 0.43 
   
Pseudo R
2
 0.18 0.12 
   
Notes: Explanatory variables are based on data for the years 1992 and 2002, depending on the year of 
investor visit/contract adoption. If investor visit/contract adoption occurred between 1992-2001, we used 
the data for the year 1992; likewise, if investor visit/contract adoption occurred between 2002-2012, we 
used the data for the year 2002;*** significance at the 1% level; ** significance at the 5% level; * 
significance at the 10% level; robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Impact of oil palm contracts 
Base regression results 
The regression results are depicted in Table 8. In all regression we use a fixed effects 
model, as the Hausman test largely suggests. 
First, we find that village wealth had increased for all villages: compared to 2002, in 
2012 the WI was around 22 percentage points higher. However, the mere adoption of a 
contract does not seem to significantly affect village wealth (column 1). Controlling for 
confounding factors, contract adoption becomes positively significant at the 10% level 
(column 2). Jointly, it seems that the mere presence of a contract only reveals a weakly 
significant effect on village wealth. Rather than contract adoption per se, it may be that 
the share of farmers under contract is pivotal for promoting the accumulation of village 
wealth. Indeed, contract size has a positive effect on village wealth (column 3) which 
remains significant after inserting control variables to the regression (column 4). In more 
detail, an increase of additional 10% of farmers under contract leads to a 7.3% increase 
in village wealth. 
Further, we argued that after a contract is adopted the materialization of wealth takes 
time. In different words, we predicted that village wealth increases in the years that have 
passed since the contract was signed. Indeed, one additional year of contract duration 
increases WI by about 4.4 percentage points (column 5). In addition, the effect appears to 
be non-linear: the squared term enters negatively significant which suggests that the 
positive effects associated with contract length diminish over time. These findings are 
robust to the effects of confounding factors (column 6). 
Regarding the explanatory variables, apart from distance to an all season road and 
contractual conflict, the remaining variables are not significant in the overall regression 
estimations. We find that increasing village accessibility is positively associated with 
village wealth. As we predicted, better village accessibility increases the access to 
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outside options and, thus, to participate in alternative income-generating activities (i.e. in 
neighboring cities, markets, etc.). 
Table 8. Panel estimation results for contract adoption, contract size and contract length 
 
Dependent variable: wealth index 
 
Coefficient (Standard error) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Year 2012 (d) 0.216*** 0.223*** 0.215*** 0.230*** 0.202*** 0.199*** 
 (0.025) (0.047) (0.024) (0.043) (0.028) (0.047) 
Contract (d) 0.129 0.154*     
 (0.089) (0.086)     
Contract size   0.628** 0.729***   
   (0.277) (0.224)   
Contract length (years)     0.044** 0.048*** 
     (0.018) (0.017) 
Contract length squared (years)     -0.002** -0.002** 
     (0.001) (0.001) 
Share of oil palm land under 
independent cultivationt-10 
 0.074  0.084  0.119 
 (0.103)  (0.106)  (0.111) 
Distance to oil palm millt-10 (km)  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Distance to all season roadt-10  (km)  -0.005*  -0.005*  -0.003 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002) 
Population densityt-10  -0.017  -0.028  -0.032 
  (0.082)  (0.081)  (0.081) 
Electricityt-10 (d)  -0.031  -0.043  -0.025 
  (0.047)  (0.046)  (0.048) 
Government land titlest-10  0.041  0.049  0.075 
  (0.085)  (0.082)  (0.086) 
Contractual conflictt-10 (d)  -0.082  -0.103  -0.142* 
  (0.056)  (0.067)  (0.087) 
Constant 0.481*** 0.457*** 0.449*** 0.431*** 0.464*** 0.436*** 
  (0.025) (0.073) (0.030) (0.074) (0.024) (0.073) 
Observations 156 156 156 156 156 156 
R
2
 (overall) 0.19 0.22 0.07 0.08 0.16 0.17 
Hausman 3.55 14.28** 9.27*** 31.84*** 20.61*** 53.72*** 
Model specification FE FE FE FE FE FE 
Notes: *** significance at the 1% level; ** significance at the 5% level; * significance at the 10% level; 
standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. 
Chapter 3: Contract Farming and Economic Development 70 
Table 9. Panel estimation results for contract adoption, contract size by adoption phase 
 
Dependent variable: wealth index 
 
Coefficient (Standard error) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Year 2012 (d) 0.225*** 0.206*** 0.226*** 0.209*** 
 
(0.046) (0.047) (0.043) (0.045) 










Government-led contract size (1991-1998) 
  
3.737*** 3.689*** 
   
(0.714) (0.728) 
Market-oriented contract size (1999-2012) 
  
0.686*** 0.623*** 
   
(0.232) (0.237) 









Share of oil palm land under independent 
cultivationt-10 
 
0.031 0.056 0.039 0.061 
(0.103) (0.107) (0.103) (0.107) 
Distance to oil palm millt-10 (km) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Distance to all season roadt-10 (km) -0.004* -0.004* -0.005* -0.004* 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Population densityt-10 -0.002 -0.027 -0.008 -0.026 
 
(0.084) (0.084) (0.083) (0.082) 
Electricityt-10 (d) -0.022 -0.011 -0.033 -0.022 
 
(0.048) (0.049) (0.046) (0.048) 
Government land titlest-10 0.033 0.014 0.045 0.031 
 
(0.085) (0.085) (0.082) (0.082) 
Contractual conflictt-10 (d) -0.076 -0.152* -0.097 -0.154* 
 
(0.051) (0.081) (0.062) (0.082) 
Constant 0.389*** 0.386*** 0.179 0.179 
  (0.082) (0.085) (0.114) (0.116) 
Observations 156 156 156 156 
R
2
 (overall) 0.13 0.10 0.01 0.01 
Hausman 18.45** 46.18*** 48.07*** 37.50*** 
Model specification FE FE FE FE 
Notes: *** significance at the 1% level; ** significance at the 5% level; * significance at the 10% 
level; standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. 
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Finally, contractual conflict affects wealth negatively (column 6). Since, it only enters 
significantly in one regression specification we should not overestimate this finding. 
Another interesting finding is that the share of oil palm land cultivated by independent 
smallholders is insignificant. However, this result should not be over-interpreted 
considering the use of lagged values. Compared to 2012, in the past independent 
smallholders were relatively few. We now examine if the actual phase of contract 
adoption matters for explaining WI. 
 
Results on government-led versus market-oriented contracts 
The results depicted in Table 9 reveal that contracts adopted before 1999, within the 
government-led phase, have an overall positive effect on village wealth (column 1). 
Compared to villages without a contract, these villages have had increased village wealth 
by 45%. In contrast, villages that adopted a contract after 1998 within the market-
oriented phase are not significantly different from villages without a contract. Rather 
than using the contract dummy, contract size enters positive and significant in both 
phases, compared to villages without a contract (column 3). In more detail, an additional 
10% increase of farmers under contract in the government-led phase leads to an increase 
in village wealth by about 37 percentage points. In contrast, an increase of 10% of 
farmers under contract within the market-oriented phase would lead to a relatively small 
7% increase in village wealth. Moreover, we control for contract length (column 2 and 
4). The insignificance of this variable allows us to argue that the respective phase of 
adoption (i.e. government-led, market-oriented), rather than the duration of the contract, 
matters for explaining village wealth. In terms of the size of the effect the estimation 
results suggest that, compared to contracts adopted within the market-oriented phase, 
government-led contracts reveal larger positive effects on village wealth. 
In sum, as predicted, compared to the market-oriented phase, the government-led phase 
is more associated with village wealth. Nevertheless, also the market-oriented phase, 
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associated with liberalization and more bargaining power for village communities, 
stimulated the accumulation of village wealth, however, to a relatively lesser degree. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we investigated the effects of community-company partnerships within 
the Indonesian oil palm sector on economic development at the village level. In addition, 
we examined the conditions under which partnership formations (i.e. contract farming) 
are established. We use data from a survey conducted in randomly selected villages 
where we collected recall data through structured interviews with village leaders 
covering a period of 20 years, from 1992-2012. 
The results suggest considerable positive economic benefits for villages within 
partnership formations with private companies. In particular, the share of farmers under 
contract appears to play a decisive role in inducing the accumulation of village wealth. 
Moreover, contract length is relevant as well. In this regard, villages that are involved in 
contract arrangements for many years tend to have larger village wealth levels, compared 
to villages where a contract has been established more recently. These positive effects 
associated with contract length, however, are not continuously increasing. At some point, 
the positive effects diminish.  
Furthermore, throughout the 20 year period of analysis contracts were established. The 
results suggest that contracts adopted in the government-led phase (before 1999) were 
more beneficial for improving village wealth than contracts that were adopted in the 
market-oriented phase (after 1999). We conjecture that these differences are due to 
contractual arrangements (i.e. oil palm service ‘package’, subsidized loans), government 
control and infrastructural investments that were more pronounced in the government-led 
phase. However, due to the complexity and various combinations of contract conditions, 
in this study we are unable to distinguish between the effects of these features. This will 
be an interesting avenue for future research. 
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Regarding the inclusion into the oil palm industry, the data show that the availability of 
land, proximity to an oil palm mill and secured land are the factors predicting that 
villages were targeted by private companies. Regarding the first, Jambi province is 
characterized by large areas which were already under rubber cultivation before oil palm 
was introduced. Increasingly, the availability of land shifted towards the remoter and 
more rural areas, where currently most of Jambi’s oil palm plantations are located. 
Second, rather than good village accessibility, proximity to existing oil palm industry 
(i.e. processing mill) is crucial for being targeted. This allows private companies to 
reduce their transaction costs. Third, the data suggest that increasing shares of farmers 
possessing formal land titles attracts private companies to the village. We conjecture that 
this is a result of increasing conflicts that arose due to unclear land rights and are likely 
to have negative effects for smooth business operations. In addition, this supports the 
relevance of secured land for the possible inclusion into community-company 
partnerships. 
Conditional on the factors that determine that an investor visits a village, we could 
demonstrate that no access to electricity predicts contract adoption at the village level. In 
different words, villages that are likely to be located in remoter areas because of their 
disconnection to the publicly provided grid seem to have few options to make an income; 
thus, these are more prone to adopt a contract. Overall, it appears that contract farming 
schemes have not been entirely equally accessible to all villages alike; however, we do 
not find evidence that the rural poor were excluded. 
From the results we can draw some policy recommendations. First of all, the analysis 
demonstrates the importance of formal land titles for attracting private companies to the 
village. An increasing governmental effort is required to make land titling more 
accessible and the titling process more affordable for rural farmers. Second, we show the 
relevance of improved infrastructure for village wealth. Further investments are needed 
to continue this positive development. 
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We realize that this research has some limitations. For example, we adopt a specific 
wealth measure to capture economic development. However, apart from an asset-based 
measure, economic development certainly has different aspects that we did not address. 
Future research could apply alternative and more durable wealth measures. For instance, 
the average income/consumption per capita could be used. Regarding a more durable 
measure, future research could adopt a wealth measure that captures the investment into 
expanding agricultural activities (i.e. share of households buying land in and outside their 
village). Further analysis is desirable that confirms the positive effects of contract 
farming for rural communities and expands the analysis for rural households. At the same 
time, the household-level analysis allows to investigate if contract farming has excluded 
certain farmers and if it has contributed to unequal economic developments within 
villages. 
Finally, despite the overall positive effects of community-company partnerships, contract 
farming should not be perceived as a panacea for improving rural livelihoods in 
Indonesia or elsewhere. In contrast, we observe that there are other means as well. For 
instance, Jambi province is characterized by rubber farmers and, more recently, a surge 
of independent oil palm smallholders. However, since oil palm cultivation requires 
resources and knowledge, contract farming provides a means to stimulate the 
development of an oil palm sector in its infant stages. The importance of contract 
farming in the oil palm industry in Jambi is likely to decrease. It should be acknowledged 
that the sector has been undergoing a structural change from vertically integrated 
plantations towards increasingly independent production of oil palm; a transformation 
which is similar to the tea sector in Sri Lanka (Herath and Weersink, 2009). However, 
there are other parts of Indonesia (and globally), i.e. Kalimantan, Borneo, where the oil 
palm boom is yet to start. 
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Chapter 4 
Market Integration and Institutional Change 
 
Abstract. A growing strand of literature investigates the links between formal and 
informal institutions and their effects on development. Yet, empirical research related to 
this topic is scarce. In this chapter, we analyze the effects of market integration into the 
oil palm sector on generalized trust at the village level. To do so, we elicit generalized 
trust through a behavioral experiment. Our data suggest that villages that are vertically 
integrated in the oil palm sector exhibit higher aggregated trust levels. Furthermore, we 
find long-term effects of market integration. The number of years villages are integrated 
in markets is positively associated with increased generalized trust. Analysis at the 
individual level suggests that the vertical integration of villages has a positive effect on 
trust preferences for all village inhabitants. Apart from contract participation increased 
investments in transportation and market infrastructure likely also increased the 
integration of non-contract participants into markets. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Ever since Putnam et al. (1993) introduced the concept of social capital to the economic 
realms, economists have started to relate it to economic performance. In this regard, trust 
as an aspect of social capital plays an important role. Trust among market actors reduces 
transaction costs, increases the frequency of successful transactions and long-term 
rewards (Bowles, 1998). In cross-country analyses and in more disaggregated contexts 
trust has frequently been found to be associated with economic growth (Knack and 
Keefer, 1997; Narayan and Pritchett, 1999; Den Butter and Mosch, 2003; Beugelsdijk 
and van Schaik, 2005; Bengtsson et al., 2005; Tu and Bulte, 2010). Considering these 
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beneficial effects for economic development, scholars have sought to explore the 
determinants of trust. 
Putnam et al. (1993) note that trust evolves by participating in various social 
environments within and outside individuals’ own groups where they experience trusting 
behavior. Translated to the market place as a social environment, Arrow (1972) argues 
that every business interaction among market actors has an element of trust. Specifically 
in developing countries, where rural economies are often characterized by spot markets, 
social relations among market actors are often personalized (e.g. family, kin, friends) and 
based on reciprocity (Fafchamps and Minten, 2001). In these economies, establishing 
formal contracts and, closely related monitoring compliance, may frequently be too 
costly. As a consequence, weak or absent formal institutions are often substituted for by 
trust that governs social relationships among market actors. Since interactions mainly 
occur with known others, their resulting trust relationships can be considered 
personalized. 
Rural economies in many developing countries are in transition, and as a result, markets 
become increasingly formal and interaction among actors more anonymous. In this 
regard, Meijerink et al. (2014) study the effects of the creation of a formal trading 
structure on personalized trust on the Ethiopian sesame market. They report that, after the 
emergence of a formal trading scheme, personalized trust for export traders has 
deteriorated. In contrast, for ‘other’ traders who still partly operate within the traditional 
system, personalized trust increased. Thus, the emergence of formalized markets may 
have deteriorating effects on personalized trust. Possibly, traders who started interacting 
with anonymous others developed a different form of trust: generalized trust (i.e. trust in 
anonymous others). This conjecture would be consistent with Henrich et al., (2001), who 
argue that increased market integration stimulates the creation of a positive attitude 
towards strangers and consequently generalized trust. Also in cross-country comparisons 
and behavioral experiments, increased market integration has been found to be conducive 
to generalized trust (e.g. Berggren and Jordahl, 2006; Fischer, 2008; Henrich et al., 
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2010). In contrast, in another study conducted in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, Siziba and 
Bulte (2012) report evidence of a negative effect of market integration (i.e. crop 
marketing) on generalized trust. The authors conjecture that this may be due to the 
exploitation of inexperienced farmers by experienced traders. Taken together, whether 
integration into more formal and thus anonymous markets promotes or impedes 
generalized trust preferences likely depends on the specific context. 
Among other modes of market integration, contract farming can be mentioned. The link 
with generalized trust, however, is not straightforward. On the one hand, contracts may 
be perceived as the basis for trust to evolve because it limits opportunities and 
opportunistic behavior. In turn, contractual relationships have also been argued to be 
detrimental to trust because contracts may be perceived as a sign for distrust. Under these 
circumstances control (i.e. monitoring compliance) and sanction mechanisms (i.e. threat 
of litigation) are required to maintain the formal relationship. Such contracts may lead to 
conflict, opportunism and defensive behavior (Lyons and Mehta, 1997) and thus 
reducing trust levels (Woolthuis et al., 2005). In sum, more empirical research is needed 
that takes into account the context-specificity that is likely to shape social preferences, 
such as trust. 
The main objective of this chapter is to contribute to the empirical literature on the 
determinants of trust. Specifically, we examine if integration in formalized markets – 
through contract farming – is conducive to generalized trust. Likewise, we investigate if 
increased integration in formalized markets has a positive effect on generalized trust. To 
do so, we use a measure of trust that is elicited through a behavioral experiment. This is 
in contrast to the use of simple survey questions to record trust preferences, as it is 
frequently done in literature (e.g. Berggren and Jordahl, 2006; Fischer, 2008; Siziba and 
Bulte, 2012; Meijerink et al., 2014). Survey questions, as used in the World Value 
Survey often appear ill-suited to measure trust and respondents are not incentivized to 
answer truthfully (Glaeser et al., 2000). 
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To address our objective we use the Indonesian oil palm sector as a study case. The 
arrival of oil palm in Indonesia in the 1970s was the start of major institutional changes. 
Large-scale agro-companies entered the sector and targeted entire village communities to 
access available land. In particular, vertical integration (i.e. contract farming schemes) 
introduced new relationships between contract participants and private companies, as it 
has been occurring in many countries (Swinnen and Maertens, 2007). Usually these 
emerging relationships between the market actors were more formalized and anonymized 
than before. This means that contracts instead of oral agreements constitute the relational 
basis and contract participants do business with an anonymous entity, such as ‘the 
company’ or ‘the cooperative’, instead of known fellow villagers. 
In addition to the direct effects of contract farming schemes on contract participants, 
there are also indirect effects associated with vertical integration. Specifically, an 
emerging industry develops along investments into market and transportation 
infrastructure to increase the efficiency of business operations within the industry 
(Govereh and Jayne, 2003). In addition, substantial migration into the area likely 
occurred as a result of high labor demand. This offers opportunities for villagers who are 
not directly participating in contract schemes but who live in the same village. These 
villagers are likely to benefit from improved market access that allows them to 
participate in various markets with new and anonymous market actors (e.g. migrants). 
Taken together, through the direct and indirect effects of vertical integration entire 
village communities underwent institutional changes. Thus, to examine the overall 
effects of formal market integration on generalized trust, we focus on the village level. 
However, although we hypothesize that both direct and indirect effects of vertical 
integration influence generalized trust, the village-level analysis does not allow an 
investigation of the relative importance of the respective effects. In different words, can 
we observe differences in generalized trust between contract-participants and non-
participants who all together live in the same village? To investigate this we make use of 
behavioral and survey data at the individual level. 
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This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we outline the context of this 
study and give some background information on the institutional change in the oil palm 
sector. In Section 3, we present the materials and methods used in this study. Section 4 
will discuss the main findings from the experiment and the regression analysis. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
4.2 Study context 
The commercial cultivation of oil palm in Indonesia has started some three decades ago. 
From 1990-2012 the oil palm area increased tenfold to 6.65 million ha (FAOSTAT, 
2014). This tremendous expansion has played a crucial role for spurring economic 
development and opportunities to alleviate poverty (Zen et al., 2005). As we will see, in 
this regard contract farming played a crucial role. 
This study was implemented in Jambi province, which during the last 20 years has been 
characterized by rapid oil palm expansion (Gatto et al., 2014). Oil palm was introduced 
by large-scale vertically integrated estates. In exchange for subsidized capital and access 
to land concessions, companies integrated smallholder farmers in surrounding villages 
through contract farming arrangements (Feintrenie et al., 2010a). Villages in which oil 
palm contract schemes were implemented underwent considerable institutional changes. 
In particular, new and formalized relationships were introduced between an anonymous 
entity (i.e. the company) and farmers. Specifically, formal contracts clearly defined 
responsibilities of the respective parties regarding, for instance, the delivery of inputs and 
technical assistance as well as output prices.
11
 Furthermore, farmers participated in loan 
repayment schemes to repay the granted loans required for land clearing and plot 
establishment (Larson, 1996). The institutional change also involved increased 
coordination and opportunities for collective action. For example, farmer cooperatives or 
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 For further information on contract conditions we refer the reader to Feintrenie et al. (2010a). 
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farmer groups were frequently established as an intermediary between the company and 
the farmers (McCarthy and Cramb, 2009). 
In those villages that were not included in the emerging oil palm sector, local 
communities largely rely on rubber as their main agricultural activity. However, in 
contrast to the oil palm sector, the Jambinese rubber market is characterized by what 
Fafchamps and Minten (2001) call a ‘flea market economy’. The relationship between 
farmers and traders are frequently informal and interactions take place on a cash-and-
carry basis. In addition farmers and traders have marketing agreements which are 
enforced by credit dependencies and trust-based relationships (Akiefnawati et al., 2010). 
The expansion of the oil palm sector in the research area was accompanied by substantial 
investments by the Indonesian government, in particular to develop transportation and 
market infrastructure (Larson, 1996). This resulted in decreased transaction costs 
associated with the logistics and commercialization of oil palm fruits, but also more 
generally contributed to improved market access in the respective villages. In addition, 
the large influx of migrants to the area contributed to the creation of new markets with 
anonymous actors (Budidarsono et al., 2013). 
 
4.3 Materials and methods 
Sampling strategy 
For this study, we purposively selected five districts in the Sumatran province of Jambi, 
Indonesia. Selection was based on the criterion to include spatial areas which are 
characterized by recent agricultural transformations towards monoculture rubber and oil 
palm. To further account for spatial variability we randomly selected five sub-districts 
per district. Next, in each of the sub-districts we further selected 4 villages on a random 
basis to arrive at the total sample of 100 village communities. As discussed, due to 
logistical difficulties we had to drop two villages. For the sample selection we relied on 
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an extensive list of villages from PODES. However, due to ethical concerns village elite 
raised in some villages regarding the economic experiment, we refrained from 
conducting it in all selected villages.
12
 As a result, for this study we draw on a total 
sample of 91 villages. 
Through a structured village survey we gathered information about the village 
communities by organizing group interviews with key villagers (i.e. village head, 
secretary, group leaders, elderly). In particular, we collected data on certain village 
aspects, such as village assets, land-use change, demographics, institutions, technology 
use, contractual arrangements with companies, etc. Six students from Jambi University 
facilitated the group interviews which were held in Bahasa Indonesia. Prior to data 
collection we extensively trained our enumerators. Data collection took place between 
September and December 2012. 
 
Trust experiment 
Most of the mentioned studies which investigate the relationship between formal market 
integration and informal institutions measure trust with survey questions (e.g. Knack and 
Keefer, 1997; Beugelsdijk and van Schaik, 2005; Bengtsson et al., 2005; Meijerink et al., 
2014). It has been argued that survey questions, as posed in the World Value Survey fail 
to adequately measure trust, instead trustworthiness is captured (Glaeser et al., 2000). 
Therefore, for this study we conducted a behavioral experiment to elicit respondents’ 
generalized trust preferences. 
Regarding the experimental setup, we followed the traditional format of the well-
established economic experiment, as pioneered by Berg et al., (1995). Basically, two 
players are randomly paired to one another and both receive an endowment of Indonesian 
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 Ethical concerns were mainly related to the perceived fairness of our recruitment strategy; only a random 
draw of villagers could participate in the game and receive a reward, whereas others were randomly 
excluded. In all villages we played the game only with prior consent of the village elite. 
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Rupiah (IDR) 20,000
13
 each. We framed this as a show-up fee. Next, the first-mover – 
the sender – is invited to send any amount between 0 and IDR 20,000 to an anonymous 
second player – the receiver. Before the sender makes his/her decision (s)he is told that 
any amount sent would be tripled. By tripling the amount sent, we induce socially 
efficient behavior. Once the receiver receives the amount sent, (s)he is deliberate in the 
amount returned to the sender. Of course, the combined payoff is maximized if the 
sender sends his/her total endowment, whereas both players equally benefit from the 
maximized payoff if the receiver returns half of his total endowment. The amount sent by 
the sender is generally been treated as his/her trust preference. In case the sender does not 
trust the receiver to return anything, (s)he would send nothing. Since the game was 
played anonymously and thus participants were not aware of the identity of their partners 
in the game
14
, we elicit generalized as opposed to personalized trust preferences. To 
explain the game we used a script which was translated to Bahasa Indonesia and read-out 
in front of the participants (see Appendix C)
15
. 
In total, 902 individuals participated in the experiment. Out of our pool of 91 villages we 
randomly selected our respondents. We assigned slightly more participants (N=474) to 
the role of the sender than to the role of the receiver (N=428). The reason is the 
following. The selected respondents did not all show up at the experiment, leaving us 
with an unequal number of participants. When this occurred we tried to replace the 
absent respondent; however, this was often not feasible. Also, to ‘disinvite’ an already 
selected participant to get an equal number of senders and receivers was due to ethical 
concerns not justifiable. Therefore, in case we had more senders than receivers we 
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 At the time of the data collection USD 1 exchanged into IDR 9,500. On average the wage rate in our 
study region was IDR 60-70 thousand per day. 
14
 Usually, we conducted the experiment in a public building (e.g. school, office village head). In doing so, 
we attempted to increase the privacy of the decisions of the participants. Prior to experiment start, we 
stressed the importance of keeping all information exchanged with us to themselves and kindly ask them to 
not talk to fellow participants. Throughout the course of the experiment, the group of participants was 
constantly supervised by one or more enumerators. 
15
 To avoid an ‘order’ bias to drive our results each of the three teams of enumerators had a different order 
of examples used to explain the game. 
Chapter 4: Market Integration and Institutional Change 83 
randomly assigned one sender to another participating receiver. This strategy allowed us 
to elicit the sender’s behavior without reducing the number of participants. After we 
conducted the trust experiment respondents participated in a short individual survey 
which covered basic socioeconomic data, such as sex, age, years of education, household 
size, social participation, contract farming participation. 
 
Empirical strategy 
We want to explore how generalized trust varies across villages with (increased) formal 
market integration. To model this, we specify the following OLS model: 
 
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑣 =  𝛼1 +  𝛽1𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑣 +  𝛾1𝑋𝑣 +  𝑣,         (8) 
 
where 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑣 is the aggregated generalized trust measure for village v, the 𝛼’s, 𝛽’s and 
𝛾’s are parameters to be estimated, and 𝑣 is an i.i.d. error term. Aggregated generalized 
trust was calculated as the mean amount sent (by the senders) for each village based on 
the individual results of the trust game. The variable 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑣 is defined as 
a dummy variable that captures if a village v is vertically integrated, that is a contract was 
signed in village v at some point (we refer to these villages as contract village). Further, 
in a second model specification based on equation (8), 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑣 refers to a 
continuous variable that captures the possible long-term effects of increasing market 
integration (we refer to this variable as contract length). The values of contract length 
refer to the number of years that have passed since the contract was signed in village v 
(i.e. 2012=1, 2011=2, …, 1986=27). 
The vector of variables 𝑋𝑣 includes various village characteristics to control for 
confounding factors related to (i) basic village aspects, (ii) general market access, and 
(iii) social capital. Regarding the first, we control for population density, WI, if a village 
is dominated by an indigenous or migrant population, and conflict related to land and 
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contracts. With respect to general market access, we control for the distance to the closest 
market, and if commercial logging took place in the village. Finally, we include a range 
of variables related to a village’s social capital: village homogeneity, village 
neighborhood density, mosque density and if it is possible to sanction the village head for 
misbehavior. Table 13 provides a description of the variables included in the model. 
Finally, to capture unobserved heterogeneity at the district level, we also include district 
fixed effects. 
In the literature, it is often stressed that generalized trust and market participation may be 
determined simultaneously (e.g. Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Berggren and Jordahl, 
2006; Fischer, 2008; Tu and Bulte, 2010). As discussed, we expect the integration in 
formal markets to have a positive effect on trust preferences. Yet, individuals with higher 
generalized trust levels may also be more likely to engage in market activities.
16
 
Likewise, increased aggregated trust at the village level may reflect the general attitude 
of cohorts of villagers towards the good intentions of private companies and thus their 
willingness to engage in contract farming schemes. Therefore, in the above model 
specifications the contract variables may be endogenous. To address this issue, we 
employ an IV estimator in addition to OLS. We identified investor visit as a good 
instrument. Prior to contract adoption, an oil palm investor visits the village to explain 
about oil palm cultivation and to propose a contract. Investor visit is highly correlated 
with contract adoption but it is less likely that investors affect generalized trust 
preferences directly. In this regard, first, building trust is likely a process that takes 
longer than a couple of visits and, second, repeated interaction with a known investor 
likely affects personalized instead of generalized trust. In sum, we believe that the effect 
of our instrument on generalized trust preferences is channeled through contract 
adoption. There is no reason to believe that trust has an influence on the probability of 
investor visit. 
                                                          
16
 For example, see Woolthuis et al. (2005) who argue that a certain trust level is required to engage in 
contract negotiations. 
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Apart from the village-level analysis we want to understand if there are differences in 
generalized trust between contract-participants and non-participants who live in the same 
village all together. To do so, we utilize our behavioral and survey data at the individual 
level. The following equation models individual generalized trust as a function of 
individual-specific and village-specific variables: 
 
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖 =  𝛼2 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖 +  𝛾2𝑋𝑖 + 𝛿𝑋𝑣 +  𝑖 ,         (9) 
 
where 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖 refers to the amount sent (by the senders) in the experiment of individual 
i; 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾 and 𝛿 are parameters to be estimated, and 𝑖 is an i.i.d. error term. The variable 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖 is a dummy variable that equals one if an individual i participates in contract 
farming and zero if individual i does not participate in contract farming. The vector of 
variables 𝑋𝑖 includes individual-specific control variables (e.g. sex, age, years of 
education, household size). Finally, to control for confounding factors at the village level, 
𝑋𝑣 includes variables related to village-specific social capital and market access. 
Similar to the village-level analysis, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖 may be endogenous. In contract villages, 
the farmer’s decision to adopt a contract may be influenced by ex ante trust preferences. 
Therefore, an IV approach is employed to address the endogeneity stemming from 
reverse causality issues. We identified the share of oil palm land at the village level as an 
instrument. We argue that within contract villages the share of oil palm land is correlated 
with the incidence that a farmer participates in a contract farming scheme. Probably, the 
larger the share of oil palm land in a given contract village, the more likely it is that an 
individual is participating in a contract scheme. In contrast, at the individual level the 
decision to participate in contract farming cannot influence the share of oil palm land at 
the village level. Likewise, it is unlikely that the outcome variable 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖, as a measure at 
the individual level, affects the share of oil palm land, as a variable at the village level. 
Overall, we argue that the effect of the instrument on the outcome variable is channeled 
through the endogenous variable. 
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Finally, to examine individual generalized trust differences between contract and non-
contract participants, we focus on contract villages only. As a consequence, we exclude 






We start with the presentation of the experimental results. The amount sent by the 
respondents in the trust experiment amounts to IDR 8,428 (Table 10). Considering the 
initial endowment (IDR 20,000), on average the fraction sent was 0.42. In turn, the 
average amount returned by the receiver in the game amounted to IDR 17,334. These 
findings are consistent with earlier empirical work conducted in the lab with students and 
in the field with farmers around the world (see Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008). 
Based on the individual behavioral experimental outcomes, at the village level the 
average aggregated amount sent amounts to IDR 8,453
18
 (Table 11). Comparing contract 
villages (N=33) with non-contract villages (N=58) reveals differences in trust levels. In 
this regard, respondents in contract villages sent on average almost IDR 650 more than 
respondents in non-contract villages, IDR 8,868 and IDR 8,216, respectively. The 
difference is statistically significant at the 10% level. This provides a descriptive 
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 Alternatively, we could have formulated equation (9) in such a way that we would not have to exclude 
the villages without a contract. Variables included would be 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖  that captures if an individual i has a 
contract or not, and 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑣 which captures if a contract exists in a given village v. In this specification 
the coefficient for 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖 captures the difference in trust between contract and non-contract participants 
who live in the same village. In contrast, the coefficient for  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑣 captures trust levels for non-
contract participants who live in a contract village. In this model both variables, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖 and 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑣 , 
are possibly endogenous. Unfortunately, we were unable to identify two valid instruments at the same time. 
Therefore we decided to exclude the non-contract villages. This allows us to deal with only one 
endogenous variable. 
18
 The attentive reader may have noticed that the average amount sent differs between the individual and 
the village level. This is mainly due to rounding mean values. Remember that the mean values at the 
village level are based on mean trust values at the individual level which. 
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indication that increased market integration is positively associated with generalized 
trust. 
Table 10. Descriptive results of individual trust levels for contract villages 

























Notes: Mean values; standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Notes: Mean values; standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
With respect to contract villages, individual respondents (N=168) sent on average IDR 
8,928 in the trust game. Comparing contract participants (N=41) with non-contract 
participants (N=127) reveals that individuals who are contracted sent on average IDR 
9,682 and non-contract participants IDR 8,685. The difference in the amount sent, 
however, is insignificant as Table 10 depicts. This also provides a first descriptive 
indication supporting our hypothesis that contract and non-contract participants exhibit 
similar trust preferences induced by direct and indirect effects stemming from increased 
market integration. 
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Turning to the socioeconomic characteristics of the experiment participants, around 64% 
of our respondents are male and average age is 42 years. Furthermore, respondents seem 
to be well educated having on average 8 years of schooling. For an extensive summary 
statistics see Table 12. 
Table 12. Summary statistics of experimental results and respondents 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Experimental variables     
   Aggregated Trust (amount sent) 8,453 2,345 4,000 14,800 
   Trust (amount sent) 8,428 5,137 0 20,000 
   Fraction sent (amount sent/20,000) 0.421 0.257 0 1 
   Trustworthiness (amount returned)
t
 17,334 12,815 0 80,000 
Socioeconomic variables     
   Male (d) 0.635 0.482 0 1 
   Age 42.01 11.74 18 76 
   Years of education 8.031 3.224 0 18 
   Household size 4.616 1.538 1 11 
   Truck ownership (d) 0.932 0.268 0 1 
Contract variables     
   C-CV 
a
 (d) 0.086 0.281 0 1 
   NC-CV 
b
 (d) 0.268 0.443 0 1 
   NC-NCV 
c
 (d) 0.646 0.478 0 1 
Notes: 474 obs.; 
t
 428 obs.; 
a 
C-CV: contract-participant in contract village; 
b 
non-contract 
participant in contract village; 
c 
non-contract participant in non-contract village. 
Table 13 describes and summarizes the socioeconomic village-level data. In terms of 
market integration, 60% of the sample villages were visited by an investor, a 
representative of an oil palm company. Conditional on investor visit, contracts are 
adopted. Considering our total sample, in 36% of the villages an oil palm contract was 
established. In addition, conditional on the existence of a contract the average length of a 
contract is 13.5 years. Considering the lifespan of oil palm trees of about 25 years, the 
average contract length suggests that the average contracted oil palm plantation reached 
full maturity. 
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Table 13. Summary statistics and description of village-level variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Contract variables     
   Investor visit (d) 0.604 0.492 0 1 
   Contract village (d) 0.363 0.483 0 1 
   Contract length; if contract village =1 
   (1=2012; 2=2011, … , 27=1986) 
13.52 6.519 1 27 
Village-level controls     
   Population density  
   (No. of villagers per ha; pop/village land) 
1.001 1.031 0.078 5.561 
   Wealth index 
a
 0.744 0.135 0.352 1 
   Indigenous village (d) (dominated by     
   indigenous group) 
 
0.604 0.492 0 1 
   Conflict in village (d) 0.341 0.476 0 1 
   Distance to closest market (km) 6.267 7.791 0.011 48 
   Logging activities (d) 0.593 0.494 0 1 
   Village homogeneity  
   (share of dominant ethnical group) 
0.812 0.165 0.421 1 
   Village neighborhood density  
   (No. of neighborhoods per 1000 villagers) 
1.874 0.957 0.556 4.324 
   Mosque density  
   (No. of mosques per 1000 villagers) 
2.537 1.945 0.556 8.576 
   Sanction village head (d) 0.604 0.492 0 1 
   Share of oil palm land  
   (oil palm land/total village land) 
0.194 0.268 0 0.961 
Notes: Observations: 91; 
a 
wealth index is an index based on the relative share of households 
owning certain assets such as motorbike, car, truck, cellphone, fridge, etc. in a given village. 
We created the wealth index following Sahn and Stifel's (2003) approach. 
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Regarding village-level characteristics, the mean population density equals one, meaning 
that on average one villager accounts for exactly one hectare of village land. Moreover, 
the mean village has a relative wealth score of 0.74. This value is based on the share of 
households owning certain assets (such as motor, car, truck, television, satellite dish, 
fridge, mobile phone) in a given village as compared to other villages.
19
 Next, the mean 
distance to the nearest market is about six km. Another source of market exposure and/or 
conflict stems from the presence of commercial logging activities in the village. We 
observe that about 60% of the villages were exposed to commercial logging activities at 
some point. 
Furthermore, 60% of the sample villages are dominated by Jambi’s indigenous ethnicity, 
the Melayu Jambi and thus have a more sedentary lifestyle. In contrast, the remaining 
40% of the villages are dominated by either people who migrated spontaneously or who 
arrived in Jambi through a government-led relocation program (Budidarsono et al., 
2013). Whereas the first group mainly migrated from other parts of Sumatra, the latter 
group has its origin in Java. Moreover, villages seem to be fairly similar in ethnical 
terms. On average, around 81% of the villagers belong to the same ethnicity. 
Regarding social capital, we use various proxies that may influence trust. Here the idea is 
that trust is an outcome of bonding with people with the same affiliation (i.e. 
neighborhood, religious). Our sample villages on average consist of about two 
neighborhoods and 2.5 mosques per 1000 inhabitants. In addition, we use the possibility 
to sanction village heads for malpractice as a proxy for a democratic village community 
that is equipped with working institutions, and thus trust. It appears that in merely 60% 
of the villages the village heads can be sanctioned for malpractice. 
Finally, villages have substantially been subject to conflict. In 34% of the villages 
conflicts exists between villagers and the government of private companies. These 
conflicts mainly revolve around contract-related and land issues. This supports earlier 
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 We constructed a wealth index as described in Sahn and Stifel (2003). In addition, we normalized the 
variable between 0 and 1. 
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findings on contractual conflicts that have often emerged as a result of lack of 
transparency and absence of free and prior consent (Rist el al., 2010). Also incidences of 
land issues have frequently been reported (Colchester et al., 2006). 
 
Market integration and generalized trust 
Table 14 depicts the regression results investigating the link between increased market 
integration and generalized trust at the village level. As a comparison, columns (1) and 
(2) show OLS estimates. As discussed, due to the endogeneity of the contract variables 
we also employ an IV approach. The columns (5) and (6) reveal the first stage estimation 
results. Here, the instrument – investor visit – significantly explains the contract variables 
at the 1% significance level. Overall the partial F statistic is high enough to argue for the 
presence of a strong instrument. 
Our results show that contract villages exhibit significantly higher generalized trust 
levels than non-contract villages. Specifically, the aggregated amount sent in contract 
villages was IDR 1,700 higher compared to non-contract villages (column 3). 
Furthermore, we examine if market integration has a long-term effect on generalized 
trust. Thus we predicted that generalized trust at the village level increases with 
increasing market integration. As a proxy for this we use the length of a contract (i.e. 
number of years that have passed since the contract was signed). Indeed, our data suggest 
that an additional year of contract length increases the amount sent by IDR 130 (column 
4). It appears that generalized trust, rather than being static, is likely to increase over time 
with market integration. In addition, all estimation results are robust to the influence of 
confounding factors at the village and district level. 
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0.28 0.24 
Partial F first stage 
      
41.08 26.38 
Test of exogeneity 
        
       Robust score chi
2
(1) 
   
1.76 0.99 
   
Notes: Number of observations: 91; robust std. errors in parentheses; ***statistical significant at 
the 1% level; **statistical significant at the 5% level; *statistical significant at the 10% level. 
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Indirect Market Participation Effects 
We now analyze the indirect effects of the emergence of formalized vertical integration 
into the oil palm sector on generalized trust. To this end, we utilize our individual 
dataset. In particular, we want to find out if there are trust differences between contract 
participants and non-participants living in the same village. An insignificant estimate 
would be in line with our prediction that all village inhabitants – irrespective of contract 
participation – drive the earlier found trust difference between contract and non-contract 
villages. As done before, we deal with the endogeneity of the contract variable by 
employing an IV strategy. Generally, the identified instrument – share of oil palm land – 
performs well. In the first stage it is significantly correlated with the endogenous 
variables (Table 15 column 6) and the partial F statistic suggests for the presence of a 
fairly strong instrument. 
To start with, as robustness check for our significant findings at the village level we re-
ran the earlier regression using the individual dataset and similar sets of village controls 
(column (1) and (3) depict the estimation results for OLS and 2SLS, respectively). 
Overall, we can confirm the earlier significant findings. 
Using the individual dataset and the total sample also allows us to control for individual 
characteristics. Apart from the dummy variable male capturing the gender of the 
respondent, the included individual controls enter insignificantly. Regarding the dummy, 
the data reveal that male respondents on average sent IDR 1,272 more compared to their 
female fellows (column 3). A possible explanation could be that male respondents acted 
more strategically in the experiment. As Buchan et al. (2008) argue the only option to 
increase personal wealth is by trusting the respondent (i.e. sending more money). 
However, analyzing if trust differences among male and female respondents are due to 
strategic behavior in the experiment or more related to social preferences (Croson and 
Buchan, 1999) goes beyond the scope of this research.  
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Table 15. Estimation results for indirect trust effects 
 OLS  












































   Contract Village (d) 962.9* 
(523.8) 
  1887.3** 
(970.3) 
    
   Contract Participant (d)  372.5 
(1014.7) 
  736.9 
(3858.9) 
   
Individual Controls 





























































   Investor visit (d)       0.492*** 
(0.031) 
 
   Share of oil palm land        0.379*** 
(0.131) 



















 0.04 0.04 
 
0.03 0.04 




      
0.36 0.12 
Partial F first stage 
      
245.7*** 8.47*** 
Test of exogeneity 
        
      Robust score chi
2
 (1) 
   
1.16 0.01 
   
Notes: Robust std. errors in parentheses; ***statistical significant at the 1% level; *statistical 
significant at the 5% level; *statistical significant at the 10% level; village controls include 
distance to market, village neighborhood density, mosque density, village homogeneity. 
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The main finding derived from Table 15 is the following. Conditional on living in a 
contract village, the data suggest that the difference in trust levels is insignificant 
between contract participants and non-participants. This finding supports our expectation 
that indirect effects from vertical integration, induced by improved market and 
transportation infrastructure and migration into the area, on trust preferences are possible. 
In contrast to contract participants who likely increased their generalized trust levels 
through repeated interaction in contract farming schemes, non-contract participants' 
increased generalized trust may be a result of a different influence. Specifically, we 
conjecture that non-contract participants increasingly participate in emerging markets 
with more anonymous market actors, such as migrants who settled in proximity to the oil 
palm industry to work as labor and smallholders on the estates. This likely also 
introduced more formalized relationships that go beyond oral agreements and 
personalized trust-based relationships. The results are similar for both OLS and using a 
IV estimator (column 2 and 4). In addition, the results are robust to confounding factors 
at the individual and village level. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter we investigate the effects of formalized market integration on generalized 
trust at the village level. We hypothesize that market integration in the oil palm sector 
had direct and indirect effects on villagers' generalized trust preferences. Direct effects 
mainly stem from participation in contract farming and repeated interaction with 
anonymous business actors in a formalized manner. Indirect effects, induced by 
investments made to improve market and transportation infrastructure, and increased 
interaction with anonymous market actors (i.e. migrants), possibly also affected villagers 
who did not directly participate in contract farming schemes. To capture these direct and 
indirect effects of market integration we focus the analysis on the village level. To arrive 
at a village-level trust measure, we aggregated the individual trust preferences that were 
elicited with a behavioral experiment. 
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We find that aggregated generalized trust levels are higher in villages that are vertically 
integrated in the oil palm sector through contract farming schemes. It appears that, 
generally, contract farming provides the market actors with a stable environment that 
appears to limit opportunities but also opportunistic behavior (Woolthuis et al., 2005). In 
case no party defaults on the contract partnership such a formalized business 
environment seems to be conducive to the development of generalized trust. In our study 
region conflicts emerge, revolving around land and contractual issues, that may shatter 
contractual relationships. However, the findings suggest that this is not the case. 
Possibly, conflicts that affect the entire village are less likely to considerably affect the 
preferences of individual villagers. Unfortunately, due to data constraints we are unable 
to further investigate if conflict experienced at the individual level has negative effects 
on individual trust preferences. In a similar vein, Siziba and Bulte (2012) also conjecture 
that their observed lowered generalized trust levels are due to conflict between farmers 
and traders. This provides an interesting avenue for future research. 
Furthermore, the data suggest for the presence of long-term effects of market integration. 
In this regard, villages that are for a longer period of time vertically integrated (proxied 
by the number of years that have passed since the contract was signed) reveal higher 
generalized trust preferences. We also investigated the relative importance of the direct 
and indirect effects of market integration on generalized trust. To do so, we conducted 
the analysis at the individual level. The data suggest that, within contract villages, 
contract participants and non-contract participants have similar generalized trust 
preferences. This provides tentative evidence that the found increases in aggregated trust 
preferences at the village level is not driven by contract participants only (direct effect), 
but that non-contract participants also increased their trust preferences as a result of 
being exposed to indirect effects of an emerging oil palm sector. 
Overall, the results are in line with earlier finding from cross-country analyzes 
supporting a positive relationship between increased market integration and generalized 
trust (e.g. Berggren and Jordahl, 2006; Fischer, 2008; Henrich et al., 2010). However, in 
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a more micro study setting other studies have found evidence for a negative relationship 
between market integration and trust (see for instance Siziba and Bulte, 2012). Although 
we find a positive effect of market integration on generalized trust the overall literature 
presents mixed results. Possibly, these are due to the context-specificity under which 
generalized trust evolves. But also more technically, the mixed findings may be a result 
of applying two different measures of trust which are either based on survey questions or 
on behavioral experiments. We encourage further research to confirm our findings for 
contract farming within the oil palm sector. At the same time, research is needed to 
expand our understanding of how generalized trust is affected by increased market 
integration. This would require to account for different levels of analysis (i.e. individual, 
village), various measures of market integration (i.e. contract farming, crop marketing, 
calorie consumption) and, more technically, different measures of trust (i.e. survey 
questions, behavioral experiment). 
We acknowledge that this research has limitations and raises more questions. For 
example, the examination of long-term effects is based on cross-sectional differences 
between the sample villages. The use of a panel dataset for generalized trust preferences 
could provide an indication if trust has actually evolved in the same villages due to 
increased market integration. Furthermore, a question that comes up when looking at the 
results is what happens to personalized trust in villages that were vertically integrated but 
also where no contract was signed? Did personalized trust erode as a consequence of 
being integrated into markets. And likewise, did personalized trust remain unaffected in 
villages without a contract? That personalized trust is likely to erode due to the 
emergence of a formalized market integration has been reported by Meijerink et al. 
(2014). A further investigation for the oil palm sector is needed to further our 
understanding whether personalized and generalized trust preferences are complements 
or substitutes. 
Finally, there are policy implications which can be drawn from our study. This research 
indicates that compared to an evolutionary process, social preferences may be affected by 
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more short-term stimuli, such as the emergence of the oil palm sector. This may be of 
particular interest considering the virtuous circle which exists between market integration 
and generalized trust. In addition to the direct effects of contract farming arrangements, 
infrastructural improvements also positively contribute. Thus, further investments into 
rural infrastructure should be made to sufficiently connect, especially rural, villages to 
emerging markets. 
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During the past decades, various interrelated factors have encouraged governments to 
promote the development of their agricultural sectors. The major factors are, population 
growth, rising incomes and thus an increasing global demand for natural commodities, 
but also emerging opportunities to spur (rural) economic development, and being 
resilient to international price shocks.  At first, agricultural sectors were largely financed 
by public investments. Later, many countries approved structural economic reforms that 
aimed to liberalize (agricultural) markets in a bid to attract private investments. This 
allowed large-scale private companies to enter agricultural sectors. At the same time, 
local smallholder farmers were involved extensively in agricultural sectors, largely 
through contract farming arrangements. 
Overall, the promotion of agricultural sectors bears many challenges and opportunities 
alike. This is especially the case for rural areas where still most of the people deemed 
extremely poor are living as well as tropical areas where much of the world’s natural 
richness can be found. In this dissertation, I analyzed the implications of an emerging 
agricultural sector in a specific rural and tropical region. In detail, I empirically 
investigated the effects of the emerging Indonesian oil palm sector on rural village 
communities in Jambi province, Sumatra. The overall study broke down into three 
specific areas: land-use dynamics, economic development, and institutional change. In 
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Land-use dynamics 
Agricultural investments have transformed many rural tropical landscapes in developing 
and transition countries worldwide. Oftentimes, tropical areas have undergone 
considerable land-use changes towards perennial crops, and have experienced an 
immense reduction of their forest cover. Today, the oil palm expansion has often been 
held responsible for much of the observed negative environmental implications, 
associated with deforestation. But who is to blame? Whereas much of the oil palm 
cultivation is still under control of private large-scale agro-companies, local smallholder 
farmers have become increasingly important actors within the oil palm industry. In many 
studies at the macro level, private companies and smallholder farmers have often been 
clubbed together, which complicates the separation of the effects of agricultural 
investments on land-use dynamics and the related implications. Also, the empirical 
evidence for local village communities is scant. Additionally, many studies on land-use 
dynamics neglect to investigate the drivers of land-use change, specifically studies on oil 
palm. 
To fill these gaps in the literature, I examined land-use dynamics at the village level of 
three land-use systems: oil palm, rubber, and forest. The dynamics were analyzed by 
looking at land-use over time. In particular, I focused on explaining village-level land-
use in 2002 and 2012 by land-use from previous time periods as well as socioeconomic 
and policy variables. I showed that in spite of significant oil palm expansion, rubber 
remains the dominant crop in the study region. Furthermore, in contrast to many macro-
level findings, I found that oil palm was not a major driver of deforestation in the study 
region. Instead, past land-use changes towards rubber plantations and the timber industry 
were most likely the drivers. However, indirect effects on deforestation are possible since 
oil palm growth occurs in locations with ongoing logging activities. Although, I do not 
want to suggest that the oil palm expansion is not a driver of deforestation. The findings 
suggest that it is of major importance to distinguish between the actors involved in oil 
palm cultivation to make assumptions about who exactly is responsible for deforestation.  
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In addition, I demonstrated the relevance of socioeconomic and policy factors in 
explaining land-use trajectories. Especially a relocation program was instrumental to the 
oil palm development. Mainly people from the densely populated islands Java and Bali 
were given resources and land in remote areas of Jambi to start cultivating oil palm. In 
contrast, many autochthonous villages have started growing oil palm later and expand 
their oil palm areas at a slower pace. 
 
Contract farming and economic development  
The Indonesian government promoted the establishment of private large-scale plantations 
which frequently involved cohorts of farmers in outgrower schemes under contract 
farming arrangements. Despite the fact that these arrangements have been in place 
already for almost as long as the arrival of oil palm in Indonesia, the empirical evidence 
on the potentially beneficial economic outcomes remains surprisingly scarce, mixed, and 
mostly based on descriptive analyses. In addition to the economic effects, I analyzed the 
inclusion of villages into the oil palm sector. The inclusion encompasses two aspects. 
First, an oil palm representative or investor targets certain villages suitable for being 
included into the oil palm industry. Second, conditional on being visited by an investor, 
usually cohorts of farmers organized in farmer cooperatives collectively adopt a contract. 
In the related literature, studies mainly focus on households’ decisions to adopt a contract 
within villages. However, due to the collective decision, village-level factors likely play 
a decisive role in participating in contract farming schemes. Moreover, investigating the 
inclusion into the oil palm sector across villages allows for taking a broader perspective 
that could be useful for the formulation of policies. The research gaps were addressed by 
firstly investigating the factors that determine the inclusion of villages into the oil palm 
sector through contract farming schemes. Second, I evaluated the impact of this form of 
market integration on economic development at the village level. 
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Contract adoption 
Since the adoption of contract farming arrangements is conditional on an investor who 
visits a village to propose a contract, I investigated contract adoption as a two-step 
model. By controlling for the conditionality, I estimated the impact of village-level 
factors on the probability of contract adoption. The findings suggest that certain factors 
predicted that investors visited certain villages. In particular, these are the availability of 
village land, proxied by larger shares of village land characterized by steep land slopes, 
the proximity of a village to an oil palm mill and formal land titles.  
Regarding land slopes, in Jambi province much of the flat land slopes can be found in 
areas that are under extensive agricultural cultivation (i.e. rubber). This may be better 
understood, knowing that rubber plantations were introduced many years before the 
advent of oil palm in Jambi province. Thus, conversely, steep land slopes may reflect 
(rural) areas characterized by little agricultural activities and, consequently, more 
available village land. Next, the proximity to an oil palm mill can be considered a 
plausible predictor of investor visit because shorter distances generally reduce 
transactions costs and guarantee that FFB are processed in a timely manner.  
In addition, I found that formal land titles predict investor visit. I conjecture that this is a 
conflict avoiding strategy as community-company relationships have increasingly been 
afflicted with conflict. Next, conditional on being visited by an investor, the findings 
suggest that access to electricity discourages village communities to participate in 
contract farming schemes. I conjecture that these villages have few outside options to 
engage in business activities. This may be due to the location of villages in remoter areas 
which are often not connected to the public grid. Other variables are insignificant.  
Overall, it appears that, at the village level, contract farming schemes have not been 
entirely equally accessible; however, I did not find evidence that the rural poor were 
excluded either. 
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Economic development 
Concerning the economic implications of contract farming, I proxied economic 
development by an index variable based on asset ownership. I demonstrated that 
compared to villages without a contract, contract villages have a significantly higher WI. 
Furthermore, the WI is also increasing as the group of farmers under contract becomes 
larger. A third estimation revealed that the WI is higher in villages that signed the 
contract earlier than those which did so more recently. However, after some point the 
positive effects diminish. Overall, it appears that the inclusion into the oil palm sector has 
stimulated economic development at the village level. 
 
Institutional change 
Finally, regarding institutional changes, I explored the effects of market integration into 
the oil palm sector on village institutions. Specifically, I wanted to understand how 
contract farming schemes, that introduce institutional changes towards more formalized 
and anonymous business relationships, affect generalized trust preferences at the village 
level. To date, the empirical evidence investigating the link between market integration 
and generalized trust remains scarce. This research aims to contribute to the empirical 
literature. In contrast to many previous studies that use survey questions to record trust 
preferences I elicited trust preferences through a behavioral experiment.  
Explaining the behavioral by the survey data, I demonstrated that compared to villages 
where no contract was signed, contract villages exhibit significantly higher aggregated 
trust levels. I also showed the effects of long-term market integration: the longer the 
period of time that villages are integrated in contract farming schemes the higher the 
level of aggregated generalized trust. Moreover, to better understand the dynamics within 
contract villages, I further probed generalized trust differences between contract 
participants and non-contract participants. The findings revealed that, at the individual 
level, villagers who are not participating in contract schemes have no different trust 
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preferences compared to their contracted fellows. I conjecture that this is a result of 
government investments in transportation and market infrastructure that integrated all 
villagers in contract villages into (emerging) markets. 
 
5.2 Policy recommendations 
Regarding the drivers of land-use change, especially concerning the expansion of oil 
palm, it can be concluded that a structural relocation program – the transmigration 
program – facilitated this process. This program has contributed to unequal developments 
between transmigrants and autochthonous people. For example, the Indonesian 
government provided transmigrants with agricultural land and a corresponding formal 
land title. This is a major advantage compared to the non-transmigrant population who 
has to endure an often costly and time-consuming administrative procedure to obtain 
formal land titles. In either case, land titles can improve access to credits which can be 
used to invest in/expand on current agricultural activities. Moreover, I demonstrated that 
land titles are important to attract oil palm businesses to the village which offers new 
agricultural opportunities. Therefore, the Indonesian government should promote an 
equal access to a transparent and affordable land titling process. Equally important, more 
effort is required by the regional and central government to produce accurate land maps 
which recognize existing customary land rights that still govern much of the 
autochthonous land.  
Moreover, in line with case study reports I found that community-company partnerships 
are frequently afflicted with contractual and land conflicts. To avoid new conflicts, 
policies should aim at strengthening the bargaining position of local villages vis-à-vis 
private companies. For instance, standardized and transparent bargaining protocols could 
support this.  
In addition, I showed that formal market integration in the oil palm industry through 
contract farming schemes has substantially contributed to economic development in local 
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village communities. From a policy perspective, the results show that the oil palm 
industry has indeed offered a viable strategy to spur rural economic development. At the 
same time, the increased market integration led to increased trust which, in turn, has 
often been found in the literature to be conducive to economic development. Further 
integrating villages into oil palm markets by investing in rural infrastructure could 
present a viable way to stimulate further virtuous circles between trust and economic 
development. 
Finally, within the Jambinese oil palm industry I observed a change from large-scale 
agro-companies to more independent smallholder farmers. These have emerged as 
contracts expire and input and output markets develop. To continue the government’s 
good intentions to promote economic development in rural areas, the Jambinese 
government should start to shift its focus on supporting independent smallholders. The 
same measures as already discussed – e.g. better access to a transparent and affordable 
land titling process and improving infrastructure – may work here as well. At the same 
time, opportunities of independent oil palm cultivation paired with an increasing 
population is likely to further pressure the existing land. Thus, future land-use changes 
towards oil palm are likely undertaken by independent smallholders, or more generally 
local communities. Sound policies need to be established to account for these 
developments by restricting the ongoing expansion in such a way that spares peat areas 
and tropical forests. A promising strategy to achieve this, for example, could be through 
an incentivizing mechanism, such as the Payments for Environmental Services. 
 
5.3 Limitations and future research 
This research is not without limitations. Here, I highlight the major ones and provide 
directions for future research. To start with, I make use of survey data to examine land-
use dynamics and link these to socioeconomic and policy factors. Alternative methods 
such as remote sensing generate much more accurate land-use data. However, in spatially 
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explicit models, factors that influence the observed land-use changes are oftentimes left 
unaddressed. Therefore, linking the socioeconomic data to land-use data that are 
collected through remote sensing could result in a fruitful combination of methods. 
Furthermore, I analyzed land-use dynamics with a particular focus on oil palm 
considering land that belongs to communities rather than private companies or the 
government. Still, the largest share of oil palm land is cultivated by private oil palm 
companies. In addition, many leases granted to these private actors remain undeveloped. 
Although, I demonstrated the importance of local communities, continuous scrutiny of 
the overall oil palm sector is required to comprehensively evaluate future land-use 
dynamics in Jambi and elsewhere. Future research should also seek to clearly distinguish 
between the actors involved in oil palm cultivation. 
In addition, I showed that economic development is positively associated with the 
integration in the oil palm industry through contract farming schemes. To arrive at this 
finding, I use asset ownership and a combination of the first and access to village 
facilities (i.e. health clinic and elementary school) as proxies for economic development 
at the village level. Future research could include alternative and more durable measures. 
For instance, the average income/consumption per capita could be used. As a more 
durable measure, future research could use factors that capture the investment into 
expanding agricultural activities (i.e. share of households buying land in and outside their 
village). 
In this study I also demonstrated that market integration is conducive to trust. A 
behavioral experiment was conducted to elicit trust preferences. Specifically, the 
examination of long-term effects is based on cross-sectional differences between the 
sample villages. With the given data I was unable to examine how trust has evolved over 
time in the same villages due to increased market integration. Therefore, future research 
could employ a panel dataset on generalized trust to examine long-term effects on trust. 
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Finally, this study uses a dataset that consists of three points in time, 1992, 2002 and 
2012. The first two points in time are recalled. This strategy was chosen because of 
restricted data availability for previous years. Although data were collected through 
group interviews and cross-checked with secondary data sources for plausibility, the long 
recall period raises some concerns regarding data accuracy. Additionally, the time 
intervals between the years are rather large. As a consequence, I was unable to capture 
socioeconomic and land-use effects in the short-run. Creating a panel dataset without 
making use of a recalling strategy and shortening the time intervals to allow 
investigations for the short-run, could be dealt with in follow-up studies. 
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Table A1. Land-use equations (SUR model) with rubber plantations and rubber agroforests 
as two separate explanatory variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
  Oil palm Rubber Forest 
Year 2012 (dummy) 527.67*** 15.98 -250.57 
(85.47) (109.75) (162.95) 
Land-use variables     
   Oil palmt-10 0.264*** 0.008 -0.746*** 
(0.097) (0.116) (0.176) 
   Rubber plantationt-10 0.198*** 0.344***  
(0.057) (0.082) 
   Rubber agroforestt-10 0.305*** 0.487***  
(0.101) (0.149) 
   Forestt-10 0.005  0.084 
(0.033) (0.061) 
   Fallowt-10 0.304*** -0.265*** -0.693*** 
(0.078) (0.099) (0.146) 
   Total landt 
a
 -0.046 0.266*** 0.304*** 
(0.036) (0.046) (0.071) 
Socioeconomic variables     
   Old village (dummy) -225.02 328.69 38.38 
(288.73) (371.99) (544.39) 
   Population densityt-10 (pop/ha) -240.57** -97.33 284.48 
(118.17) (151.86) (224.69) 
   Distance to roadt-10  (km) 10.92** -6.203 38.41*** 
(4.831) (6.169) (9.332) 
   Chemical fertilizert-10 (share of HH) -98.17 -233.92 -279.09 
(144.36) (184.94) (277.29) 
   Wealth indext-10 -485.95*** 471.64* -23.72 
(195.43) (250.02) (376.64) 
   Land titlet-10 (share of HH) 121.59 -86.59 87.72 
(132.49) (165.82) (255.39) 
   Dominant ethnicityt-10 (share of HH) 208.95 659.92** 537.61 
(237.81) (304.48) (446.87) 
Constant -714.32*** -1023*** 358.24 
(281.83) (374.97) (431.89) 
Village fixed effects YES YES YES 
Observations 180 180 180 
R
2
 0.87 0.99 0.91 
Breusch-Pagan independence test (chi
2
) 52.37*** 
Notes: Estimation coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses. All land-use variables are 
expressed in ha. HH, households. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * 
Significant at the 10% level. 
a
 Total land comprises the total village area, including oil palm, rubber, forest, 
and fallow land, as well as residential areas and food crops such as paddy, fruits, and vegetables. 
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Table A2. Land-use equations (SUR model) with contract dummy included 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
  Oil palm Rubber Forest 
   Year 2012 (dummy) 474.27*** -3.961 -222.09 
(84.41) (112.61) (163.57) 
Land-use variables     
   Oil palmt-10 0.162* -0.014 -0.671*** 
(0.098) (0.121) (0.183) 
   Rubbert-10 0.286*** 0.459***  
(0.073) (0.109) 
   Forestt-10 -0.006  0.091 
(0.032) (0.061) 
   Fallowt-10 0.362*** -0.196* -0.702*** 
(0.079) (0.105) (0.145) 
   Total landt 
a
 -0.051 0.255*** 0.302*** 
(0.036) (0.047) (0.071) 
Socioeconomic variables     
   Old village (dummy) -698.29*** -264.91 125.39 
(278.65) (370.34) (545.78) 
   Population densityt-10 (pop/ha) -263.75** -46.97 334.42 
(118.16) (157.99) (226.81) 
   Distance to roadt-10  (km) 14.01*** -7.335 35.39*** 
(4.847) (6.417) (9.561) 
   Chemical fertilizert-10 (share of HH) -4.261 -176.54 -321.22 
(142.25) (189.43) (277.78) 
   Wealth indext-10 -519.16*** 356.07 -57.55 
(191.23) (253.84) (375.71) 
   Land titlet-10 (share of HH) 120.53 6.365 134.57 
(131.47) (169.87) (256.57) 
   Dominant ethnicityt-10 (share of HH) -233.03 -54.96 544.11 
(232.94) (300.43) (444.76) 
   NES contract (dummy) 290.63*** -49.67 -260.52 
(100.36) (132.76) (197.29) 
 Constant 20.04 102.68 307.26 
(218.89) (290.09) (431.53) 
Village fixed effects YES YES YES 
Observations 180 180 180 
R
2
 0.87 0.99 0.91 
Breusch-Pagan independence test (chi
2
) 50.51*** 
Notes: Estimation coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses. All land-use variables are 
expressed in ha. HH, households. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * 
Significant at the 10% level. 
a
 Total land comprises the total village area, including oil palm, rubber, forest, 
and fallow land, as well as residential areas and food crops such as paddy, fruits, and vegetables. 
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Table A3. Land-use equations (SUR model) with share of independent oil palm land 
included 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
  Oil palm Rubber Forest 
   Year 2012 (dummy) 493.56*** -4.349 -240.67 
(84.57) (112.02) (162.05) 
Land-use variables     
   Oil palmt-10 0.233*** -0.011 -0.719*** 
(0.094) (0.117) (0.175) 
   Rubbert-10 0.307*** 0.461***  
(0.074) (0.108) 
   Forestt-10 0.021  0.061 
(0.033) (0.062) 
   Fallowt-10 0.353*** -0.188* -0.683*** 
(0.079) (0.105) (0.145) 
   Total landt 
a
 -0.054 0.255*** 0.305*** 
(0.036) (0.047) (0.071) 
Socioeconomic variables     
   Old village (dummy) -568.87** -300.11 -14.71 
(279.58) (368.62) (542.11) 
   Population densityt-10 (pop/ha) -227.33** -45.91 318.56 
(117.61) (155.99) (224.43) 
   Distance to roadt-10  (km) 11.07** -6.991 37.91*** 
(4.748) (6.245) (9.278) 
   Chemical fertilizert-10 (share of HH) -48.69 -168.24 -274.54 
(142.59) (188.34) (275.55) 
   Wealth indext-10 -621.53*** 386.25 53.43 
(193.95) (254.83) (377.76) 
   Land titlet-10 (share of HH) 144.23 18.38 130.46 
(131.76) (170.43) (255.29) 
   Dominant ethnicityt-10 (share of HH) -175.31 -97.72 452.08 
(236.29) (305.22) (447.52) 
   Share of independent oil palm landt-10 245.42** -100.76 -314.72 
(106.94) (136.31) (209.01) 
Constant -4.329 96.21 314.84 
(220.09) (289.46) (430.11) 
Village fixed effects YES YES YES 
Observations 180 180 180 
R
2
 0.87 0.99 0.91 
Breusch-Pagan independence test (chi
2
) 49.63*** 
Notes: Estimation coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses. All land-use variables are 
expressed in ha. HH, households. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * 
Significant at the 10% level. 
a
 Total land comprises the total village area, including oil palm, rubber, forest, 
and fallow land, as well as residential areas and food crops such as paddy, fruits, and vegetables. 
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Table A4. Bivariate probit with selection model estimates and marginal effects 
































 Average land slope  0.632***  0.632***   0.234***  
  (0.222)  (0.247)   (0.087)  
 Village land area (ha) (x1000) -0.002  -0.002 -0.027  -0.001 -0.011 
  (0.017)  (0.018) (0.025)  (0.001) (0.011) 
 Village population (x1000) -0.024  -0.018 0.397  -0.007 0.159 
  (0.253)  (0.204) (0.268)  (0.081) (0.111) 
 Electricity (dummy) -0.181  -0.173 -0.805  -0.064 -0.336* 
  (0.388)  (0.382) (0.593)  (0.141) (0.209) 
 Distance to all season road (km) 0.004  0.004 -0.009  -0.002 -0.003 
  (0.019)  (0.013) (0.017)  (0.001) (0.011) 
 Distance to oil palm mill (km) -0.005**  -0.005* -0.001  -0.002* -0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.001) (0.000) 
 Wealth index 0.204  0.177 -0.868  0.065 -0.341 
  (0.761)  (0.819) (1.133)  (0.303) (0.463) 
 Transmigrant village (dummy) 0.296  0.284 0.539  0.101 0.221 
  (0.514)  (0.426) (0.606)  (0.143) (0.178) 
 Government land titles (share of HH) 1.454***  1.439** -0.353  0.532** -0.056 
  (0.542)  (0.587) (0.549)  (0.212) (0.258) 
 Constant -0.854  -0.857 0.626    








     Log likelihood -42.19 
 
-71.79 
     Wald test of independent equations 
   
     Chi
2
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0.1 To be completed by Interviewer 






0.02 Date:  └──└──┘  / └──└──┘ / 2012   (dd/mm) 
0.03 Recency (kabupaten)     Code └──┘ 
0.04 District (kecamatan) Code └──┘ 
0.05 Village Name: 
Code └──└──└──┘ 
0.06 GPS Coordinates:   __________________N; ___________________E; ____________________Alt 





Signature of Interviewers: 
 
1.__________________________________ 






Signature Data Entry 
0.07 How many were not willing to participate?   
0.08 Why not? 
 
 
0.09 Interview Language   
0.10 Starting Time      _ _ :_ _ (hh:mm)  
Space for Remarks 
 







1. Interviewee Information/ Characteristics 
 a b c d e f g h i j k l 
Name Age Sex 
1 = male 


























1.01           ha ha 
1.02           ha ha 
1.03           ha ha 
1.04           ha ha 
1.05           ha ha 
1.06           ha ha 
1.07           ha ha 
1.08           ha ha 
1.09           ha ha 
Codes for 1.d: Title Codes for 1.h: Religion Codes for 1.i: Ethnicity Codes for 1.j: Main income source 
1 = village head/chief 
2 = chief assistant (vice) 
3 = sekretaris 
4 = Dusun Leader 
5 = RT Leader 
6 = elders’ group leader 
7 = women’s group leader 
8 = youth leader 
9 = other, specify in box 
1 = Islam 
2 = Hindu 
3 = Protestan 
4 = Katolik 
5 = Pantekosta 
6 = Buddha 
7 = Konghucu 
8 = other, specify in box 
1 = Minang 
2 = Melayu Jambi 
3 = Bugis 
4 = Jawa 
5 = Batak 
6 = Sunda 
7 = Betawi 
8 = Banjar 
 
 
9 = Melayu 
10 = Tionghoa  
11 = other, 
specify in box 
1 = Agriculture (oil palm, rubber, 
livestock, etc.) 
2 = Trade/ Commerce (wage laborer, 
working for company, etc.)  
3 = Government Official 
4 = Other, specify 





















2. History and Demographics 
2.01 When was the village founded? (year)   
2.02 
Was the village part of another village 
or was a part separated from this 
village?   
 Another village  A part was separated  Tidak 
2.03 If YES, which village? (name)  
2.04 Did the government found this village?  YES      NO 
2.05 
Is this a transmigrant village (program 
transmigrasi)? 
 YES      NO 
2.06 
If YES, how many hectares were 
provided per HH? 
Rubber/Oil Palm Farm Land Rumah 
└──┘ha └──┘ha └──┘ha 
2.07 If YES, was it rubber or oil palm.   Oil Palm  Rubber 
2.08 
How many Dusuns does this village 
have? └──┘ 
 




a b c d 
Sekarang (in 2012) 
 
in 2002  
(10 years ago) 
in 1992 
 (20 years ago) 
If other year, 
specify: 
2.10 Number of male population      
2.11 Number of female population     
2.12 If either is not known: total population size     
2.13 Number of households (HHs)     
2.14 Number of indigenous (asli) HHs; never left this 
village? 
    
2.15 Number of transmigrant HHs:  from other parts 
of Sumatra? 
    
2.16 Number of transmigrasi HHs: from Java, Sulawesi, 
etc.? 
    
 Kira-kira 100% Kira-kira 100% Kira-kira 100% Kira-kira 100% 
2.17 Number of HHs which left the village? (Migration)     
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Ethnicity and Religion  If different year, specify: 
         Sekarang (2012) In 2002 (10 years ago) In 1992 (20 years ago) 




































 Tionghoa  
other, 
specify:_________ 
2.19 How many HHs 
have these 
ethnicities? 
1. └──┘ 2. └──┘ 3. └──┘ 1. └──┘  2. └──┘ 3. └──┘  1. └──┘  2. └──┘  3. └──┘  
2.20 Indicate the 2 
major religions 


























 other,  
specify:__________ 
2.21 How many HHs 
have these 
religions? 
1. └──┘  2. └──┘  1. └──┘  2. └──┘  1. └──┘  2. └──┘  
3. Development Projects/External Funding 
a b c d 
How many of the following programs did your village benefit from? When was program 
introduced first 
(year)? 
When was the program 




3.01 Agriculture Aid/ Agricultural Extension (Training)/Microfinance    
3.02 House (re)construction/Road (re)construction    
3.03 Water and Sanitation/ Health     
3.04 Education (for example, building schools, or scholarships, etc.)    
3.05 Environmental/Forest Conservation    
3.06 Other:________________    
Codes for 3 d: Funding Institution 
1 = Head of Recency (Bupati) 
2 = Provincial Government (Jambi) 
3 = Central Government (Jakarta) 
4 = NGO (LSM) 
5 = Other, specify:_________________ 





4.1 Land Allocation 
Specify the village land area in hectare!  Sekarang (in 2012) 2002 (10y ago) 1992 (20y ago) If other year, specify:__________ 
4.101 Total village area     
4.102       Agricultural Land     
4.103            Rubber Plantation     
4.104            Jungle Rubber     
4.105            Palm Oil Plantation     
4.106            Paddy     
4.107            Other, specify:__________________     
4.108      Other Plantation Land (Gov. or Company)     
4.109      Forest     
4.110      Lahan Tidur     
4.111      Non-Agricultural Land     
4.2 Land Slopes 
Estimate how many hectares have the following slopes (in ha; 99= not applicable; all hectare same slope= all)  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
4.21 Rubber Plantation:       
4.22 Jungle Rubber:       
4.23 Palm Oil Plantation:        
4.24 Forest:       
4.25 Waste/Sleeping/Fallow:       
4.26 Other:       
4.27 Other:       
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4.4 Land Rights 
4.41 How many HHs hold Adat land rights? 
└──┘ 
4.42 How many HHs have land rights established on village consent? 
└──┘ 
4.43 How many HHs have land rights from the government? 
└──┘ 
Specify the land rights for the following sub-groups.  
 
(99= not applicable) 





How many HHs 






When obtained from 
government? 
(year) 
4.44 Indigenous Villagers asli 
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘  
4.45 Transmigrant Villagers (from other parts of Sumatra) 
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘  
4.46 Transmigrasi Villagers (from Java, Sulawesi, etc.) 
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘  
4.47 Private Company: _____________  └──┘  
4.48 Other:______________________ 
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘  
4.3 Land Ownership   
How many hectares of land are 







If different year, write here: 











Do Companies or 
Government own 
land in this village? 
COMPANY: 
If YES, how much? 
GOVERNMENT: 





















4.31 Rubber Plantation:            
4.32 Jungle Rubber:           
4.33 Palm Oil Plantation:           
4.34 Forest:           
4.35 Waste/Sleeping/Fallow           
4.36 Other:_____________           
4.37 Other:_____________           











5.1 Has logging taken place in your village  Ya  Tidak 
If YES, please specify the following. If NO, skip this section. 
 a b c d e f 
Year How much 
area? 
(in hectares) 





Main land usage 
after logging 
 (see codes) 
Land Size after logging 
(in hectares) 
5.2   
└──┘ha └──┘  Ya  Tdk 
1. 2. 1. 2. 
    
5.3  
└──┘ha └──┘  Ya  Tdk 
1. 2. 1. 2. 
    
5.4  
└──┘ha └──┘  Ya  Tdk 
1. 2. 1. 2. 
    
5.5  
└──┘ha └──┘  Ya  Tdk 
1. 2. 1. 2. 
    
5.6  
└──┘ha └──┘  Ya  Tdk 
1. 2. 1. 2. 
    
5.7  
└──┘ha └──┘  Ya  Tdk 
1. 2. 1. 2. 
    
Codes for 5c: Who did the logging Codes for 5e: Land Usage after Logging 
1= Private Company:___________________ 
2= Government 
3= Individuals 
4= Others, specify:___________________ 
1=Rubber Plantation 
2=Jungle Rubber 
3=Oil Palm Plantation 
4=Reforestation 
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6. Economic Situation 
 Estimate the number of HHs or % for which 





(10 years ago) 
In 1992 




└──┘  └──┘  └──┘ └──┘ 
6.02      Rubber Plantation 
└──┘  └──┘  └──┘  └──┘  
6.03      Jungle Rubber 
└──┘  └──┘  └──┘  └──┘  
6.04      Palm Oil 
└──┘  └──┘  └──┘  └──┘  
6.05      Paddy 
└──┘  └──┘  └──┘  └──┘  
6.06      Horticulture 
└──┘  └──┘  └──┘  └──┘  
6.07      Husbandry 
└──┘  └──┘  └──┘  └──┘  
6.08      Forestry 
└──┘ └──┘  └──┘  └──┘  
6.09 Mining 
└──┘  └──┘  └──┘  └──┘  
6.10 Retailer/Vendor 
└──┘  └──┘  └──┘  └──┘  
6.11 Trader 
└──┘  └──┘  └──┘  └──┘  
6.12 Transport/Lender (Storage, Land, Credit) 
└──┘  └──┘  └──┘  └──┘  
6.13 Public Service  
 
6.14      Civil Servant (orang) 
└──┘  └──┘  └──┘  └──┘  
6.15      Police (orang) 
└──┘  └──┘  └──┘  └──┘  
6.16      Military (TNI) (orang) 
└──┘  └──┘  └──┘  └──┘  
6.17      Health Doctor (orang) 
└──┘  └──┘  └──┘  └──┘  
6.18 Pension/Retired (orang) 
└──┘  └──┘  └──┘  └──┘  
6.19 Other (important), specify: 
└──┘  └──┘  └──┘  └──┘  
6.20 Other (important), specify: 
└──┘  └──┘  └──┘  └──┘  
7.1 Has your village received any payments/compensation for 
preserving the forest? 
 Ya  Tidak 
7.11 If YES, please indicate all payments/compensation the village received from either NGO or government  
 a b c d e f g 

















7.12        
7.13        
7.14        
7.15        
Codes for 7.1d: Conditions Codes for 7.1e: Frequency Codes for 7.1g: Infrastructure 
1 = No burning 
2 = No logging 
3 = Conservation (no use at all) 
4= Other, specify:__________ 
1= once (lumpsum) 
2= monthly basis 
3= yearly basis 
4=other, specify:__________ 
1= road (re)contruction 
2= school 
3= health clinic 
4= other, specify:__________ 






















8. Farm gate prices  
Estimate the farm gate prices 
for the specific crop/input 
 




(10 years ago) 
In 1992 
(20 years ago) 
If different year: 
8.1 Oil Palm (1 kg) 
└─────┘Rp └─────┘Rp └─────┘Rp └─────┘Rp 
8.2 Rubber (1 kg) 
└─────┘Rp └─────┘Rp └─────┘Rp └─────┘Rp 
8.3 Rice (1 kg) 
└─────┘Rp └─────┘Rp └─────┘Rp └─────┘Rp 
8.4 Fertilizer (1 kg) 
└─────┘Rp └─────┘Rp └─────┘Rp └─────┘Rp 
8.5 Wage Labour (per day) 
└─────┘Rp └─────┘Rp └─────┘Rp └─────┘Rp 
8.6 Other, specify:________ 
└─────┘Rp └─────┘Rp └─────┘Rp └─────┘Rp 
9. Village Assets 
Indicate the number of HHs or 
% possessing the following 
assets  




(10 years ago) 
in 1992 
(20 years ago) 
If different year: 
9.01 Television 
└─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ 
9.02 Satellite Dish 
└─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ 
9.03 Motor Cycle 
└─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ 
9.04 Car 
└─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ 
9.05 Truck 
└─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ 
9.06 Kulkas 
└─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ 
9.07 Air-conditioner 
└─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ 
9.08 Cellphone 
└─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ 
9.09 Computer 
└─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ 
9.10 Generator 
└─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ 
9.11 How many HHs have 
more than 10ha oil 
palm/rubber? └─────┘ └─────┘  └─────┘  └─────┘  






10. Village Facilities and Access 
How far are the following facility/services 
starting from the village head office? (in 
kilometers!) 




(10 years ago) 
in 1992 
(20 years ago) 
If different 
year: 
10.01 Vehicle Road (asphalt road) 
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘ └──┘ 
10.02 Hospital/ Clinic 
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘ └──┘ 
10.03 Primary School 
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘ └──┘ 
10.04 Junior High School 
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘ └──┘ 
10.05 Senior High School 
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘ └──┘ 
10.06 Police Station 
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘ └──┘ 
10.07 Post Office 
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘ └──┘ 
10.08 Market 
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘ └──┘ 
10.09 River 
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘ └──┘ 
10.10 Lake 
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘ └──┘ 
10.11 Well/Spring 
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘ └──┘ 
10.12 National Park 
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘ └──┘ 
10.13 Closest Neighboring Village: 
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘ └──┘ 
10.14 Closest Oil Palm Mill 
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘ └──┘ 
10.15 Closest Rubber Buying Point 
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘ └──┘ 
10.16 NGO: 
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘ └──┘ 
10.17 Electricity   Ya  Tdk  Ya  Tdk  Ya  Tdk  Ya  Tdk 












11. Water Quality 
  1992 (20 year ago) 2002 (10 years ago) Sekarang (2012) 
11.1 Estimate what the water quality 
is/was? 
 High quality 
 Medium quality 
 Low Quality 
 Worse than 1992 
 Better than 1992 
 Same 
 Worse than 2002 
 Better than 2002 
 same 
11.2 If water quality worse than in 1992, what are the reasons 
for the lower water quality? 
 Palm Oil Mills 
 Application of fertilizer/pesticides/herbicides 
 Other Industry 
 Dumping waste in river 
 Others, specify:______________ 
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12. Access to Food 
12.01 How is the availability of food in the village? 1= plenty; 2=enough; 3= not enough 
└──┘ 
12.02 How many HHs cannot afford 3 rice meals/day? 
└─────┘ 
12.03 10 years ago, was the amount of HHs unable to 
afford 3 rice meals/day… 
1= more;  2=same;  3=less 
└─────┘ 
12.04 Have you had any periods of food shortage or famines?   Ya  Tidak 
12.05 If YES, during the past 20 years, mention all the periods of food shortage or famines. If NO, skip the next section! 
 a b c 
When was it? (year) Ending Year (2012=ongoing) How many HHs did receive food aid due 
to the shock? 
12.06 
└─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ 
12.07 
└─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ 
12.08 
└─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ 
12.09 
└─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ 
12.10 
└─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ 
 




13. Technology Usage  
Estimate the number of HHs which 
use the following technologies for 
agriculture. (99=not applicable) 
a b c d 
In 2012 
 
In 2002  
(10 years ago) 
In 1992  
(20 years ago) 
If different year: 
13.1 Irrigation (lake/river) 
└─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ 
13.2 Irrigation (well/pump) 
└─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ 
13.3 Mulching 
└─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ 
13.4 Manure 
└─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ 
13.5 Chemical Fertilizer 
└─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ 
13.6 Pesticides 
└─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ 
13.7 Herbicides 
└─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ 
13.8 Hand Tractor 
└─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ └─────┘ 
13.9 Improved Seeds 
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14. Before rubber/palm oil was introduced to your village, was there a broker/investor/liaison officer of the palm oil/rubber company who talked with you 
about it? 
 a a c d e f g h 
What kind of 
broker have 



















What was the 
offer? 
(50 desa:50 firm) 





└──┘   └──┘ └──┘        desa :          firm  Ya  Tidak └──┘└──┘└──┘ 
14.2 
└──┘   └──┘ └──┘        desa :          firm  Ya  Tidak └──┘└──┘└──┘ 
14.3 
└──┘   └──┘ └──┘        desa :          firm  Ya  Tidak └──┘└──┘└──┘ 
14.4 
└──┘   └──┘ └──┘        desa :          firm  Ya  Tidak └──┘└──┘└──┘ 
Codes for 14 a: Broker Codes for 14 e: Meetings Codes for 14 h: Why? 
1 = oil palm 
2 = rubber 
3 = timber 
4 = other, specify_______________ 
1 = village meeting 
2 = village council 
3 = farmer group 
4 = women group 
5 = elder group 
6 = youth group 
7 = other, specify:_____________ 
1= heard of bad experiences in other desa/konflik 
2= did not want to give away lahan 
3= heard of good experiences in other desa 
4= higher income 
5= trust company 
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15. Cooperatives and Oil Palm Company 
15.1 





15.2 For Oil Palm Farmers: how many are in 







For Rubber Farmers: how many are in 






15.4 How many oil palm companies operate close to the village? 
└──┘ 
15.5 How many mills for oil palm are in the village area? 
└──┘ 
15.6 When was the first oil palm mill that you supply to established? (year) 
 
 What is the name of the company that this mill belongs to? (nama) 
 
 
The next sections is for contract famers only! If there are no contracts between oil palm companies and farmer 
cooperatives/villages skip to the next section!  
16.1 For the contracts between oil palm companies and farmer cooperatives/ villages specify the following: 
16.11 a b c d e f g 



















└──┘ └──┘ └──┘└──┘└──┘    Yes  No 
16.13  
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘└──┘└──┘    Yes  No 
16.14  
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘└──┘└──┘    Yes  No 
16.15  
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘└──┘└──┘    Yes  No 
Codes for 16.1 b: Company Type Codes for 16.1 d: Signing Contract 
1= Perusahaan Terbatas Perkebunan Nasional (PTPN) 
2= Private Company regulated through Badan Koordinasi 
Penanaman Modal (BKPM) 
3= Private Company 
4= Other, specify:______________________ 
99= don’t know 
1= Leaders Cooperative 
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16.2 Contractual Conditions between village/cooperative and the oil palm company (OP) 
=> If there are more than 1 contract ask for the contract which in the largest in terms of hectares and HHs! 
16.201 If there are more than 1 contract in the village, please mention the name of the company 
and year of contract. 
Nama: Tahun: 
16.202 How many HHs/farmers does this contract bind? 
└─────┘HH 
16.203 How many farmers are not working on their own land (plasma lahan)? 
└─────┘HH 
Specify the following contractual conditions: 
a b 
How much/what is in contract? 
(99=not in contract) 
What has been 
materialized/Has it been 
materialized? 
16.204 What was the offer ratio? (50%desa : 50%firm) 
└─────┘desa : └─────┘ firm └─────┘ desa : └─────┘ firm 
16.205 After how many years should the desa-land be returned to work on it 
themselves? (This is NOT about the total contract length!) └─────┘ └─────┘ 
16.206 How much loan/credit should the HHs receive? 
└─────┘ └─────┘ 
16.207        What should be the annual interest rate on loan? (in %) 
└─────┘ └─────┘ 
16.208        What should be the monthly repayment rate? (in %) 
└─────┘ └─────┘ 
16.209        After how many years should the repayment start? 
└─────┘ └─────┘ 
16.210 On average, how many seedlings should be planted per hectare? 
└─────┘ └─────┘ 
16.211 How much direct compensation payment per hectare should be paid? (in Rp) 
└─────┘ └─────┘ 
16.212 Regular application of fertilizer should be provided in the beginning? 
 Ya  Tdk  99  Ya  Tidak 
16.213 Should the company invest in schools, roads, hospitals?  Ya  Tdk  99   Ya   Tidak 
16.214 Should you be restricted to sell to the company only?  Ya  Tdk  99   Ya   Tidak 
16.215 Should the company offer employment at estate before crop matures?  Ya  Tdk  99   Ya   Tidak 
16.216 Should the Inti land be returned after cutting oil palm trees? (after ca. 25 years)  Ya  Tdk  99   Ya   Tidak 
 
16.217 If the land has not been returned, why not?   Missing land certificates 
  Land borders not known anymore 
 other, specify 
16.218 Space for remarks and comments: 
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16.4 Contractual Prices for Oil Palm 
16.41 What is the price for one kilo Fresh Fruit Bunch (FFB) of Oil Palm last week?(Rph) 
└─────┘Rph 
16.42 Will the farmers receive a different price after the crop matured? (after ca 10 years)   Yes   No 
16.43 For contract farmers, how are loans and purchases 
(fertilizer etc.) repaid to the company? 
 reduced price per kilo 
 less paid for harvest 
 paid back during the course of the contract 
 other, specify:__________ 
 
Only for INDEPENDENT FARMERS! If no independent farmers, skip this section. 
17. Individual Smallholders without contract 
17.1 How much land did the independent farmer allocate to oil palm? (in 
hectares)  └─────┘Ha 
17.2 Do they have access to high-yielding oil palm seeds?  Ya  Tidak 
17.3 If YES, where are these bought?   Oil Palm Company 
 Market;  
 Other:_______________ 





16.3 Contractual Decision-Making Regarding Oil Palm Contracts 
16.31 Who was involved in bargaining about the contract?  
->(mention all which is applicable) 
 Kepala Desa 
 KUD members 
 Government official 
 company broker/investor/liaison officer 
 all villagers 
 elderly group leader 
 youth leader 
 women’s group leader 
 
16.32 Who was involved in deciding about the contract? 
->(mention all which is applicable!) 
 Kepala Desa 
 KUD members 
 Government official 
 company broker/investor/liaison officer 
 all villagers 
 elderly group leader 
 youth leader 
 women’s group leader 
16.33 How was decision made?  Public Vote 
 Private Vote 
 Discussion (Consensus) 
 Village Head only 
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19. Bordering Agreements  
 a b c d e f 
 Mention the villages you 
have common borders with! 
Village has oil 
palm/rubber?  
 



















 Oil Palm 
 Rubber 
 Tdk 
 Lp  Ya  Tdk └──┘  Ya  Tdk 
19.2 2. 
└──┘ 
 Oil Palm 
 Rubber  
 Tdk 
 Lp  Ya  Tdk └──┘  Ya  Tdk 
19.3 3. 
└──┘ 
 Oil Palm 
 Rubber 
 Tdk 
 Lp  Ya  Tdk └──┘  Ya  Tdk 
19.4 4. 
└──┘ 
 Oil Palm 
 Rubber 
 Tdk 
 Lp  Ya  Tdk └──┘  Ya  Tdk 
19.5 5. 
└──┘ 
 Oil Palm 
 Rubber 
 Tdk 
 Lp  Ya  Tdk └──┘  Ya  Tdk 
Codes for 19 e: Type of overlapped land 
1 = Forest  
2 = Oil Palm Plantation 
3 = Rubber Plantation 
4 = Jungle Rubber 




 How many of the following worship building does the village have? 
20.11 Mosque (Masjid) 
└──┘ 
20.12 Small Mosque (Surau/Langgar) 
└──┘ 







18. Switching Crops 




More satisfied now? How many 
HHs want to 
switch back? 
18.1 Oil Palm to Rubber 
└──┘ └──┘└──┘└──┘  Ya  Tidak └──┘ 
18.2 Rubber to Oil Palm 
└──┘ └──┘└──┘└──┘  Ya  Tidak └──┘ 
18.3 Other: 
└──┘ └──┘└──┘└──┘  Ya  Tidak └──┘ 
Codes for 18: Why Switch? 
1= more profit than rubber/oil palm 
2= friend/neighbor farmer switched 
3= less work 
4= other, specify:_______________ 
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20.2 Which organizations exist in and outside your village? 
  Answer this only for the biggest (most members) institution/group: 
 a b C d e f g h i j 
How many of the following 








































20.201 Farmer Cooperative └─────┘  └──┘ └─────┘ └──┘ └──┘  └──┘ └──┘  Ya  Tdk 
20.202 Credit/ Saving Association └─────┘  └──┘ └─────┘ └──┘ └──┘  └──┘ └──┘  Ya  Tdk 
20.203 Village council/government └─────┘  └──┘ └─────┘ └──┘ └──┘  └──┘ └──┘  Ya  Tdk 
20.204 Women’s group └─────┘  └──┘ └─────┘ └──┘ └──┘  └──┘ └──┘  Ya  Tdk 
20.205 Elderly Group └─────┘  └──┘ └─────┘ └──┘ └──┘  └──┘ └──┘  Ya  Tdk 
20.206 Youth Group └─────┘  └──┘ └─────┘ └──┘ └──┘  └──┘ └──┘  Ya  Tdk 
20.207 Sport Group └─────┘  └──┘ └─────┘ └──┘ └──┘  └──┘ └──┘  Ya  Tdk 
20.208 Political Group └─────┘  └──┘ └─────┘ └──┘ └──┘  └──┘ └──┘  Ya  Tdk 
20.209 Environmental Group └─────┘  └──┘ └─────┘ └──┘ └──┘  └──┘ └──┘  Ya  Tdk 
20.210 Other, specify:____________ └─────┘  └──┘ └─────┘ └──┘ └──┘  └──┘ └──┘  Ya  Tdk 
Codes for 20.2 c: Founding 
Authority 
Codes for 20.2 e: 
Meeting Frequency 
Codes for 20.2 f: 
Membership 
Codes for 20.2 h: How is leader 
chosen? 
Codes for 20.2 h: Decision-making 
1 = Village Head 
2 = Government Official 
3 = Villagers 
4 = NGO 
5 = Other 
1 = every day 
2 = once a week 
3 = once a month 
4 = once in 6 months 
5 = once a year 




5=elected by group 
6=elected by villagers 
7=other:__________ 
1 = inheritance 
2 = appointed by village head 
3 = elected by group 
4 = elected by everyone in the 
village 
5 = other, 
specify:_______________ 
1 = by group leader 
2 = by discussion (census) 
3 = by public vote within group 
4 = by secret vote within group (i.e. ballot) 
5 = other, specify:__________ 
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20.3 Does your village participate in social meetings outside of the village? 
 If Yes, fill in the following. How often do you 
meet? (see codes) 
Purpose of Meeting 
Mention all that applies! 
 
20.31 Meeting with other villages  Ya  Tidak 
└──┘ └──┘└──┘└──┘└──┘└──┘  
20.32 Meeting with only other village head  Ya  Tidak 
└──┘ └──┘└──┘└──┘└──┘└──┘  
20.33 Religious Meeting  Ya  Tidak 
└──┘ └──┘└──┘└──┘└──┘└──┘  
20.34 Sports Meeting  Ya  Tidak 
└──┘ └──┘└──┘└──┘└──┘└──┘  
20.35 Political Meeting  Ya  Tidak 
└──┘ └──┘└──┘└──┘└──┘└──┘  
20.36 Other: specify:  Ya  Tidak 
└──┘ └──┘└──┘└──┘└──┘└──┘  
20.37 Other: specify:  Ya  Tidak 
└──┘ └──┘└──┘└──┘└──┘└──┘  
Codes 20.3: How often do you meet? Purpose of Meeting 
1= once a week 
2= once a month 
3= every three month 
4= less than every 6 months 
5= other, specify:____________ 
1= social activity 
2= exchange information on village issues 
3= solving conflict 
4= talking about conflicts 
5= discussion about village improvement 
6= writing proposals together 
7=other, specify: ________________ 
 
20.4 Credit Institutions  
20.401 Does your village have the following credit institutions? How many? % of HHs which are depending on that institutions 
20.402 Commercial banks (e.g. BNI)  
└──┘ └──┘ 
20.404 Output trader – rubber 
└──┘ └──┘ 
20.405 Output trader – Oil palm 
└──┘ └──┘ 
20.406 Plantation companies (Rubber) 
└──┘ └──┘ 
20.407 Plantation companies (Oil palm) 
└──┘ └──┘ 
20.408 Rice mills 
└──┘ └──┘ 
20.409 Input dealers 
└──┘ └──┘ 
20.410 Private money trader  
└──┘ └──┘ 
20.411 Others (specify)  
└──┘ └──┘ 





















21.1 Political Organization 
21.11 In general, how many years is a term in office for the village head? 
└──┘ 
21.12 How many different village heads has this village had in total? 
└──┘ 
21.13 How does someone become a village head? 
 (mention all which is applicable) 
 elected by all villagers 
 elected by some villagers 
 public vote 
 secret election (ballot box) 
 appointed by former village head 
 inherited 
 other, specify:___________________ 
21.14 Can the village head be sanctioned for poor performance?  Ya  Tidak 
21.15 If YES, how?  
(mention all which is applicable) 
 retreat 
 village law 
 monetary fine 
 in-kind fine 
 expelled from village 
 jail 
 other, specify:_______________________ 
21.16 Since the founding of your village, how many village heads have been sanctioned? 
└──┘ 
21.17 How many of the sanctions led to retreatment of the village head? 
└──┘ 
21.2 Village Meeting 
21.21 How often does the village head/council have a meeting with entire 
village? 
 once a month 
 once per 2 months 
 once per 4 months 
 once per year 
 seldom 
 never 
21.22 Which themes are being discussed at the meetings?  Land Conflicts 
 Family Conflicts 
 Other Conflicts, specify:_______________ 
 Ceremonies 
 Oil palm contractual agreements 
 Development projects 
 Selection of Leaders 
 Other, specify:______________ 





22. Land Expropriation/Grabbing 
22.1 Has land been expropriated or taken away in your village?  YA  Tidak  
If YES, please specify; if NO, skip to next section. 

















Which role did the 
village head play? 
(see codes) 
Did the behavior 




└──┘  └──┘ └──┘ └──┘  Ya  Tdk  Ya  Tdk └──┘  Ya  Tdk 
22.4 
└──┘  └──┘ └──┘ └──┘  Ya  Tdk  Ya  Tdk └──┘  Ya  Tdk 
22.5 
└──┘  └──┘ └──┘ └──┘  Ya  Tdk  Ya  Tdk └──┘  Ya  Tdk 
Codes for 22 a: Land Type Codes for 22 c: By Whom Codes for 22 e: Purpose Codes for 22 h: Village Head Role 
1 = Indigenous land 
2 = Transmigrasi Land 
3 = Other, 
specify:________________ 
1 = Logging company 
2 = Palm oil company 
3 = Rubber company 
4 = Provincial government 
5 = National government 
6 = Neighboring villages 
7 = Other, 
specify:________________ 
1 = Logging 
2 = Oil palm 
3 = Conflict with neighbor 
4 = Conflict with government 








23. Shocks  
Indicate for each of the past 
years when your village was 
affected by the respective 
shock 





























23.1 Too much rain 
(flooding) 
            
23.2 Late Rain 
 
            
23.3 Drought 
 
            
23.4 Human Disease 
(epidemic?) 
Specify disease in box 
            
23.5 Animal Disease 
Specify disease in box 
            
23.6 Crop Disease 
Specify disease in box 
            
23.7 Conflict   
Specify disease in box 
            
23.8 Other,   
Specify disease in box 
            
23.9 Other,   
Specify disease in box 
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 This is the end of the questionnaire. Thank you very much for 
participating!  
0.19 Ending time _ _ : _ _ (hh:mm) 
 
 
24. Perception of Village on Development + General Trust   
24.1 Overall, would you say that your village is better off, worse off or has not changed compared to 2002?  Better off 
 Worse off 
 No change 
24.2 Overall, would you say that your village is better off, worse off or has not changed compared to 1992?  Better off 
 Worse off 
 No change 
24.3 On a scale of 1-5, do you have trust in the Government in Jakarta?   1 =highly trust 
 2 =trust 
 3 =not trust but not distrust 
 4 =distrust 
 5 =strongly distrust 
24.4 On a scale of 1-5, do you have trust in the government in Jambi?  1 =highly trust 
 2 =trust 
 3 =not trust but not distrust 
 4 =distrust 
 5 =strongly distrust 
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Appendix B2: Individual survey questionnaire 
0.1 Village Name  0.3 Respondent Name  
0.2 Village ID  0.4 Repondent ID  
 
1.01 Sex 1 = male; 2 = female 
└──┘ 
1.02 Age  
└──┘ 
1.03 Years of Education  
└──┘ 
1.04 HH-Size  
└──┘ 
1.05 Parents Do you have children? 1=yes; 2=no 
└──┘ 
1.06 Religion 1=Islam; 2=Hindu; 3=Protestan; 4=Katolik; 
5=Pantekosta; 6=Buddha; 7=Konghucu; 8=Other, 
specify:__________________ └──┘ 
1.07 Main Crop 1=Palm Oil; 2=Jungle Rubber; 3=Rubber Plant; 
4=Others, specify:_________________ └──┘ 
1.08 Daily working 
hours 
How many hours do you work per day, on average? 
(in hours) └──┘ 
1.09 Working days per 
week 
How many days do you work per week? 
(in days) └──┘ 
1.10 Contract  Do you have a contract with an Oil Palm Company? 
1=yes; 2=no └──┘ 
1.11 HH assets Do you have the following assets in your 
household? 
□ Air condition                   □ Cellphone 
□ Computer                        □ Generator 
□ Motorbike                       □ Car 
□ Truck  
1.12 Insurance Do you have a health insurance? 
1=yes; 2=no └──┘ 
1.13 Information  Are you using one of the following sources for 
information and news? 
□ Newspaper                      □ News in television 
□ Internet café                   □ Radio 
□ Other, specify:____________  
 
2. Are you a member of one of the following organizations/groups?  1= YES , 2 = NO 
2.01 Farmer Cooperative └──┘ 2.06 Youth Group └──┘ 
2.02 Credit/ Saving Association └──┘ 2.07 Sport Group └──┘ 
2.03 Village council/government └──┘ 2.08 Political Group └──┘ 
2.04 Women’s group └──┘ 2.09 Environmental Group └──┘ 
2.05 Elderly Group └──┘ 2.1 Other, specify:____________ └──┘ 
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4.1 Do people talk about the other people in the village, so that if a person does something from, the 
neighborhood will know about it?    1=yes; 2=no └──┘ 
4.2 Generally speaking, which of the following people do you feel you could trust not to cheat 
you? (Please mention everything that applies!) 
1= members of one’s religion          3=foreigners 
2=citizens of one’s country              4=if subject does not trust any of the above groups └──┘└──┘└──┘ 
4.3 In general, do you think… 1 = most people can be trusted; or 2 = I have to be careful with people? 
└──┘ 
4.4 In general, do you think… 1 = people would try to take advantage of you; or 2 = people are fair? 
└──┘ 
4.5 Have you ever been betrayed with money by a …? 
□ stranger           □ close one           □ never  
4.6 In general, how much trust do you have in the local police to help you if you need them?  
1=trust                                                3=no trust, no distrust                         5=distrust 
2=little trust                                       4=little distrust                            └──┘ 
4.7 Overall, how much trust do you have in the Government of Jakarta? 
1=trust                                                3=no trust, no distrust                         5=distrust 
2=little trust                                       4=little distrust └──┘ 
4.8 Overall, how much trust do you have in the Government of Jambi? 
1=trust                                                3=no trust, no distrust                         5=distrust 
2=little trust                                       4=little distrust                 └──┘ 
This is the end of the survey. Please ask the respondent for the mobile phone number and the 
current amount of Pulsa he has on his phone, and we will transfer the money. 
Current Amount of Pulsa_____________________________________
3. Please specify the following for the other participants from the game. 
 If Relation =4, skip the rest 
a b c 
 Name 
(The names 




















gift/loan last 3 
months? 
1=YES; 2=NO 
3.1   
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘ └──┘ 
3.2   
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘ └──┘ 
3.3   
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘ └──┘ 
3.4   
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘ └──┘ 
3.5   
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘ └──┘ 
3.6   
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘ └──┘ 
3.7   
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘ └──┘ 
3.8   
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘ └──┘ 
3.9   
└──┘ └──┘ └──┘ └──┘ 
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Appendix C: Script for trust experiment 
 
Welcome to this game. In this game you can earn some money. This money will be given 
out in the end of the game in form of credit for your mobile phone. The amount of credit 
that you may earn does not depend on luck. Rather it depends on your decision and the 
decision of another participant. 
The people that are here were randomly chosen to be part of this game. In this game there 
are two roles: the sender and the receiver. As a sender you will be paired with a second 
participant out of this group, a receiver. But none of you will know with whom you will 
be paired. 
In the beginning of the game each sender and receiver will receive monopoly money 
which is worth 20,000 Rupiah.  
Sender - Instructions 
The sender is invited to make a decision: how much to send to the receiver and how she 
wants to keep for herself. This can be any amount of her 20,000 monopoly money. The 
amount sent to the receiver will be tripled. The receiver gets the tripled amount and 
makes a decision. How much to send back to the sender and how much to keep for 
herself.  
As a sender, your final earning is the amount you kept plus the amount the receiver sent 
back to you.  
Receiver – Instructions 
Remember, as a receiver you also have 20,000 monopoly money in the beginning. In 
addition you will get an envelope with money from a sender. But you don’t know who 
the sender is. You can make a decision: how much you want to return to the sender. And 
how much you want to keep for yourself.  
As a receiver, the final earning is the amount you keep for yourself.  
Appendix C   152 
Examples: 
1. The sender decides to send everything, 20,000 and keeps nothing. The receiver, 
who has 20,000 will now get an additional 60,000; she is deliberate in choosing 
how much she wants to return. Imagine she sends back 40,000. The final earning 
of both, sender and receiver, will be 40,000.  
2. The sender decides to send everything, 20,000, and keeps nothing. The receiver, 
who has 20,000 will now get an additional 60,000; she is deliberate in choosing 
how much she wants to return. Imagine she sends back 20,000. The final earning 
of the sender will be 20,000. Whereas the final earning of the receiver, will be 
60,000.  
3. The sender decides to send nothing and keep the 20,000 for herself; the receiver 
will receive nothing and decides to send back nothing either. In the end of the 
game both will get 20,000. 
